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ABSTRACT 
Terrorist networks have evolved from locally-oriented political organizations into 
complex, adaptive, loosely structured groups that span international borders to promote 
larger regional and global goals through violent asymmetric attacks dependant on 
compartmentalization and deception.  This adaptive terrorist organizational structure and 
the lack of U.S. IC and LE intelligence sharing were to blame for the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001.  Because terrorist groups are moving toward a less predictable, but 
more diverse, dynamic, and fluid structure, effective combativeness of terrorism will 
require fighting terrorist networks with a network capable of collecting and sharing 
credible, reliable and corroborative information on an unprecedented scale, transcending 
geographic, agency, and political boundaries. 
This thesis demonstrates how the utilization of a network-theory approach for 
sharing information will allow the U.S. intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement 
(LE) to work and act in concert by building better relationships through organizational 
innovations, interagency networking, eliminating compartmentalization, and 
implementation of correct policy options.  The utilization of network theory, it will be 
argued, can provide insight into the system dynamics of the U.S. IC because it will allow 
a systematic, comparative analysis of the system representation and fundamental 
problems associated with information sharing.  A regional to national networked 
intelligence-sharing structure termed the Dedicated National Intelligence Network 
(DNIN) is discussed.  This includes geographic areas, regional centers, personnel, 
computer IT networks, and policy options, as well as intelligence sharing from a 
network-centric approach.  The discussion also includes a dedicated, national-scale 
intelligence-collection system, the necessary computer system architecture, intelligence 
analysis in a network perspective, the psychology of sharing, and the strategy for 
implementing DNIN.  The problems associated with past intelligence failures can be 
overcome with such a system because it will allow completion of three primary tasks: (1) 
examination of the strength of criminal/terrorist connections, (2) identification of 
 vi
suspects and mapping of networks, and (3) prediction of future behavior and better 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis discusses a networked-based approach to intelligence sharing that is 
national in scope.  This networked approach has been named DNIN (Dedicated National 
Intelligence Network).  Though intelligence communities and law enforcement agencies 
utilize a hierarchal organization, the networked process described herein outlines an 
approach for intelligence collectors, analysts, and consumers to operate cohesively 
against increasingly complex enemies.  Providing more intelligence to customers is 
simply not the answer, but having the capacity to analyze more intelligence, to scrub it as 
it goes up the chain, and share it with those who need it most is imperative and is the 
subject of this thesis.   
The Department of Homeland Security began work in 2004 on a Joint Regional 
Information Exchange System (JRIES) to exchange information with other participants.  
Although JRIES does increase connectivity and provides more efficient responses to 
deter, detect, prevent, or respond to terrorist attacks, it has the shortcoming that it 
operates at the Sensitive-but-Unclassified level for most of the participants excepting 
state offices where it operates at a Secret level.  Other programs such as RISS, LEO, and 
state fusion centers address primarily criminal related activities, but also have limited 
sharing abilities due to database incompatibility, IT platform issues, and other problems.  
However, through the process of what is now termed “radicalization” in which 
individuals move from having fundamentalist views to becoming a terrorist threat, as 
well as other issues, all three of these programs would be necessary to effectively deal 
with intelligence that affects homeland security on a national scale.  The DNIN was 
designed for this specific purpose, to provide the priority capabilities necessary on a 
national scope and to work at any level of secrecy from a need-to-share basis, as well as 
provide the communications, collaboration/analysis, and information desired.  The DNIN 
will also achieve the objectives desired by DHS that include focusing more power on 
combating terrorism by capitalizing on the collection capabilities of 800,000 law 
enforcement personnel who will collect most of the data.  This will leverage federal, 
state, local, rural, and tribal anti-terrorism assets, and perform secure, real-time 
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collaboration and information sharing at not only local, state and regional levels, but on a 
national level and with the 16 member agencies of the intelligence community.  DNIN 
can maximize analysis and intelligence sharing capabilities across all intelligence 
components, whether working with border surveillance and reconnaissance intelligence 
and capabilities, terrorist intelligence, radicalization, or criminal activity.  A major 
problem within the intelligence network that DNIN will also overcome is information 
overload. 
Information overload encourages intelligence failures; the DNIN networked 
process is designed to overcome this problem.  A network approach will allow pattern 
recognition at a heightened level.  Although it will not change the need for qualified and 
experienced analysts and other intelligence and LE personnel, it will assist them in 
detecting the “needle in the stack,” i.e., let us move the stack and find the needle and not 
look through all the hay.  Past intelligence failures have been the result of interagency 
non-cooperation, differing agency focus, and other factors.  Application of a networked 
approach can help solve these problems by organizational innovations, interagency 
networking, eliminating compartmentalization, and implementation of correct policy 
options.  The process of getting to the answer, i.e., actionable intelligence, especially on 
complex intelligence problems against a networked adversary, is fundamentally a social 
one.  A network-centric approach such as that discussed herein will address these 
problems by emphasizing the sharing of information and expertise among stakeholders.  
If there is one key to a successful team outcome it would be efficient collaboration built 
on mutual trust, which can best be accomplished in a networked, multidisciplinary 
approach to intelligence sharing.  Mutual trust is described well by transactive memory 
theory (detailed in Chapter VII).  A networked, multidisciplinary approach will change 
agency cultures that keep the sum of the parts separated, causing animosity and lack of 
cooperation as well as adapting a need-to-share rather than a need-to-know policy.  
Factually, the application of network theory to agency wide structure and to intelligence 
collection and sharing will reduce much of the impedance in the sharing process.  This 
will be accomplished through flattening of organizations, developing and using social 
network maps to determine key knowledge connectors and information transfer 
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bottlenecks (the latter is similar to transactive memory systems), developing better filters 
for information and better ways of organizing, indexing, sorting, and archiving it for later 
retrieval to differentiate between useful and useless information, and expanding risk and 
knowledge management and transfer processes (these issues are more thoroughly 
discussed in Chapters V, VI, and VII).   
Although the popular focus is on collection and the DNIN described focuses on 
collecting a wealth of information, it also focuses on analysis.  Most of the major failures 
in intelligence are due to inadequate or nonexistent analysis, and most of the rest are due 
to a failure to act on that analysis, which is political rather than collection or analysis 
oriented.  Intelligence is about reducing uncertainty by obtaining information that the 
opponent in a conflict wishes to deny you; a network-centric capacity for obtaining that 
information can overcome this.  Uncertainty is reduced because, in a real sense, the 
DNIN system arms the analyst with an arsenal of databases, resources, checklists, and 
variables that can be used to validate inferences, probabilities, and hypotheses.  Once data 
are consolidated, a number of analytical techniques can be performed against the data to 
develop a model.  At the initial stage an analyst seeks to identify potential targets, 
relationships, associates, time lines, and other information.  Each piece of information is 
carefully analyzed.  To avoid incorrect assumptions at this phase, the results should be 
reevaluated against the “big picture” in order to validate them, which is particularly 
necessary since terrorist groups are known to have sleeper cells.  After comparing against 
the “big picture,” spatial and temporal analysis and other quantitative techniques can be 
applied to further refine the product.  During analysis one the focus is not solely on one-
on-one relationships so that other associations are not missed.  Consequently, analysts 
cannot rely upon only one method to verify information, which is why a network-centric 
approach will deliver intelligence that is credible, reliable, and corroborative (see Chapter 
V).  While most methods of intelligence and non-intelligence research are identical, there 
is one important distinction.  When accurate information is not available through 
traditional and less expensive means, a wide range of specialized techniques and methods 
unique to the intelligence field can be called into play.  DNIN is yet another tool to use 
with existing techniques that can be applied to this problem.   
 xx
The goal of DNIN is to achieve a network-centric approach to intelligence 
analysis and sharing and to construct a shared picture of the target(s) from which all 
participants can extract the elements they need to perform their job.  This is not a linear 
process, it is a highly complex networked process, a social process in which all 
participants are focused on the objective — to accurately analyze and effectively share 
intelligence information.  This collaborative and networked team approach has the 
potential for addressing two significant problems that intelligence analysts, law 
enforcement, and the intelligence community faces today: 
• Information Overload — An overwhelming amount of information is 
available.  The DNIN approach will expand the analyst team to include 
knowledgeable personnel from the collector, processor, and customer groups 
that can each take a portion of information glut to filter irrelevant material 
and, thus, constrain information to smaller and smaller amounts (the 
information is scrubbed) as it moves from local, regional, and up to the 
national level (an example of this is transactive memory systems/theory 
described in Chapter VII). 
• Customer Demand for Enhanced Detail — Customers are demanding more 
detail about the target(s) since they have become more complex and our 
capabilities to deal with them have also become more robust.  A networked 
approach that delivers intelligence of all kinds, from mapping and imaging, 
OSINT, building floor plans, information from databases that may contain 
persons of interest, critical infrastructure, GIS, and other types, can give that 
necessary detail since the indexing, sorting, and organizing of data will be 
complimentary and will allow “drill-down” capabilities within the network 
and, from any level. 
All significant intelligence targets are complex systems in that they are nonlinear, 
dynamic, and evolving.  To counter opposing networks, Al Qaeda as an example, the 
intelligence network must be highly collaborative, but large intelligence organizations 
such as those in the U.S. intelligence community (U.S. IC) provide disincentives to 
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collaboration.  These include, but are not limited to, individual fear of lack of 
opportunities to climb the promotion ladder, loss of job, and disapproval of one’s 
superiors, which serve as strong psychological fear barriers to go against the grain and to 
share information.  Additionally, competition between employees for both pay and 
promotion for a fixed number of career-level slots creates an atmosphere of non-sharing 
as does competition and intelligence returns between agencies for justification of 
budgeted funds.  The management of knowledge should be the primary focus.  To do this 
efficiently will require placing one agency or group such as Department of Homeland 
Security Intelligence and Analysis (DHS IA) into a central role of being the hub for both 
domestic and foreign intelligence in regard to Homeland Security.  The Department of 
Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (DHS IAIP) 
Directorate was established after 9/11 to enhance domestic intelligence collection and 
sharing and other duties.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established IAIP (which 
has since been split into IA and IP), by Congressional Mandate to provide this integration 
and to merge into one organization the capability to identify and assess future terrorist 
threats and to make recommendations as necessary.  Because the IAIP has the 
Congressional Mandate to fulfill this role, this thesis utilizes the DHS IA as the assumed 
“Central Hub” for the DNIN.  The creation of DNIN will allow DHS to accomplish the 
six intelligence goals advocated by the IAs Chief Intelligence Officer Charles Allen, 
which are: (1) Requirements, Collection, and Dissemination; (2) Analysis and Warning; 
(3) Information Sharing & Knowledge Management; (4) Mitigation, Prevention, and 
Readiness; (5) Mission Advocacy; and (6) Culture and Business Process. 
Because of the complexity of the intelligence needs of DHS IA, the IC, law-
enforcement groups, and other agencies, this thesis discusses intelligence sharing from a 
network-centric approach — the development of regional to national-scale intelligence 
collection centers, the necessary computer system architecture, intelligence analysis in a 
network perspective, the psychology of sharing, and the strategy for implementing DNIN.  
Problems with information technology (IT) such as those with the FBI “Carnivore” 
system can be overcome because the technology is now available to make such a system 
a success.  The incorporation of current fusion centers is briefly discussed; it will require 
 xxii
cooperation, and could be a complex undertaking in regards to budget, coordination, 
standards, training, and restoration of the network from old to new, but it can be 
accomplished.  The computer IT architecture of the DNIN will overcome the failure of 
the former system, and has been designed, but is beyond the scope of this thesis (contact 
the author for additional information).   
This thesis also discusses the six keys of analysis of information within a 
networked context (see Chapter V) and the relational databases and multi-dimensionality 
this entails.  Incorporation of the six keys, combined with immediate analyst access to the 
databases gives the analyst a very powerful tool, especially on a preventive basis due to 
timely analysis of information.  Associated with this process are workload sharing, 
expediting analysis, pooled intelligence, and shaping forces of networks.  The DNIN 
approach will tend toward agility by focusing on organizational analysis through 
examining size and capabilities, assessing effectiveness and structure, and analyzing the 
relationships among groups in the organizational structure.  Further, to effectively 
achieve intelligence sharing we need to ensure a national/international strategic approach 
in addition to improving the present poor cooperation between the intelligence 
community and law enforcement groups (see Chapters VI and VII).  This will require 
development of a mutual operations doctrine analogous to that of the military, 
appointment of a single intelligence authority to own DNIN, development of good 
personnel policies, civil liberties, and other issues.   
The strategy for implementing DNIN is addressed in regard to its problems and 
advantages and its strengths and weaknesses.  It is estimated that utilization of the DNIN 
approach will allow collection of data a hundred fold greater than that now collected by 
the IC.  DNIN will improve the quality of intelligence analysis, promote integration of 
intelligence from all sources and particularly DHS, provide the necessary national 
architecture for a dedicated intelligence network, ensure that homeland security and 
intelligence is melded with the IC, and hopefully solidify DHS relations with not only 
other IC members, but congress as well.  Finally, the operational network principles of 
DNIN will allow for proper analysis and dissemination of this information, which could  
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make significant progress in intelligence and information sharing within the U.S. and 
reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks as well as threats from domestic groups and 



































                                                
I. NETWORKING AND INTELLIGENCE 
Since the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 
(9/11), intelligence sharing between the intelligence community (IC) and law 
enforcement (LE) has clearly become a critical issue.  Director of National Intelligence 
John D. Negroponte defended his first year on the job by citing institutional innovations 
that have been achieved, but many disagree.1 Advancing technology utilizes capabilities 
that have continually gained distance from the target from which the data is being 
collected.  This technological shift, which occurred decades ago, has created serious 
intelligence collection problems with the agile adversary the U.S. is now facing — an 
adversary who has no mobile armies or fixed infrastructure from which war is waged.  
The new war and threat are asymmetric in nature and thus are forcing change on the way 
we deal with intelligence collection.  A large component of intelligence collection since 
9/11 has become sharing among the intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement 
(LE) in an effort to thwart the new adversary.  A congressional critic noted: “The CIA 
continues to excessively compartment sensitive reporting and fails to share important 
information about reporting and sources with IC analysts who have a need to know.”2 
The lack of sharing intelligence product, rather than the complex task of collection, has 
plagued counter-terrorist efforts against Al Qaeda and other transnational and domestic 
terrorist groups.  This problem within the continental United States (CONUS) has 
become greatly exaggerated since most of the intelligence is gathered by LE and the U.S. 
does not have a domestic intelligence (DI) agency.  This is especially true in regard to 
Homeland Security in which sharing collected intelligence between the CIA, FBI, and LE 
agencies (LEAs) is problematic.  Several factors have contributed to the failure to share 
product: (1) a reduction of funding for intelligence in general; (2) the shift toward 
TECHINT; (3) an attitude of need-to-know versus need-to-share; (4) the problem of 
compartmentalization of human intelligence (HUMINT); (5) policies that have impeded 
information sharing; and (6) agency culture and other factors.   
 
1 Walter Pincus, "Negroponte Cites 'Innovations' In Integrating Intelligence," WashingtonPost.com,  
April 20, 2006; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/20/AR2006042001785.html. [cited May 1, 2006]. 
2 John LeBoutillier, "Congress Let Us Down Too," NewsMax, September 24, 2001; available from 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/9/24/83522.shtml. [cited January 15, 2006]. 
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Perhaps the most recent examples that exemplify this problem are those 
associated with the 9/11 attacks.  From the beginning the FBI was the agency most 
singled out for intelligence failures that led to the attacks.  Pre-9/11, the FBI had 
attempted reforms to strengthen its terrorist-intelligence abilities.  Many believed the 
reforms failed because of the occurrence of 9/11; Louis Freeh, FBI director from 1993 to 
2001, rejected these criticisms saying the FBI, despite resource constraints, did all it 
could to prevent terrorism, indicating terrorism was not a national issue at the time — the 
issue of terrorism was absent from the 2000 presidential campaign, despite Al Qaeda’s 
attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, in Port Aden, Yemen.  Looking back on 
9/11, various agencies had dropped the ball.  Janet Reno said, “The FBI didn’t know what 
it had.  The right hand didn’t know what the left hand was doing.”3  
A classic example of 9/11 intelligence failure is the CIA response.  The U.S. IC 
was close to thwarting the Al Qaeda plot.  They had tracked Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf 
al-Hazmi to the Malaysia meeting in Kuala Lumpur and knew that one of the men had a 
visa that would allow U.S. entry.  The intent was to follow these men after the meeting.  
However, the alert to agents in Bangkok arrived too late and the trail was lost.  Directly 
after the attack on the USS Cole the FBI attempted to locate those responsible.  One, 
apparently by the name of Khallad, jumped to the top of the list because it was believed 
that Khallad and Midhar may be the same person.  The FBI began working with the CIA.  
The investigation revealed that Khallad and Midhar were not only different people, but 
they were a higher up Al Qaeda official and foot soldier, respectively.  The most blatant 
criticism was that the two agencies did not meld separate pieces of intelligence.  This lack 
of intelligence sharing became a critical issue; follow-through issues also became a 
problem.  Investigating cables from the Malaysia meeting, the FBI decided something 
“bad” would happen, but while the FBI focused on Malaysia, the CIA’s attention was on 
overseas events.4 The FBI focus was to build a criminal case — the “who” — while the 
CIA used a more broadly focused intelligence purpose — the “where.”  The conundrum 
between culture and sharing is therefore manifest.  If the CTC/CIA and FBI had been 
working with a sharing information model, the outcomes would have been undoubtedly 
 
3 The 9/11 Commission Report  (New York: W.W.  Norton & Company, 2004). 
4 Ibid. 
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different.  The big question is how can we increase intelligence sharing and distribute that 
intelligence to those who need it most? The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is against 
transnational terrorist networks.  This thesis therefore examines the need for devising 
counter-terrorism intelligence-sharing strategies within a network context that will allow 
for more efficient and rapid sharing. 
 
A. TWO CASE STUDIES 
Two case studies will be addressed in this thesis to illustrate (1) lack of 
information sharing and (2) the strengths and principles of networking.  Each will be 
briefly described (a more complete accounting and how things may have been different 
using a networked intelligence-sharing approach is given in Chapter II).   
The first case study is Al Qaeda — for two and a half weeks before the 9/11 
attacks, the U.S. government knew the names of two hijackers (Khalid al-Midhar and 
Nawaf al-Hazmi), that they were Al Qaeda, and that they were already in the United 
States.  More importantly, acting on legal counsel, senior FBI officials refused to involve 
its criminal investigators alongside intelligence agents to track down and arrest these 
terrorists because of possible legal issues.  The following partial email message is one of 
many that were exchanged between FBI agents regarding this issue.  In a reply message, 
a New York agent protested the ban against using law enforcement resources for 
intelligence investigations in what became prophesy, “Some day someone will die ― and 
wall or not ― the public will not understand why we were not more effective and 
throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let’s hope the lawyers who gave 
the advice will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us 
now, UBL (Usama Bin Laden), is getting the most ‘protection.’”5
The second case study is the “Malaysia Meeting” in Kuala Lumpur that occurred 
January 2000.  The key intelligence questions were not asked: What was the significance 
of the Malaysia meeting? Who attended? Where are they now? Why are they here? Who 
are they meeting? The Malaysia meeting included the two leading Al Qaeda 9/11 cell 
members (mentioned in the first case study) who infiltrated into the U.S. These two 
 
5Stewart Baker, "Wall Nuts: The Wall between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Is Killing Us," 
Slate.com, 2003. [cited May 1, 2006]. 
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individuals were listed in the white pages under their true names.6  If the full significance 
of the Malaysia meeting had been recognized and shared it is possible that 9/11 may have 
been disrupted.  The local service that conducted the surveillance restricted itself to video 
and not audio surveillance.  Total coverage would have been necessary to assess the full 
significance of the meeting.  The four-day meeting of the terrorists and CIA’s failure to 
ensure the meeting was the target of total surveillance represent arguably the most 
egregious intelligence failure of this decade, illustrating the consequences of the lack of 
sharing intelligence.  Further, asking the correct questions would have led to a network 
structure of the terrorists that possibly could have prevented their catastrophic actions. 
How can the principles of network theory and applications be applied to 
intelligence-sharing policies and practices? How would this improve delivery of relevant, 
timely and accurate information among the IC and law enforcement? 
U.S. intelligence agencies are bureaucratic, not unlike major corporations.7  To 
survive in the new technology age, corporations have been forced to adopt a flattened 
management structure to remain competitive8 while U.S. intelligence agencies have 
changed little.  For example, beginning in the late 1990s, as a result of the economic 
downturn in the industry, aerospace companies found themselves embroiled in a crisis 
and responded creatively by using organizational changes and a multitude of strategies.  
With looming budget cuts and restrictions, these companies adapted their organizations to 
survival mode.  “Three types of competitive organizational structures have emerged from 
the forces shaping the industry.  Companies will compete as technology leaders, cost 
leaders or adaptable niche leaders.  There is a necessity to downsize and the strongest 
technology and cost leaders are going to do it through innovation, acquisition and 
abandonment.”9 To achieve the greatest success in both gathering and sharing 
intelligence information, there is an urgent requirement to review current thinking and 
 
6 Gerard L. Posner, Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11 (New York: The Random House 
Publishing Group, 2003), 48. 
7 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 137. 
8 Kenneth C. Loudon and Jane T. Loudon, Essentials of Management Information Systems: Managing 
the Digital Firm, Sixth ed.  (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005). 
9W.V. Dee, "Defense Contractors Must Change to Survive in the 1990s," Aviation Week & Space 
Technology 131, no. 3 (1997). 
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outdated hierarchal interests with consolidation and cooperation between IC agencies and 
a new approach toward intelligence sharing.  This thesis will examine the problem from 
both a qualitative and quantitative perspective.  An example of the qualitative component 
would be describing the most suitable method of sharing HUMINT or other intelligence 
collection information. 
The quantitative perspective will be development of a network-based sharing 
model.  The model can be only quantitatively described through incorporation of network 
theory.  As an example, if private sector corporations have been forced into a flattened 
management structure utilizing network theories to compete because of new technologies 
and foster new cooperation among management to reduce resource cost and remain 
effective and competitive, what does this portend for the U.S. IC?  This thesis makes the 
case for changing policies to intensify intelligence collection, sharing, and the network or 
organizational theories and methodology necessary to achieve it. 
Competitive intelligence is information that is critical to the survival, growth, and 
development of companies.  Intelligence relating to national security is even more 
critical, especially given the level of threat from Chem-Bio and WMD attack.  Al Qaeda 
has been attempting to obtain WMDs since 1993.  The U.S. IC learned of these attempts 
from a “walk-in” at a U.S. Embassy in a foreign country. 
The Robb-Silberman Report found there was no evidence that Iraq had 
capabilities of WMDs.10  Further, intelligence was very fragmented regarding WMDs 
that Iraq supposedly possessed as well as the capabilities to develop new 
WMDprograms.11  The lack of HUMINT, subsequently admitted to by former CIA 
Director Tenet, meant that the CIA was vulnerable to fabricators exemplified in the 
notorious “Curveball” case.12  Through the summer of 2001 the CIA repeatedly warned 
the White House of attacks because the CIA knew that an attack was imminent in 2001, 
 
10 Charles S. Robb and Laurence H. Silberman, "The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Washington, D.C.: Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, 2005), 50. 
11 Anthony Glees and Philip H.J. Davies, Butler's Dilemma (2004); available from 
http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/digipub. [cited January 29, 2006]. 
12 Ibid. 
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but had no tactical intelligence to counter the threat.13 If this information had been fused 
with information collected by the FBI and other agencies and shared it is likely that 9/11 
may not have occurred.  One can conclude that the development of HUMINT and other 
intelligence-sharing programs could prevent costly intelligence failures in the future and 
thwart such attacks as 9/11.   
The necessity of credible, reliable, and corroborative intelligence was succinctly 
stressed in the UK (United Kingdom) working paper, “The failure to find WMDs 
(weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq six months after Saddam was toppled was a failure 
of intelligence, not of Government.”14  Lack of HUMINT and other forms of intelligence 
has plagued collection operations against terrorist groups including Al Qaeda because the 
CIA did not have any penetrations into the Al Qaeda leadership.  Admittedly, Al Qaeda is 
a hard target as it is based on kinship and primordial affiliations, and recruitment is 
carefully conducted although a number of U.S. citizens managed to join Al Qaeda and 
meet with bin Laden as did a number of U.S. journalists.15a, b  Advances in technology 
necessitate a change in information sharing and organizational structure if the United 
States IC is to maintain its leadership and advantage edge and have the capability to 
defeat an asymmetric enemy that long ago accomplished these changes.  Because current 
technology and continued enhancement of capabilities in this area are rapidly advancing 
so too must the methods used to share collected intelligence, or the technological 
advantage decreases.  The U.S. Government must develop and institutionalize sharing 
methods to keep pace with our technological advantage as well as the terrorists’ 
technological advantage.  Application of network theory and principles into intelligence-
sharing practices can accomplish this goal. 
 
B. NETWORK THEORY APPROACH 
The network-theory approach to counter-terrorism began in the late 1990s.  John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, widely recognized experts in terrorist networks, argue that 
 
13 Posner, Why America Slept. 
14 Ibid. 
15Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown 
with the KGB (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2003). 
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it will take “strong networks to fight networks” and further state that, “The strongest 
networks will be those in which the organizational design is sustained by a winning story 
and a well-defined doctrine, and in personal and social ties at the base.  Each level, and 
the overall design, may benefit from redundancy and diversity.  Each level’s 
characteristics are likely to affect those of the other level.”16
1. Defining a Network 
In the context of this thesis, networks, whether social or technical, are defined as 
computer based and are stable sets of relationships (links) between two or more entities 
(nodes) that can be agencies, groups, or individuals.  Network theory is based on the 
premise that networks grow and evolve.  Links are not randomly added but attach to the 
nodes by the principle of preferential attachment.  An excellent analogy is terrorist cells.  
Within the U.S. IC there are both a technical network and a social network, which 
follows the principles of network theory.  A social network is a social structure between 
individuals and organizations; an analysis of that network is often termed network theory.  
Such networks operate on many levels and play a critical role in determining the way 
problems are solved, agencies are run, and the degree to which an individual(s) succeeds 
in achieving goals, and perhaps more importantly, how information is shared.  The shape 
of a network will determine its usefulness.  Perhaps the single most important mistake 
assumed about networks, especially terrorist networks, is that they are organized in a 
hierarchal manner.  In his study of organized criminal activity, Klerks argues that we 
should not assume hierarchal organization just because most law-enforcement agencies 
and other groups are organized in this manner.17
Terrorist networks have evolved from locally oriented political organizations that 
engage in acts of terror into complex, adaptive systems of loosely structured 
organizations that work across national borders to promote larger regional and global 
ambitions primarily through violent and surprise attacks that depend on 
compartmentalization and deception.18
 
16 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Advent of Netwar (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 
1996), 119. 
17 P. Klerks, "The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking or a 
Relevant Doctrine for Investigators? Recent Developments in the Netherlands," Connections 24, no. 3 
(2001). 
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In the 1970s and well into the 1980s, social scientists working from a social-
network analysis perspective explored the informal functioning of social networks.  They 
developed theories and new understanding about human behavior in complex societies.  
Research during this period showed that informal network organization offered particular 
kinds of advantages over more formalized, hierarchal, functionally organized groups. 
Milgram coined the phrase, “the strength of weak ties.”19  Individuals (or 
organizations) with many diverse ties adapt to changing circumstances, are more 
resilient, and have a greater coping capacity than those with fewer but “stronger” ties; 
they are also more agile.  An excellent example of this is the flexibility of local agencies 
and first responders who are proactive and respond more quickly than the U.S. Federal 
Government.  For example, Al Qaeda terrorist cells and those from other terrorist 
organizations discovered the principle that business organizations (and social network 
theorists) have long known.  Network-like structures of cooperating organizations can 
augment manpower, increase available information and expertise, improve access to 
critical resources, shorten critical paths to goals, and create useful redundancies to ensure 
mission success.  While first responders and Al Qaeda are very agile due to the 
networked process, the IC due to bureaucracy is not agile and therefore poorly equipped 
to deal with a networked adversary.  However, the necessary features to make an IC 
agency agile should become manifest when network theory is applied to intelligence 
sharing. 
Social network theory assists in understanding Al Qaeda’s success, which is 
partially due to its loosely knit networked organization.  This model presupposes that the 
system of reciprocities, rewards, and advantages are clearly understood and accepted and 
that these outweigh costs and risks.  Networks and network theory can be a very powerful 
organizational and operational tool.  For example, Al Qaeda’s relationship with the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan enabled it to take over and maintain MAK’s camps.  
Al Qaeda also trained recruits in Sudan, Yemen, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, the 
 
18 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A 
Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2002). 
19 Stanley Milgram, "The Small World Problem," Psychology Today (1967).  
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Philippines, and Indonesia.  Estimates of the number of graduates of these camps range 
from 25,000 to 50,000 non-Afghan nationals.20
The Al Qaeda network also developed cooperative relationships with Hezbollah, 
who lent bomb experts to assist in technical training of Al Qaeda members.  The 
technical excellence of training provided by Al Qaeda has drawn top quality students to 
its camps who later return to their local Islamist organizations deeply indoctrinated with 
the Al Qaeda message of the importance of working against the West and also that 
further increased the strength, flexibility, and effectiveness of their network structure.  
The “Hamburg Cell” is a paradigm case. 
Gunaratna, an expert on Al Qaeda’s organization and history, notes that the 
Islamic Group of Egypt has “merged with Al Qaeda at strategic, operational and tactical 
levels and functions almost as one organization — Al Qaeda pursues its objectives 
through a network of cells, associate terrorist and guerilla groups, and other affiliated 
organizations and shares expertise, transfers resources, discusses strategy, and even 
conducts joint operations with some or all of them.  While Al Qaeda cells mostly operate 
in the West, its associate groups are more numerous in the South or developing nations, 
while its affiliates operate in Muslim societies or countries within Islamic communities.  
Al Qaeda’s cadres are better motivated, trained and disciplined than its own members and 
tend to be more mobile and have a wider reach, while Al Qaeda’s associates operate on a 
local level.  While associate groups tackle tactical targets, strategic targets are Al Qaeda’s 
responsibility.  According to the CIA, Al Qaeda can draw on a support base of six to 
seven million radical Muslims worldwide, of which 120,000 are willing to take up 
arms.21  
Networks concern different types of relationships, whether objective and 
measurable as a resource, or subjective, like effective links.  They can serve tactical, 
strategic, or other purposes.  Utilizing a network theory approach to sharing information  
 
 
                                                 
20 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002). 
21 Ibid., 97. 
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will allow groups, agencies, and individuals to work and act in concert although they 
operate on a need-to-know basis and on the principle of compartmentalization and cell 
structure. 
The utilization of network theory, it will be argued, could provide insight into the 
system dynamics of the U.S. IC and the intelligence network because it will allow a 
systematic, comparative analysis of the system representation and fundamental problems 
associated with information sharing for the GWOT.  Networks occur in nature, such as 
neural networks, or they can be human artifact, such as power distribution grids.  Using 
network theory, Tremayne discovered that news Web stories contain links to external 
sites less frequently today than just a few years ago.  As each organization builds its own 
archive of Web content, the new content material appears to be favored over content that 
is offsite.22  Each Web page has links to other pages (nodes).  It has been discovered that 
a scale-free power-law distribution develops from the Web network.23  Eventually there 
are many Web pages with few links and others with hundreds or thousands of links, the 
latter being called hubs.  This process develops rather naturally due to freedom of access 
by almost all who share the information. 
In contrast, within the U.S. IC each agency, group, local entity or individual 
would be a node.  If network theory can be applied to the intelligence-sharing process, 
natural hubs would evolve within the IC that would share the intelligence needs of all.  
But, information in the IC is restricted by a “need-to-know” basis to prevent source 
identification and ensure collection methods are not compromised.  
Compartmentalization that can become ritualistic may be the enemy of sharing product.  
The concern therefore is not only to develop the method but to clarify policies and ensure 
that intelligence product is shared and distributed to the appropriate agency or individual 
from a need to share approach. 
This will require both a social network and a technical network.  The technology 
for the technical network already exists for achieving the technical component of the 
sharing problem.  One example is the Semantic Web.  The Semantic Web is a new 
 
22 Mark Tremayne, Internet Newspapers: Making of a Mainstream Medium (Austin: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 2004). 
23 Ibid., 3. 
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approach to using information online.  The Semantic Web gives one the ability to find 
what they need, when they need it, and prevent too much information overload.24
The coordination of the complex elements within the U.S. — law enforcement, 
Homeland Security, intelligence collection processes and policy, economic and political, 
to name a few — is exceedingly difficult, but the challenge must be met to deal with the 
scope of the threat.  Intelligence collection and sharing for Homeland and National 
Security requires a unified entity that links agencies; this will be greater than the sum of 
IC parts, which is the advantage of network principles.  A network approach is best able 
to accomplish our goal of intelligence sharing.  Unless intelligence is shared with local 
law enforcement, which can use local-area knowledge and ground truth for counter-
terrorist operations, terrorists will continue to adhere to the motto, “think locally; act 
globally.”  
The GWOT requires new information and theory-centric techniques and more 
intelligent methods of warfare such as those utilized by network theory.  The trend away 
from HUMINT to technical intelligence has further reduced and constrained the 
intelligence-sharing process between agencies due to lack of personal contact and mutual 
trust and informal social networks.  This has contributed to the stovepipe problem.  
Excellent examples are the two cases briefly mentioned above; also, the literature is 
replete with copious information within the U.S. about how “the wall” still persists five 
years after 9/11. 
As wedged, the process that advances in technology and coupling those advances 
with the power of network principles argue that the same technology can be utilized to 
remove the wedge and integrate the IC into a stronger sharing-based entity.  It can and 
will be shown mathematically that, as the proposed network is constructed, the additions 
of agencies and links will make the network stronger, not weaker.  Theoretically, for this 
to happen, R, the distance between nodes in terms of radius, will become shorter, which 
signifies a stronger relationship.  Therefore, the same technologies that prevented the 
sharing of information prior to 9/11 can be utilized to enhance information sharing.  
 
24 Jennifer Golbeck, Aaron Mannes, and James Hendler, "Semantic Web Technologies for Terrorist 
Network Analysis," in Emergent Technologies and Enabling Policies for Counter Terrorism (Piscataway, 
NJ: IEEE Press, 2005). 
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Further, it has been proposed that a specific agency, the DHS IAIP (Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection, now the IA) for example, needs to be named to promote 
information sharing and dissemination of domestic intelligence throughout all levels of 
government as well as budgetary oversight by DHS.  This issue has been closely studied 
by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).25  After four years, 
little has been done to rectify this problem.  While this argument does not negate the need 
for HUMINT or other intelligence, it exemplifies the need for sharing that intelligence as 
we must first create the methodology before defining the sharing agency and its 
responsibilities; i.e., the cart must not come before the horse.  Through the utilization and 
application of principles of network theory and social engineering we can more fully 
develop and enhance interagency intelligence-sharing practices.  Such a proposal is not a 
matter of “connecting the dots;” we need to increase relationally and connectively to 
ensure that not just “dots” are “connected.” Network theory, applied to either or both a 
technical or social network can give us the tools we need to effectively share intelligence 
between and among the IC, from local LE to the Pentagon.  Law enforcement agencies 
and the Pentagon can also network with each other. 
 
C. POLICY OPTIONS 
Policies issues are (i) who needs to know; (ii) how much can be shared; and (iii) 
that at least for Homeland Security, one agency should serve as a central hub for 
dissemination of the intelligence collected from all sources.  To address these concerns, 
the following policy issues will be discussed:  
• Implementation of a mutual operations doctrine 
• A single authority 
• Development of a regional structure  
• Leadership 
The anticipated output of this thesis will be the development of a national scale 
model based on network theory that demonstrates the most effective way to share 
Homeland Security intelligence among the IC and LE from local to Federal levels.  The 
 
25 Richard Best, "The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Congressional Hearing and the Status of the 
Investigation," ed.  Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: National Printing Office, 2002). 
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policy options portion of the thesis will investigate and make recommendations on the 




Since 9/11, it has become clear that intelligence sharing problems exist between 
law enforcement and the intelligence community as well as within the IC.  In part, these 
problems exist due to: 
• Interagency non-cooperation. 
• Differing agency focus — arrest versus surveillance. 
• Inability to connect the dots. 
 
These problems can be solved in part by: 
• Organizational innovations (a modification of organizational structure). 
• Utilization of interagency networking theory for sharing intelligence. 
• Applying network theory to collection processes to reduce errors. 
• Eliminating compartmentalization. 
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II. INTELLIGENCE FAILURES 
A. MALAYSIA MEETING — A CASE STUDY IN SHARING 
INFORMATION 
The initial reaction among the press and government directly after 9/11 was to 
look for scapegoats to blame for the attacks.  From the beginning the FBI was the agency 
most singled out for the intelligence failures that led to 9/11.  Focusing on this one 
agency obscured the big picture.  Another question that arose due to the 9/11 attacks was 
whether or not there was enough actionable intelligence.  The White House specifically 
noted that all the briefings it received from the various agencies gave no “actionable” 
intelligence, i.e., where and/or when an attack would occur.  Instead, there was only 
supposition by the IC.  The argument pressed the White House into a corner, emerging 
with a new query, which was whether it would be up to the White House to pump the IC 
for information or for the IC, especially the FBI and CIA, to pump better data to the 
White House.26  Thus, the ensuing Washington two-step of shifting and relegating blame 
slowed and obscured real solution(s) to the intelligence-sharing problem. 
Another example of 9/11 failures is the response of the CIA.  According to the 
9/11 Commission reports, the U.S. IC was very close to thwarting the Al Qaeda plot.  
Looking back, connecting the dots was relatively easier than during the turmoil that led 
up to 9/11.  The CIA had tracked Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to the Malaysia 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia and knew that one of the men had a visa that would 
allow U.S. entry.  The intent was to follow these men after the meeting.  One, by the 
name of Khallad, jumped to the top of the list because it was believed that Khallad and 
Midhar may be the same person.  The FBI began working with the CIA.  However, the 
investigation revealed that Khallad and Midhar were not only different people, but that 
they were a higher up Al Qaeda official and a foot soldier, respectively.  The most blatant 
criticism was not that each agency did not do an outstanding job of using the same source 
to identify the men; the tragedy is that the agencies did not talk with each other and mesh 
their separate pieces of intelligence.  Thus, lack of communication or rather intelligence 
 
26Gail Russell Chaddock, "Was There Enough Intel to Act?" Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 
2004; available from http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p01s03-uspo.html. [cited February 28, 2006]. 
16 
                                                
sharing, became an issue.  Follow-through issues also became a problem.  Investigating 
cables from the Malaysia meeting, the FBI decided something bad would happen, but 
while the FBI focused on Malaysia, the CIA’s attention was on overseas events.27  This 
problem is an age-old one and illustrates why many do not believe the FBI should be in 
charge of domestic intelligence since their focus in this case was to build a criminal case 
against one person, while the CIA had a more broadly focused intelligence purpose.  The 
FBI focus was on who, while the CIA focused on where.  There should be some middle 
ground between these extremes for domestic intelligence (DI) to function properly.  It 
would appear that perhaps the best focus for DI would be an all threat/all hazard 
approach on whom, where, and how.  To accomplish this will require many fragments of 
information coming from a variety of sources being analyzed properly.  In hindsight, the 
FBI and CIA opened a case, but they did not share information because of the well-
known “wall” that exists between agencies in the IC and especially between the CIA and 
FBI.  While each had a specific expertise, neither referred to the other or cooperated to 
leverage that expertise, which is common among poorly-communicating teams as 
described by mutual trust or more technically as transactive memory systems (see 
Chapter VII). 
Can “the wall” be overcome?  Can the intelligence divide that exists within the IC 
and LE be bridged?  Do these questions relate to merely communication between 
agencies, or do they go deeper into the culture of those agencies?  For example, the FBI 
appointed an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, and then FBI director Mueller 
appointed Louis Quijas, former police chief of High Point, North Carolina as assistant 
director of the new department.28  Mr. Quijas pointed out that there are 800,000 police 
officers in the U.S. representing 18,000 agencies and 27,000 FBI agents, only 11,400 of 
whom are in U.S.  Despite this change, which was an attempt to foster cooperation, 
Baltimore Police Commissioner Edward Norris, even though he possesses a top-secret 
clearance, still was unable to obtain information about on-going investigations.29  This 
lack of sharing, according to Norris, was eerily similar to a 1990 murder investigation 
 
27 Chaddock, "Was There Enough Intel to Act?"  
28 Faye Bowers, "How FBI Is Remaking Intelligence Functions," Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 
2004; available from http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0519/p02s02-usju.html. [cited February 28, 2006]. 
29 Ibid. 
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where an Egyptian had been apprehended and several cab drivers interviewed because the 
suspect jumped into a cab to get away.  Norris, after talking to several cab drivers, was 
convinced the suspect had gotten into the wrong cab or he would not have been caught.  
However, Norris was instructed to focus only on the murder, not the conspiracy — the 
FBI would do that.  Three years later (1993), one of the cabbies Norris interviewed drove 
a van loaded with explosives into the World Trade Center.30  Again, this illustrates lack 
of intelligence sharing, which would be prevented by such a network as the proposed 
DNIN.  It is akin to putting a jigsaw puzzle together when different parties have pieces of 
the puzzle; either party is not likely to get the complete picture.   
Culture is at the core of good intelligence sharing.  For example, William 
Rosenau, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and co-author of “Confronting the 
Enemy Within,” a study of four domestic intelligence services, stated that the FBI sees 
itself as the crime-fighting elite, much like the Marine Corps sees itself as an elite 
military force.31  While the FBI is brilliant at apprehending kidnappers, organized crime 
figures, and bank robbers, terrorism is a new tack and requires new thinking.  The only 
way to acquire this new type skill is a rethinking of the culture.  For those who have been 
exposed to the cultures of different large agencies and corporations, the predominant 
view that arises from the company/agency and personnel is that they do in fact view 
themselves as better/superior to everyone else.  This is usually not true, however, and it 
denies those in other agencies who have great ideas from expressing them and therefore 
contributing to the problem at large — terrorism in this case.  Culture keeps the sum of 
the parts separated and causes animosity and lack of cooperation, not only within an 
agency itself, but between other groups.  This in turn fosters the premise of the need-to-
know, which is most often based on a personal relationship so if one is outside the agency 
there exists less likelihood of a personal relationship, which results in a lack of 
intelligence sharing.  Without a personal relationship a presumed “not a need-to-know” 
exists despite the fact that almost all agencies use the DoD model for obtaining a top-
secret clearance.  In his testimony before congress, Charles Allen (DHS Chief 
Intelligence Officer) alluded to the prolonged problem of the inability to obtain security 
 
30 Bowers, "How FBI Is Remaking Intelligence Functions." 
31 Ibid. 
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clearances quickly enough for essential personnel.32 The conundrum between culture and 
intelligence sharing will remain until this problem is overcome. 
 
B. AL QAEDA — A CASE STUDY IN NETWORKING PRINCIPLES AND 
STRENGTHS 
The news media would have one believe that Al Qaeda is everywhere and that the 
national security of the U.S. is at risk, that another 9/11 disaster could happen at any 
moment.  While the latter is true, because of Al Qaeda’s strong network links, there is no 
consensus among experts about the magnitude of the threat posed by Al Qaeda against 
U.S. interests.  However, one startling fact about Al Qaeda and from which it derives its 
strengths is the networking principles it uses. 
Let us begin with a brief history of Al Qaeda so the development of the 
networking principles the group uses is clear.  The primary founder of Al Qaeda is 
Osama bin Laden, the son of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin.  While 
most Saudis practice the Sunni Muslim conservative views, bin Laden adopted the more 
radical Islamic militant views.  When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, bin 
Laden traveled to the battle front using personal funds33 to establish himself as a donor to 
the Afghan mujahedin and a recruiter of Arab and other Islamic volunteers for the war.34  
Ironically, because of the feelings of the U.S. toward the Soviets and the invasion, the 
volunteers recruited by bin Laden as well as himself were considered allies and were 
funded (the mujahedin), covertly for 10 years (1981 to 1991).  A colleague of bin Laden, 
Azzam, helped bin Laden establish a network to help recruit fighters and funds.  This 
network was called the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office), also known as Al 
Khifah.35 Thus, early on, this first use of a network and its principles helped propel bin 
Laden and Al Qaeda forward.  After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, bin Laden 
wanted the recruits to return to their respective home countries for future efforts to topple 
 
32 Charles Allen, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee Subject: Examining the Progress of the Chief 
Intelligence Officer (Federal News Service, 2006); available from http://www.fnsg.com. [cited July 5, 
2006]. 
33  9/11 Commission Report.  
34 Kenneth Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, ed. Congressional Research Service 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2005). 
35 Ibid. 
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pro-Western Arab leaders such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.36  In control of the 
Maktab, bin Laden had the resources to work at will and promote his own ideas and 
ideology.  Apparently, it was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and ensuing 
U.S. and multilateral peacekeeping forces (Operation Desert Storm) that turned bin 
Laden into an adversary of the U.S. He began lobbying Saudi officials to expel U.S. 
troops from Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi royal family rejected his petition and there was a 
rift between the two parties and a strong difference of ideas and philosophies.  During the 
1990s bin Laden and his Egyptian confidant, Dr.  Ayman al-Zawahiri, operational leader 
of Al Jihad in Egypt, transformed Al Qaeda into a global threat from a coalition of 
factions that originated from the Soviet-Afghanistan war.  While it can be said that the 
climax of Al Qaeda operations was the 9/11 attack, there exists no good intelligence for 
the world-wide numbers involved in Al Qaeda and who is currently in charge.  This is a 
testament to the strength and operational tactics of a network that has grown stronger 
with each passing year.  Even though one cell is destroyed, the remaining cells continue 
to operate in seclusion or through cooperation with other cells.  Even the pressure applied 
during the Clinton Administration through covert operations against Al Qaeda in 1999-
2000 and consideration by the Bush Administration of arming anti-Taliban oppositions 
groups in Afghanistan have failed to disrupt Al Qaeda.37  Because Al Qaeda is so 
decentralized through use of networked principles, only one individual has been arrested 
as a result of the 9/11 attacks, Zacharias Moussaoui, a U.S. citizen.38  Other top leaders of 
Al Qaeda have been captured or killed, but some senior leaders are believed to be in Iran, 
which that government has admitted but has also refused extradition for punishment.39  
Thus, while it is likely that the core of Al Qaeda has suffered damage to its leadership, 
organization, and capabilities, its tentacles through networking with other groups have 
allowed it to continue to spread its anti-Western ideology across wide geographic 
regions.  Some of these groups include the Islamic Group and Al Jihad (Egypt); the 
Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria); the Islamic  
36 Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, 2. 
37   9/11 Commission Report,  117.  
38 U.S. Department of Justice, United States of America v. Zacharias Moussaoui (2001); available 
from http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm. [cited March 10, 2006]. 
39 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (2003); available from 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/c12153.htm. [cited March 10, 2006]. 
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Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); the Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia)40; the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (Libyan opposition); Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon); other groups out of 
Pakistan (Harakat al-Mujahedin, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi).41  Other groups include Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as emerging 
threat groups in Africa (particularly Somalia) and Europe.42
Why is the Al Qaeda network so strong and resilient?  When Lawrence led the 
Arab revolt against the Turks during WWI, he did so with a community, not an army.  
This community group was simply a variety of ordinary individuals and tribes recruited 
for a cause.  Does this sound familiar?  How was this Arab group organized?  First, it was 
small groups of relationships as there was little if any formal structure.  Second, recruits 
participated at will depending on how much ego, honor, or religious fervor they had.  
Third, this community was formed in response of one primary goal, to expel the Turks 
from Arabia, which is analogous to the desire of Al Qaeda and participating terrorist 
groups, specifically Hezbollah, to expel the U.S. and other westerners from the Middle 
East.  In a very real sense this group exhibited patterns of community, which is an ancient 
method of warfare, and through the development of the Internet, cell phones, e-mail, and 
similar tools, has been drastically and efficiently modernized.  In networking terms, this 
type of community, which Al Qaeda through the efforts of bin Laden has adapted, is of 
the emergent type. 
Emergent communities in terms of terrorist tactics exhibit several distinct 
patterns, yet are difficult to detect because of networking principles.  These communities 
are composed of four segments or parts: (1) leadership, (2) active cell members, (3) 
individuals seeking active membership, and (4) potential members.  Many believe that 
the Al Qaeda leadership is diminished due to captured or killed leaders and that as a 
result another attack such as 9/11 is unlikely; this may not be the case.  Why?  First, this 
terrorist community is geared toward open source warfare, as is evidenced by its 
advancing tactics in explosives and communications, and it possesses a resilience of 
 
40 For more information on this and related groups operating in Southeast Asia, see CRS Report 
RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia; available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/27533.pdf. 
[cited May 1, 2006].  
41 Ibid. 
42 Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,  9. 
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networking principles.  Second, the core leadership is still intact and active.  Although 
they have not been physically present, their positions have been enhanced through 
acknowledgments of the state, particularly the U.S. and the media.  They have substituted 
direct presence with messages that have been broadcast by a variety of technological 
means, particularly television through delivery of taped statements and through the 
Internet.  Third, the very nature of terrorist networks makes the largest portion of the 
community, i.e., the members, impossible to detect.  If we assume that, of the four 
components discussed earlier, this portion is approximately one-third of the whole, there 
is a significant number of terrorists who, as long as the leadership is expressing views and 
remains intact and active through the means discussed, without physical presence, will 
carry out attacks to achieve community goals.  Fourth, those seeking active membership 
in the group can form teams with active cell members and still carry out large-scale 
attacks such as 9/11 through what may be termed “organic” formation, and thus, have the 
necessary resources for high-capability teams.  Finally, other groups such as Hezbollah, 
who have significant capabilities and appear to be State sponsored, are also networked 
and have the same goals as Al Qaeda.  There is a clear example of this in network 
technology within the Internet (which was designed to be attack proof), which is the 
advent of packet switching that sends packets of information through various routes that 
is then compiled at the end point into a congruent message as if it had never been divided.  
If one were to disable or attack multiple computer systems and nodes on the Internet, 
these packets would still get delivered as if nothing had happened.  So, too, it is with Al 
Qaeda and other terrorist groups; this is a testament to network principles and strengths, 
which implies that fighting this network will require another network — not a grouping 
of agencies that is as disjointed as is the current IC, but a cooperative network with a 
common goal.  This will require integrated intelligence components.43
The terrorist group responsible for the London bus and subway attacks operated 
through network principles.  Observance of any of the maps of the attacks quickly 
indicates a rule of thumb high-value node selection for disruption rather than symbolism 
since the attacks were placed on the four points of the compass, i.e., simple rules of city-
 
43 Allen, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Subcommittee. 
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wide disruptions.  The attacks were repetitive, which may indicate that repetition is more 
important than size of the attack; the D.C. sniper case is an example of this.  Perhaps 
more important the London attacks were rapidly executed, which indicates network 
design since it is easier to recruit terrorists from an emergent community for a simple 
disruption rather than for suicide bombings.  This is an indicator of participating at will, 
as discussed previously based on personal conviction or fervor.  There are other network 
principles that Al Qaeda has used and continually gains advances in; an example is global 
swarming.  This is particularly important since bin Laden himself has expressed desire to 
defeat the U.S. economically and the goal of terrorist swarming will likely converge on 
urban infrastructure attacks that will cause significant damage and result in economic 
attrition.  As with a packet sent across the Internet, terrorists will continue to use network 
principles to finance (which can be done via focused attacks to manipulate the stock 
market, drug sales, black-market guns, and other means) their operations, remain elusive 
and highly mobile by leveraging encrypted Internet communication globally and public 
transportation systems, all of which work through networked principles, i.e., nodes and 
links. 
The terrorist network depicted in Figure 1 was developed using social network 
analysis (a mathematical method for connecting the dots).  This network is a 
representation of the terrorists tracked by the CIA and FBI.  Through extended 
surveillance, the network slowly emerged through results of the Malaysia meeting, the 
9/11 attacks, and other events.  Such network maps are constructed utilizing typical 
surveillance and investigative methods such as tracking back a visitor through a car 
license plate traced back to a rental company at an airport, telephone calls, and so forth.  
Initially, the network may not make sense of bits and pieces of data; but with time, direct 
links and nodes are visible.  Although the network illustrated in Figure 1 was developed 
through hindsight, it shows two important features: (1) the strength of the Al Qaeda 
network; and (2) the number of links developing around Mohammed Atta (near top one-
third in center — green square) indicating his importance as a developing central hub. 
The Al Qaeda network depicted in Figure 1 is but a small sample of the entire 
terrorist organization.  This network only denotes the cells that were relatively or closely 
associated with the 9/11 attacks.  If the scale of Figure 1 was magnified to show the entire 
Al Qaeda network and those who are affiliated with Al Qaeda from other terrorist groups, 
the true scale and strength of this network would be staggering.  It would be worthy of 
our attention because of its complexity and for its networking strength, which helps 
terrorists remain undetected.  Perhaps a good analogy is that Figure 1 is similar to an ice-
berg for which the tip is but a very small representation of the whole.  As mentioned 
previously, the only way to fight such a network will be with another network.  Network 
theory and methodology will be discussed more fully in Chapter III. 
The goal of LE or the IC would be to remove nodes (representative of terrorists) 
from the graph (Figure 1) by apprehension or death so that the organizational structure is 
disrupted.  Mathematically, the question would arise as to how many nodes must be 
removed before the cell or organization becomes disconnected or separates into two or 
more pieces.  We can write an equation, based on ordered sets in network theory that will 
quantify the effectiveness of an operation against an Al Qaeda cell for how effective LE 
or the IC has been in disrupting a particular terrorist cell.  For example,  
k
n
kCutk ),(),Pr( Γ=Γ       (1) 
where Pr(Γ,k) is the probability that the cell, Γ, has been disrupted once k members have 
been apprehended or killed.  Cut(Γ,k) is the number of cutsets in the ordered set Γ with k 
members.  Also, )( kn  = )( !!kn (n-k)! and r! = r(r - 1)(r - 2) · · · 3 · · · 2 · · · 1 for a positive  
whole number r.  However, the purpose is to demonstrate that terrorists work through a 





Figure 1. Network analysis of terrorist (groups) involved in the World Trade 




Intelligence failures have not occurred because of lack of technology, but persist 
due to: 
• Agency cultures that keep the sum of parts separated, causing animosity and 
lack of cooperation. 
• Need-to-know rather than need-to-share attitude despite the fact that almost all 
IC and LE groups use the DoD security-clearance model. 
 
Failures in intelligence can be reduced by: 
• Applying network theory to agency-wide structure and to intelligence 
collection and sharing processes. 
 
                                                 
44 Valdis Krebs, "Connecting the Dots - Tracking Two Identified Terrorists," Orgnet.com, 2005; 
available from http://www.orgnet.com/prevent.html. [cited May 1, 2006].  
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III. NETWORK THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. BASIC THEORY  
For about the past 10 years, mathematicians, physicists, and sociologists have 
advanced the scientific study of networks and have identified surprising commonalities 
among various industries and other relationships such as the way airlines route flights, 
interaction of individuals at social events, distribution of electric power, and even the 
way the Internet connectivity works in regard to communication between individuals.  
Network theory is able to map non-obvious connections and relationships (links) between 
nodes (individuals or groups) with the goal to expose patterns that are not recognizable or 
apparent.  However, while American scientists and others seem to be just discovering the 
complexities and strength of network theory, terrorist adversaries appear to have 
substantial experience in this field.  Terrorists have carefully nurtured their networks and 
intelligence agencies are just beginning to catch on; but what goals and hidden agendas 
can spies uncover that will help protect the homeland?  Are these networks so strong and 
embedded that they are impregnable, or will the intelligence priorities and operational 
objectives be able to identify them?  Regardless, one important aspect to remember is that 
networks are not random.  They are much like terrorism, well planned, complex and 
dynamic. 
Whether working in domestic or international intelligence, at least in terms of a 
network theory-approach we must ask, what are the priorities for intelligence collection 
and sharing?  The goal is to connect the dots or utilize the links between the nodes.  Thus, 
the key to effective intelligence is link analysis, i.e., identifying the strength of the 
relationship, which was not done during the Malaysia meeting investigation.  As a matter 
of fact, this is generally the cause of our intelligence failures.  In simplistic terms, we call 
this pattern recognition because we are attempting, through extraction of large, almost 
overwhelming volumes of information from whatever the source, to detect a pattern 
between seemingly unrelated people, events, and other details.  By setting the right 
priorities we can connect the nodes or entities because link analysis will help determine 
the relationship or pattern between those entities.  In general terms the problem is making 
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sense of the wealth of information at our disposal.  To separate the “white noise” from 
the pertinent information sought, priorities must be set.  First, management of knowledge 
rather than information is a necessity.  It must be decided how information can best be 
managed to support the critical objectives of the enterprise/agency.  The knowledge 
sought can be obtained through various sources, especially data mining, pattern 
recognition engines, and mental models.  Second, the latest and best knowledge of what 
actually works must be used.  No intelligence entity can rely on obsolete knowledge.  To 
be effective, reliance on good intelligence and analysis must be based upon evidence-
based management.  Third, in terms of domestic intelligence and even international 
cooperation, intelligence from Federal sources must be passed to local police, and vice 
versa, in an efficient and timely manner.  Because almost all agencies use the DoD model 
for security clearances, the need-to-know for those who have the clearance is an obsolete 
knowledge and reflects gross mismanagement of intelligence as well as cultural bias.  
The current border security problems along the U.S. southern border with Mexico are an 
excellent example.45  Further, DNIN would help solve many of the intelligence capturing 
and dissemination problems associated with border security and intelligence. 
The priorities are weighed against the information obtained, which can come from 
a wide variety of sources such as local law enforcement, HUMINT agents, news feeds, 
press releases, Websites, magazine articles, keynote addresses, Web blogs, corporate 
strategies, geospatial information, panel discussions, marketing materials, and more - 
especially, transaction space.  The list is virtually endless. 
 
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR COOPERATION AND INFORMATION 
The requirement for greatest chances of success for consistent cooperation and 
information to and between IC agencies and to local LE and other necessary parties is 
that one group or agency becomes the central hub for both foreign and domestic 
intelligence coordination.  This restructuring may have been solved by the creation of the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of Homeland Security.  Mr. 
Charles Allen, the recently appointed director of that office, set forth priorities for the 
 
45 Chris Strohm, "Border Intelligence Plan Still in 'Early Stages,' Official Says," GovExec.com, June 6, 
2006; available from http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0606/062806cdpm1.htm. [cited July 5, 2006]. 
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organization in testimony before Congress.46  The DHS IA has the Congressional 
Mandate to fulfill this role and thus, will be used as the “Central Hub” or the owner of 
DNIN.  
 
C. RELATIONS AND CONNECTIONS — CONNECTING THE DOTS 
The term “connecting the dots” has become quite prevalent since 9/11, perhaps 
more for the intent to make needed changes to the IC than to assign blame for the failures 
of 9/11.  Thus, most frequently this term is used in the past tense.  Given the term denotes 
connecting a relationship to an entity or person, this concept of connecting the dots 
should be used to help fight the GWOT because in a real sense, it infers a networked 
approach to gathering intelligence.  Two key cases illustrate this point.  First, after 9/11 
and throughout the Commission Report hearings, LE and the IC presented great amounts 
of testimony about the relationship of the hijackers with each other, Al Qaeda, where they 
had come from, and what the implications were.  The Malaysia meeting was a case of 
connecting the dots, although linking the individuals with the organizations proved to be 
difficult.  Second, perhaps one of the best cases was during the end of the Cold War when 
the CIA believed the Soviet economy was growing at a constant rate, but in fact it was 
not.  HUMINT from the streets of Moscow and other large Soviet cities soon indicated 
the economy was about to implode.47  This intelligence insight provided President 
Reagan the information necessary to spur the end of the Cold War.  A simple matter of 
“connecting the dots” and analyzing the correct relationships between the economy and 
various industries played a key role.  Further, the information was not secret at all; it was 
gained from everyday occurrences on the streets of Moscow — from workers 
complaining about lack of soap and other products, factories closing from lack of raw 
goods, and workers rioting.  Suddenly, almost as quickly at it had begun, the Cold War 
was over.  However, we now find ourselves in a new war that we have been very poor in 
performance of network analysis, i.e., “connecting the dots” between one of the earliest 
 
46 Charles Allen, "Written Statement before House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment." Department of Homeland Security 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism/HUMINT Analysis and 
Counterintelligence, 2005. 
47 Herbert E.  Meyer,"Connecting the Dots," National Review, April 8, 2004; available from 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/meyer200404080954.asp. [cited March 13, 2006]. 
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incidences of terrorist attacks beginning in 1993 — the first attack on the World Trade 
Center.  A string of attacks ensued throughout the 1990s, the Khobar Towers in 1996, 
Kenyan and Tanzanian Embassies in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000.  The dots or rather 
the links, were always there; war had been declared on the U.S. and its allies, but the IC 
did not “connect the dots.”  Rather than declare war in word, it had been declared in deed, 
and because the incidents were linked to terrorists, they were treated as separate incidents 
and not as the beginning of a global movement, perhaps because the attacks were not 
attributable to a state or standing army.  Also, like the streets of Moscow and the free-
flowing intelligence in them, LE does the same on the streets of America today.  Working 
in tandem with network-sharing principles and with the IC, perhaps they, too, can force 
the terrorists to fall. 
Many believe that Al Qaeda has few teeth left to mount a serious attack against 
the U.S. or its allies akin to 9/11.  However, connecting the dots of the past to those of the 
future would defy this notion, i.e., it would give us insights.  A good example is the 
London attacks on July 7, 2005, in which a group called the “Secret Organization of Al 
Qaeda in Europe” claimed responsibility.48  This clearly demonstrates that, although Al 
Qaeda itself did not carry out the attacks, another network that supports Al Qaeda in 
common goals did.  Additionally, there have been various other global events that 
illustrate this same pattern such as the Madrid, Spain, train attacks in 2004.  While it was 
initially believed the ETA was responsible, Al Qaeda, through a video, claimed 
responsibility.49  There are many terrorist groups that have been influenced by and 
psychologically link to Al Qaeda and therefore, terrorists need to be viewed in terms of a 
global network and not in terms of separate or specific groups.  Treating terrorists as a 
global network will allow fighting a network with a network. 
Connecting the dots has become increasingly more difficult because of 
technological advances.  The IC and other private and public sector agencies are literally 
drowning in data.  There is so much data that it is difficult to collect, process, analyze and 
obtain actionable intelligence.  It is becoming increasingly more important to have the 
 
48 MSNBC Staff, "Islamic Group Claims London Attack," MSNBC News, 2005; available from 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8496293/. [cited March 13, 2006]. 
49 BBC News Staff, "Al-Qaeda 'Claims Madrid Bombings'," BBC News, 2004; available from 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3509426.htm. [cited March 13, 2006].  
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ability to identify threats in the out-of-the-ordinary data or what has also been termed 
non-obvious recognition.  As the terrorist adversary has become much more mobile, 
smaller in size, and agile compared Soviet forces during the Cold War Era (which was 
less mobile and much larger), the sifting of data for pre-established patterns is less useful.  
This has caused a paradigm shift to look for non-obvious patterns because looking for 
pre-established patterns has become ineffectual.  This also requires sifting and sorting 
much larger volumes of data, as well as forward rather than backward thinking.  Post 
mortems always illustrate evidence that should have given clues that an attack was 
imminent 9/11, for example.  However, using the same evidence and moving forward to 
the next dot gives a completely different picture, which is why it is important to connect 
the dots by using non-obvious patterns and then predicting forward. 
 
D. SHARING DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, have emphasized an important point 
— care must be taken not to lose the important information in day-to-day events, i.e., the 
signal must be higher than the signal-to-noise ratio.  The IC, LE groups, and others must 
mimic the adversary; we must respond quickly, be flexible, and adapt easily.  The 
bureaucratic policies of the past must make way for a networked sharing, multi-agency 
cooperation.  This is the only way to reduce the number of future catastrophic events.  As 
an example, during the Cold War, the Soviets changed slowly due to their size and scope 
of operations.  Contrasting this to present day, terrorists and other criminal groups are 
very agile, adapt quickly, and are very small.  Today’s terrorist organizations can attack 
from many directions, disperse their assets globally, and use a variety of unconventional 
tactics to evade the IC and attack the U.S. and other peaceful nations.  States utilizing 
terrorist tactics can employ these same methods.  What would happen if 40,000 suicide 
bombers were released on 29 American and British targets?  Dr. Hassan Abbasi, head of 
the Center for Doctrinal Strategic Studies in the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, who is 
under the authority of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has informed Western sources 
that these suicide bombers are poised and ready to strike if the U.S. or Israel attacks its 
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nuclear sites.50, 51  Because these terrorists are so scattered and mobile, it is imperative 
that to detect the new threats, data must be collected from a wide variety of sources that 
will vary with time.  To analyze this data properly, it will need to be shared with a great 
many experts with the goal of connecting the dots.  Using a networked approach this will 
be advantageous since it is impossible to investigate every piece of information and also 
maintain a high alert status.  Agility will be the key to adaptation so that the IC and LE 
groups can make a concerted effort at the right time for resource concentration against the 
problem.  Using a networked approach, the IC will be able to move people and resources 
quickly, deliver information easily to those who need it, and draw on expertise from 
around the Nation and the world and from multiple agencies to deliver a useable product.  
This would be particularly useful for border-security issues and intelligence to address 
the concerns of congress.52  Networking will allow this agility.  Also, networks operate 
from four primary factors: (1) trust; (2) tasks; (3) money (including resources); and (4) 
strategy or goals.  A combination of all four factors develops the strongest networks. 
 
E. THE SHARING MODEL 
Development of a sharing model must consider the potential components that it 
may involve.  These components are geographic, personnel, computer networks, regional 
centers and connecting participants, and nodes and links.  The initial stage of the sharing 
model is adopted from the U.S. Census Bureau because, while there is much talk about 
how to share intelligence, little has been written about where that intelligence comes 
from.  Within the U.S. that intelligence will come from states, localities within the state, 
across regions and finally encompassing the entire U.S.  This is a fairly accurate premise 
about how the original censuses were set up and taken.  In fact, the data-requirements 
analysis of the Census Bureau had substantial impacts on the history of computing, which 
has become the most significant tool for intelligence collection and sharing. 
 
50 Fox News Staff, "Tehran Threatens West with Homicide Attacks," Fox News.com, 2006; available 
from http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,191910,00.html. [cited April 24, 2006]. 
51 Marie Colvin, Michael Smith, and Sarah Baxter, "Iran Suicide Bombers 'Ready to Hit Britain'," 
London Times, 2006; available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2136638,00.html. [cited 
April 24, 2006]. 
52 Strohm, "Border Intelligence Plan Still in 'Early Stages,' Official Says.” 
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Herman Hollerith built tabulators under contract to the Census Bureau to 
dramatically speed the process of analyzing the 1890 census, which was an important 
step in establishing a market for automated data processing.  Most of the major census 
bureaus around the world leased his equipment and purchased his cards (key-punch 
cards).  To make his system work, he invented the first automatic card-feed mechanism, 
the first key punch, allowing a skilled operator to punch 200-300 cards per hour.  
Holleriths’s company (Tabulating Machine Company) later merged with other firms to 
become the Computing Tabulating Recording Corporation, which, under the presidency 
of Thomas J.  Watson, was renamed IBM in 1924.53  
Geographically, the Census Bureau is composed of four regions and nine 
divisions (see Figure 2).  The regions are not grouped by geographical, historical or 
cultural bonds, but were initially set up by population base, which has significantly 
changed with time as many areas have become much more populated due to the 
influences of agriculture, water supplies, manufacturing trends, marketing and 
transportation.  At the same time, these trends have caused a variety of infrastructure 
developments within geographic regions of the census map.  For example, in California, 
New York, and New Orleans, sea ports represent a significant infrastructure, whereas in 
Houston, Dallas, and Lincoln, rail transport is a more critical infrastructure.  Because of 
this change in population and infrastructure, the census regions, for purposes of homeland 
security and population base, have been changed to form the new base for the geographic 
component of the sharing model (Figure 3).  Each separate region on the new map ranges 
in population from about 40 to 55 million.  While the Midwest region makes up the 
largest geographic area, it also has the smallest population.  An approximately equal 
population base will allow development of an adequate computer/IT network in one 
geographic region that can be mirrored in another and deliver economy of scale. 
Richard Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State) said, “Probably the most dramatic 
improvement in our intelligence collection and sharing has come in bilateral cooperation 
with other nations — those we considered friendly before 9/11, and some we considered 
 
53 Wikipedia Contributors, "Herman Hollerith," 2005; available from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Herman_Hollerith&oldid=61950396. [cited December 9, 2005].   
less friendly.”54  Such strides in intelligence sharing, while important will accomplish 
little if intelligence sharing cannot occur effectively within the U.S.  The sharing model 
must include a regionalized structure for agencies, regionalized databases, specific 
regions, specific IT functions, and other necessary components.  These must all feed back 
to a central hub in charge of DI, i.e., the DHS IA and Chief Intelligence Officer.  Thus, 
this model must begin at the physical layer (as described above) — geographical, 
computer sharing/IT, intelligence collection/analysis — and include the central office 
where final collection and processing will occur. 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of U.S. Census Regions.  
(From: http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf) 
 
The primary purpose of the geographic component for the sharing model is that 
information must come from somewhere, and organizational development on the 
geographic level will expedite model development.  This base will consist of a regional 
structure that will become the sharing and dissemination parties, a central hub, 16 
member agencies of the IC, nationwide LE groups, and a method of sharing, i.e., 
computer systems and IT.  The proposed network structure is illustrated in Figure 4 and is 
                                                 
54 Richard Armitage, Intelligence Sharing and September 11 Attacks (U.S. Department of State, 
September 19, 2002); available from http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/2002/13566.htm. 
[cited March 20, 2006].  
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designed in this manner due to the attributes of network principles which is why link and 
nodal network analysis is so important.  Additionally, the cities of Los Angeles, Denver, 
Dallas, Chicago, Atlanta, and New York were chosen as regional centers not only for 
population, but more importantly for the significant LE resources these cities possess.  
For example, social network analysis (SNA) is the mapping and measuring of 
relationships and flow between people, groups, organizations, computers, and other 
information and knowledge-processing entities.  The intelligence-sharing network is 
composed of all these components.  As with a terrorist network, this sharing network 
must have strong links between all entities.  As an example, link analysis is about making 
connections (connecting the dots) that represent meaningful links between data elements 
that will allow detection of complex relational structures to indicate patterns of interest.  
Post-9/11, connecting the dots was relatively easy, but it was not connecting the dots that 
caused the greatest difficulty.  Rather it is deciding, which dots to connect that is most 
important; this argues why the sharing network must be a true network and why it is so 




Figure 3. Six Region Intelligence-Sharing Model for the U.S. 
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Figure 4. Six-Region Networked Intelligence-Sharing Model for the U.S. 
 
Why is a network-centric approach so important?  There is so much information 
that all agencies are becoming overwhelmed with information overload.  Further, past 
experience has shown that information overload in intelligence makes failures 
inevitable.55, 56  A network approach will allow pattern recognition at a heightened level.  
Although it will not change the need for qualified and experienced analysts and other 
intelligence and LE personnel, it will assist them in detecting the “needle in the stack,” 
i.e., let us move the stack and find the needle and not look through all the hay. 
Let us investigate a possible scenario.  A deputy from the Los Angeles County 
Sheriffs Department (LASD) is told by an informant that word on the street indicates a 
shipment of explosives, possibly a WMD, will be smuggled into the Los Angeles area 
next month.  By itself this is a small piece of non-actionable intelligence; there is no 
pattern and it may not be true.  However, the informant has always been known to be 
reliable, and the deputy passes along the information.  The task now becomes one of 
                                                 
55 Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World 
Politics 31, no. 1 (1978). 
56 Richard J. Heuer, Jr., "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis," Center for the Study of Intelligence 
(Langley: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999). 
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making connections between otherwise meaningless bits of information, which will be at 
the core of transnational threat analysis.  The information from LASD is quickly reported 
to the regional centers in Los Angeles, Dallas, Denver, Atlanta, Chicago, and New York.  
At the same time it is reported to the central hub (DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis) in 
Washington, D.C.  In a matter of minutes the other 15 member agencies of the IC also 
have the information.  Upon further investigation, the LASD deputy learns from DEA the 
nearest source from the informant was a past accountant for a Cali, Columbia drug cartel.  
Hence, the first connection or link in what may become a network is identified.  A few 
days later the informant indicates the type of bomb is termed a backpack explosive; this 
is of great concern since it could be a Russian backpack nuclear weapon made in the 
1960s for use against NATO targets in time of war and consisting of three “coffee can-
sized” aluminum canisters that must be connected before detonation.  Formerly in 
custody of the Ninth Directorate of the KGB and having a 3-5 kiloton yield and at the 
upper range, the explosive would be about one-third the yield of the Hiroshima bomb 
during WWII.  U.S. intelligence sources have believed that Osama bin Laden or other 
groups could have obtained some of these weapons. 
The DEA is able to determine that the Cali cartel member has ties to Al Qaeda 
operative in Yemen who the FBI linked to the USS Cole bombing.  The CIA and DIA 
have additional information on links from Yemen of these same individuals with ties to 
Pakistan and Iran.  One of the individuals in Pakistan was linked directly to a Russian 
nuclear physicist and an Iranian physicist.  Suddenly, analysts in the central hub notice a 
pattern emerging as previously obscure links between individuals appear much stronger.  
Through data mining, intelligence reports, transaction space and other records, central 
hub analysts are beginning to put pieces of the puzzle together using the DNIN network-
centric approach.  The Atlanta regional office garnered information about a shipment of 
car parts destined for New Orleans via India, but India does not make car parts.  As a 
result of the regional office report, DHS IA requests the Office of Naval Intelligence to 
become involved and track the maritime cargo shipment.  Additional CIA reports arrive, 
linking various individuals to relationships with an incident in September 2001 in which 
Israeli security arrested a man linked to Osama bin Laden with a radiological backpack 
bomb as he attempted to enter Israel from the Palestinian Territories via a border 
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checkpoint at Ramallah.  Within this new sharing paradigm, the FBI, working closely 
with CIA and DHS, detects a relationship between the Yemen and Pakistan ties to 
specific individuals in New Orleans, New York, and Los Angeles.  Additional reports 
from the LA TEW, provides evidence of stronger individual ties.  A pattern is emerging 
that signifies a serious threat, and combined criminal fighting and intelligence efforts 
have been able to detect it, when likely in the past they would not have been able to do 
so.  A planned attack that was to involve transport of a small nuclear device from the 
shipping port at New Orleans to the city of Los Angeles has been thwarted, and the 
terrorists, at least those within CONUS, have been taken into custody.  This is the power 
of the DNIN networked intelligence sharing.  This ability has come not from the creation 
of a new domestic intelligence agency but through giving oversight to one group to act as 
a collector through and from all others and the authority to develop a dedicated national 
intelligence network that shares multiple databases and resources of all types and that 
crosses criminal, border, terrorists, and other intelligence segments. 
 
F. THE NETWORK ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The goal of this network structure is to prove quantitatively that, constructed in 
the proper manner links become shortened and thereby stronger, which will qualitatively 
allow better information sharing.  Let us suppose that the regional intelligence-sharing 
centers are as suggested in Figure 4.  From east to west, these centers are New York, 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, and Los Angeles and of course the central hub, which 
is in Washington, D.C., the single intelligence authority.  As mentioned previously, even 
businesses now realize that the old hierarchal structure is no longer competitive due to 
global changes in technology, management, manpower, outsourcing, and many other 
factors.  Put in hierarchal form, the regional structure shown in Figure 4 would appear as 
in Figure 5. 
The round nodes at the bottom of Figure 5, below the named triangle, can 
represent individual cities, police forces, government or non-government organizations, 
or other entities, and on a regional basis, there could be a great many of these.  The links 
from round node to triangle and from triangle to triangle represent the relationship 
between each entity for reporting and/or data flow.  As represented, this organizational 
structure is hierarchal and has been used extensively in the past for IC management.  It is 
not very flexible or adaptable to change.  However, utilizing a network approach, the 
regional centers must not stand alone, reporting only to the central hub; they must share 
knowledge among each other to integrate the system.  Linking the regions together 
flattens the structure and builds a networked community.  The result of linking the 
regional centers is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 5. Six-Regions Hierarchal Organizational Structure — Intelligence-
Sharing Model for the U.S. 
 
While there may be some management problems in terms of accountability with 
the networked organizational structure (Figure 6) it is very adaptable and agile and will 
perform rapidly in regard to information sharing.  The idea in networking is not to pass 
the information through too many nodes — the fewer the better.  This would typically 
indicate that personnel would not have to continually obtain directions from a central 
superior.  Rather, they would be more autonomous, which means they can quickly 
combine key pieces of information and disseminate it according to protocol.  In 
mathematical terms, linking the regions into a network shortens the path length of the 
relationship; the shorter the path, the better and quicker the sharing and, thus, the stronger  
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the relationship.  The goal of course would be not only to link the regions, but to link the 
IC as well.  If we now have an overview of the system, it is obvious that a network is 
beginning to emerge (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 6. Flattened Organizational Structure — A Regionally Networked 
Structure.   
 
.   
Figure 7. An Emerging Network. 
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Within the IC there are 16 intelligence agencies, all collecting and disseminating 
information; but as has been shown, cooperation among agencies is lacking and therefore, 
sharing is minimal.  Figure 8 shows an overview of the 16 member agencies of the IC.  
Note that in Figure 8 the IC members are connected to the central hub that has been 
denoted in Figures 5-7.  The network architecture is becoming more complex so that the 
network capabilities are becoming much stronger.  Assuming we connect the 16 member 
IC with the regional structure, a powerful networked intelligence-sharing community is 
created (Figure 9).  To reduce clutter and illustrate the concept well, a side view with 
only two of the agencies connected to the central hub and to the regional centers is shown 
in Figure 10.   
 
 
Figure 8. 16 Members of the IC Connected to a Central Hub (DHS IA). 
 
The 16-member IC represented in Figure 9 is listed, beginning at left center and 
progressing in clockwise direction, as DOS (Department of State), CGI (Coast Guard 
Intelligence), Army Intel (Army Intelligence), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency, NSA 
(National Security Agency), CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), DOE (Department of 
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Energy), AFI (Air Force Intelligence), DHS (Department of Homeland Security), DOT 
(Department of Treasury), Navy Intel (Navy Intelligence), DEA (Drug Enforcement 
Administration), NRO (National Reconnaissance Office), NGIA (National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency), MCI (Marine Corps Intelligence), and FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation).  The key to a strong network is the relationships among nodes (the link); 
the shorter the link or path, the stronger the network.  This has been termed network 
metrics.57  Assuming the President remains in his current position of the ultimate 
intelligence user the addition of the central hub (Figure 6) initially increases the path 
length of the President (Table 1), but as the network becomes more interconnected, the 
President’s path length is shortened (Table 1).  Further, as all the agencies are fully 
connected to each other and the regional centers within the network (shown in Figure 10), 
the path length shortens dramatically (Table 1) so that for the central hub, R=1 (where R 
is the radius — measured length). 
 
 
Figure 9. 16-Member IC Joined with the Regional Network Through Central 
Hub. 
                                                 
57 Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Randomness 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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The interconnected network, which now links all 16 members of the IC to the central hub 
as well as the regional centers, will shorten the path length for intelligence sharing, both 
mathematically and organizationally (Table 1).  This shortening, in addition to 
strengthening sharing should thereby reduce intelligence failures. 
 
 
Figure 10. Side View of Entire Network Illustrating Connectivity of only two IC 
Members but Denoting the Enhanced Collection and Sharing Capabilities. 
 
A commission report to the President delivered two specific findings: (1) “The 
Intelligence Community's performance in assessing Iraq's pre-war weapons of mass 
destruction programs was a major intelligence failure.  The failure was not merely that 
the Intelligence Community's assessments were wrong.  There were also serious 
shortcomings in the way these assessments were made and communicated to 
policymakers” and (2) “In sum, today’s threats are quick, quiet, and hidden.  We need an 
intelligence community that is truly integrated.”58  An integrated and network-based IC 
will help prevent such failures. 
 
                                                 
58 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005). 
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Table 1. Shortened Path Length Between Nodes Denoting Increased Sharing 
Strength 
Network Structure Overall Agency/Regional 
Path 
President’s Path 
Figure 4  
Washington, D.C. 
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Clearly, a network has more distinctive features than conventional organizations 
that make it stronger for a great many contemporary evaluation tasks.  First, focusing on 
the connections and “patterns” of relations between entities rather than attributes offers 
both a different conceptual and theoretical perspective.  Second, shifting to a relational 
and systemic collection and dissemination process is more aligned to the context of the 
paradigm shift in technological abilities as well as the overload of information volume 
that confronts us.  Network analysis also lends the ability to examine and analyze 
relationships at a different level, whether single or interrelated.  Finally, network analysis 
permits a description of very complex processes as well as a capacity to draw on a range 
of methods that can be integrated qualitatively, graphically, and quantitatively, which will 
allow a more thorough or, in intelligence terms, more “fine-grained” analysis.  An 
example of this analysis can be seen in Figure 11 in which a network analysis of the new, 
networked community was performed to determine allocation of resources and current 
risk.  Note that the blue lines in Figure 11 represent the links/relationships of each agency 
to the central hub in the center (surrounded by a green line); the six regional intelligence-
sharing centers are in the lower right quadrant.  Thus, in addition to strengthening 
intelligence sharing, the network itself is granted powerful tools for self analysis.  
Perhaps the greatest weakness of a network is that, in order to acquire network data sets 
and to obtain a full response rate, there is a need to establish a relationship with the 
network and its members.  This will have immediate implications in the accuracy of 
reported data and possible loss of objectivity.59
 
 
Figure 11. Network Analysis of Regional Intelligence-Sharing Network when 
Connected to Central Hub and 16-Member IC. 
                                                 
59 R.A.W. Rhodes, "Putting People Back into Networks" (paper presented at the Australasian Political 
Science Association 43rd Annual Conference, Brisbane, Australia, September 24-26, 2001). 
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The development of such a strong network would allow law enforcement, 
homeland security, and the intelligence community to accomplish three primary tasks.  
First is the ability to examine ties between suspected criminals or terrorists and determine 
whether these ties are weak or strong.  For example, because the dynamics of a network 
are constantly changing the ability to determine who is “in” or who is “out” would 
become a valuable tool (to identify patterns).  Second, the best practical application of 
network analysis could be used to identify suspects and then map their networks to 
determine where they lead.  Third, this network would allow for better prediction of 
certain future behaviors, making for clearer evidence and a better likelihood of 
prevention, response, and prosecution.   
 
G. SUMMARY 
The goal of effective intelligence is to connect the dots.  This can be 
accomplished by the IC and LE communities by: 
• Instituting organizational structures supportive of network processes and 
principles. 
• Setting priorities to allow link analysis. 
• Identifying relationship strengths. 
• Replacing the obsolete need-to-know with need-to-share policy. 
• Making knowledge a primary focus. 
• Instituting evidence-based management for intelligence collection. 
• Placing one agency or group such as DHS IA into the central role of being the 
hub for both domestic and foreign intelligence coordination. 
• Developing agility — only networked principles will allow this. 
• Operating from the four primary factors of networks — trust, tasks, money, 
and strategy/goals.  These factors develop the strongest networks. 
• Developing regional sharing centers due to the scale, scope, and volume of 
U.S. domestic intelligence.  This will enhance sharing by fostering 
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cooperation and strengthening relationships (see Chapter VII).  Network 
analysis lends the ability to examine and analyze relationships. 
 
The use of networked operations through regional centers will allow completion 
of three primary tasks: (1) examination of the strength of criminal/terrorist connections, 
(2) identification of suspects and mapping of networks, and (3) prediction of future 
behavior and better likelihood of prevention, response, and prosecution, all of which are 
goals of DHS IA and other IC members.60  It will also improve the quality of intelligence 
analysis across DHS and participating agencies, increase overall intelligence production, 
promote integration of DHS intelligence, ensure the priorities of DHS within the IC, and 
increase analytic capabilities, which are primary DHS IA goals. 
 
 
60 DHS Staff, "Homeland Security Information Network to Expand Collaboration, Connectivity for 
States and Major Cities" (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2004); available from 
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IV. THE COMPUTER NETWORK — A CENTRIC APPROACH 
A. COMPUTER NETWORKS — THE BACKBONE OF SHARING 
The field of terrorism research has experienced tremendous growth.  As the field 
has benefited greatly from recent advances in information technologies, more complex 
and challenging new issues have emerged from numerous counter-terrorism-related 
research communities as well as governments of all levels.  Advanced methodologies 
must be sought for analyzing terrorism research, terrorists, and the terrorized groups 
(victims).  In this age of advancing technology, the computer is the backbone of national 
and global information sharing and is thus a networked system.  Once completed, the 
system can become a major sharing and learning resource and tool.  Information-related 
issues, such as the communication and sharing of research ideas among counter-terrorism 
researchers and the dissemination of counter-terrorism knowledge among the general 
public, become critical in detecting, preventing, and responding to terrorism threats.  The 
recent advances in information technology, especially Web technology has alleviated 
these problems to some extent.  However, more complex and challenging issues continue 
to emerge from terrorism-related research communities as well as local, state, and Federal 
governments.  Terrorism threats have a wide range that spans personal, organizational, 
and societal levels and have far-reaching economic, psychological, political, and social 
consequences.61, 62
The first factor of information sharing and terrorism challenges is primarily 
associated with data collection, searching, and knowledge management.  Currently, there 
are large and scattered volumes of terrorism-related data from a wide variety of sources 
available to analyze terrorist threats and system vulnerabilities.63 Maximizing the 
usefulness of the data is a challenge because of (1) the lack of counter-terrorism-related 
databases that integrate these diverse sources; and (2) the absence of advanced as well as 
new methodologies to identify, model, and predict linkages among terrorists (connect the 
 
61 S. Cutter, ed., Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism (Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2003). 
62 L.W. Kennedy and C .M. Lunn, Developing a Foundation for Policy Relevant Terrorism Research 
in Criminology (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 2003). 
63 National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in 
Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002). 
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dots), their supporters, and other perpetrators.  Further, information access and 
management are major challenges, especially in reference to identifying where to start, 
what to focus on, what types of data are available, where to obtain such data, who 
controls the data, data accuracy, if the data can be shared, and perhaps more importantly 
the cultural differences in the sharing attitude among the major players, e.g., the IC and 
LE.  Thus, advanced techniques to support intelligent information searching and 
techniques to analyze and map terrorism knowledge domains are urgently needed.   
The second factor of information sharing and terrorism challenges is mostly 
associated with how to trace dynamic evolution of terrorist groups and how to analyze 
and predict terrorist activities, associations, and threats.  While the Internet has evolved 
into a global platform for anyone to use in disseminating, sharing, and communicating 
ideas, we cannot negate the fact that terrorists are also using the Internet to their own 
advantage.  Terrorist-owned Websites and other terrorist-associated Internet content and 
terrorist-generated information are commonly referred to as the “Dark Web.”  Terrorist-
generated online contents and the terrorist Internet usage patterns could be analyzed to 
enable better understanding and analysis of the terrorism phenomena.  Unfortunately, 
such terrorist-generated information has seldom been used in traditional terrorism 
research.  On the other hand, since the amount of terrorist-related information has well 
exceeded the capability of traditional analysis methods, applying advanced techniques 
such as network theory and social network analysis are required and may provide a 
significant added value.  The final factor of information sharing and terrorism challenges 
involves how to successfully grant systematic access to system-level intelligence in 
regard to security.  Thus, how to utilize various information technologies in achieving 
these goals remains an interesting and challenging problem. 
The use of networked computers will enhance the capabilities of a truly 
networked IC and help eliminate the “stovepiping” that is so prevalent within the IC 
among the different agencies and also among LE groups.  It is well known that agencies 
tend to stovepipe (hide) their activities, especially with respect to information under the 
cloak of “need-to-know.”  The proper network will collect and disseminate critical 
information that is located in many disparate data sources, especially on a national level.  
This will not only counter the stovepipe tendency, but will promote collaborative 
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information sharing.  On the other hand, whoever owns the network will stovepipe 
automatically because it is the culture to stovepipe and not the nature to share; thus, we 
are fighting a human problem (see Chapter VII).  However, one way to lessen this 
problem is to ensure access to data in the system by those who submitted it, which means 
regardless of security level, the generator of the information always maintains access of 
the data they submitted.  Finally, the use of such a networked computer system will 
increase connectivity and provide more efficient responses to deter, detect, prevent, and 
respond to terrorist attacks as desired by DHS IA.64
Similar to the regionalization process that involved network principles, computer 
linkage within and across regions will also follow a network pattern and principles, as 
well as allow a dedicated, national network.  The collected data must follow a process 
that will remove the great volume of extraneous information by data mining and other 
techniques so that the relevant information remaining is converted to usable knowledge, 
i.e., we must be able to separate the non-obvious to develop patterns that are 
recognizable.  The general flow of data would follow similar to the schematic in Figure 
12.  Because there will be such large volumes of data, not only from input from areas 
within each region from the LE and IC groups, but also because of the large volumes of 
OSINT, several factors must be considered.  These include (1) basic theory; (2) search 
engines, especially meta-search engines; (3) information portals; (4) information analysis; 
(5) social network analysis and/or network theory; (6) chatterbot techniques; (7) 
archiving data; (8) transmitting data; (9) data warehousing and data mining.  It must also 
consider incorporation of data from existing fusion centers and other programs and 
agencies.   
1. Basic Theory 
First, the computer network and database(s) would need to consider or address the 
challenges associated with the information-collection and sharing problem.  Examples 
would include the support of intelligence Web searching and mining of terrorism or 
criminal-related information, to analyze knowledge creation and information 
dissemination patterns, and to map terrorist domains and related, recognized patterns.  
 
64 Allen, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Subcommittee. 
Also, the network would need to examine how the Internet is used by terrorist and 
criminal groups for propaganda, training, and targeting and to map the dynamic evolution 
of these groups, or in other words to analyze and predict criminal and terrorist activities.  
This step would require development of and/or use of existing information portals from 
which to extract information through the use of meta-searchers and other search engines, 
keyword suggestion, document summarization, categorization, and visualization.  For 
example, document summarization would use sentence-selection heuristics to rank text 
segments, which could reduce redundancy of information in a query-based summary.  
The summarizer would flexibly summarize Web pages by using a few sentences, and 
users could invoke it by choosing the number of sentences for summarization via a pull-
down menu under each result. 
 
 
Figure 12. Proposed intelligence sharing computer network system architecture. 
 
Second, the system would need to address knowledge representation such as 
Web-based user interface, domain knowledge visualization of required processes, 
terrorist activities and relationship visualization, and a chatting interface.  Categorization 
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would simply place the information into a variety of folders labeled by key phrases for 
easier access and analysis.  These phrases could be automatically based on part-of-speech 
tagging and linguistic rules.  An indexing program could calculate the frequency of 
occurrence of these phrases and select the most frequently occurring phrases to index the 
results.  Since a folder may contain more than one indexing phrase, the categorization is 
nonexclusive. 
Third, knowledge discovery would be required in the areas of post-retrieval 
analysis (key words, phrases, categorization, summarization, and so forth), biometric 
analysis and social network analysis, script parsing, breaking encryption, and pattern 
matching.  Finally, data collection would need to be addressed due to the overwhelming 
volumes of information.  This could theoretically include many diverse areas such as 
search engines, meta-search engines, Web crawlers, Dark Web collection, multilingual 
domain spiders, terrorism domain knowledge, and a host of other factors.  Ideally, the 
network would be treated as a graph in which nodes represent individuals, and links 
represent relations between them.  Logically, these would be analyzed by node, link, 
group, overall structure, and dynamics.  For instance, Sageman partitioned the terrorist 
network, Global Salafi Jihad, into four groups: Central Staff, Maghreb Arabs, Core 
Arabs, and Indonesians.  In each group are a hub and several gatekeepers.  An example of 
this is shown in Figure 13 — Osama bin Laden is the hub of the Central Staff cluster and 
issues commands to the whole network through his gatekeepers.  The ability to visualize 
relationships is crucial.  For example, Atta’s group (represented left in yellow) was 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks; the Indonesian group (top right, green) was responsible 
for the Singapore Plot (2001), Bali bombings (2002), and Jarkarta bombings (2003); the 
Nashiri group (middle bottom, yellow) was responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings; 
the Maghreb Arabs (bottom right quadrant, blue) were responsible for numerous 
bombings including France 1995, LAX 1999, Casablanca 2003, Istanbul 2003, and 
others. 
2. Search Engines 
Many search engines are available on the Internet.  Each has specific performance 
characteristics primarily defined by its own algorithm for indexing, ranking and 
visualizing Web documents.  As an example, AltaVista and Google allow users to submit 
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queries and retrieve Web pages in a ranked order, while Yahoo! groups Web sites into 
categories, creating a hierarchal directory of a subset of the Internet.  Internet spiders 
known as Web crawlers have been used as the main program in the back end of most 
search engines.  These are programs that collect Internet pages and explore outgoing links 
in each page to continue the process, i.e., they build a relationship link or network as they 
work outward from the originating pages.  An example is the World Wide Web Worm.65  
The majority of search engines, such as Google, are keyword-based.  Although these 
engines have rapid search speeds, search results are often overwhelming and imprecise, 
further adding to the information overload problem.  Low precision combined with low 
recall rates make it difficult to obtain specialized, domain-specific information from these 
search engines, which means little intelligence but lots of information.  However, 
understanding the keywords of the search and the data one is seeking can increase search 
precision.  Such a search can be accomplished by utilizing custom search software within 
the network architecture.  This would take place in the data mining (pre-processing) step 
illustrated in Figure 12.   
Because there is no central hub or agency in charge of all the collection and 
knowledge-management processes that occur within the U.S., i.e., the “Central Hub” 
listed in Figure 6, there can be no joint effort in fighting terrorism (it should be noted that 
the HUB in this instance refers to DHS IA).  As an example, remove the central hub from 
Figure 6, where does the data then go?  Removing the hub cripples the database and 
information retrieval, exactly as the current structure of disjointed intelligence sharing 
has done for the U.S. in terms of struggling against terrorism.  Chief Intelligence Officer 
Allen specifically mentioned that the DHS and the IC must come together and the 
development of DNIN, along with its enabling information enterprise will provide the 
knowledge management system that will accelerate intelligence integration on a national 
scale.66 A single hub is essential for this to happen.  Further, DHS IAIP was mandated by 
Congress to fulfill this very role.67
 
65 O. McBryan, "Genvl and WWW: Tools for Taming the Web" (paper presented at the Proceedings 
of the First International Conference on the World Wide Web, Geneva, Switzerland, 1994). 




Figure 13. Example of visualized network of the Global Salafi Jihad where pink 
color represents core staff; yellow color represents core Arabs; green color 
represents Indonesian terrorists; and blue color represents Maghreb Arabs 
(From Sageman).68 
 
Reliance solely on one search engine can cause users to miss over 77 percent of 
the references or OSINT they might find most relevant because no single search engine is 
likely to return more than 45 percent of relevant results.69  Factually, most Internet search 
engines cannot keep up with the net’s dynamic growth, and each search engine covers 
only about 16 percent of the total Web sites.70  The emergence of meta-search engines 
provides a credible resolution of the aforementioned limitations by triangulating outputs 
from several engines to arrive at relevant results.  Several server and client-based meta-
search engines, such as Copernic (http://www.copernic.com) “search the search 
engines.”71  The results from other search engines are combined and presented to users.  
Copernic has now developed personal computing software such as “Copernic Agent                                                  
68 Mark Sageman, Understanding Al Qaeda Networks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005); 
available from www.bfrl.nist.gov/PSSIWG/presentations/Understanding_al_Qaeda_Networks.pdf. [cited 
May 4, 2006]. 
69 E.Selberg and O.Etzioni, "Multi-Service Search and Comparison Using the Metacrawler" (paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 4th International World-Wide Web Conference, Boston, 1995). 
70 S. Lawrence and C.L.Giles, "Accessibility of Information on the Web," Nature 400 (1999). 
71 Selberg and Etzioni, "Multi-Service Search and Comparison Using the Metacrawler.” 
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Professional” that can be installed onto a computer and utilized for very specific searches 
of the Internet.  Although the information returned is comprehensive, the problem of 
information overload worsens if no post-retrieval analysis is provided; thus, it is akin to 
intelligence analysis. 
3. Information Portals 
Web or information portal services provide another approach for retrieving 
information.  In the field of terrorism, there are numerous portals provided by specialized 
research centers such as the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence 
(CSTPV), located at St.  Andrews University in Scotland and directed by noted terrorism 
researcher, Professor Paul Wilkinson and formerly co-directed by Dr.  Bruce Hoffman, 
Rand Corporation.  These centers conduct terrorism research and provide portals that 
cater to the needs of academics, journalists, policymakers, students, and the general 
public.  Such portals primarily provide information retrieval and dissemination services 
except for a few organizations such as the Terrorism Research Center (TRC), the 
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), that have expanded 
their functions to include personalization, and the Emergency Responders Knowledge 
Base (MIPT).  For example, the TRC, founded in 1996, has the highest number of portal 
features including four terrorism databases, and is highly recommended with about 5,000 
incoming links.72  The most frequently identified features of these portals are information 
retrieval and dissemination services. 
4. Information Analysis 
Information portals provide access to a diversity of unstructured (e.g., reports, 
news stories, transcripts) and structured (database) information, but offer limited tools for 
integrating the resources and information fusion (including post-retrieval analysis).  After 
a search, the user has to manually browse through the list of retrieved documents to 
locate relevant resources and then establish relationships among the documents.  
Automatic indexing algorithms have been used widely to extract key concepts from 
textual data.  It is widely known that automatic indexing is as effective as human 
indexing, which is greatly improving as computer and software technology progress.  
Many proven techniques have been developed such as information extraction (IE), which 
 
72 Terrorism Research Center, "About the Terrorism Research Center," (Tampa: Terrorism Research 
Center, 2003). 
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is the use of noun phrasing to perform indexing for phrases rather than just words.  These 
techniques are useful in extracting meaningful terms from Web and text documents for 
both retrieval and further analysis.  Because of the large volumes of information there has 
been an increased interest in the use of data and Web mining and machine learning 
techniques that focus on identifying patterns in data.  These techniques have been applied 
to the analysis of news articles (such as in the Message Understanding Conference or 
MUC), online information sources (e.g., the Columbia University’s News blaster 
system), and high-speed data streams that are processed and mined in a Distributed 
Mining and Monitoring System at Cornell University.73  New data miners are capable of 
processing 25,000 pages of documents per hour, and software ability is constantly 
improving, which means this rate will increase significantly during the next several years.  
Incorporation of various components into the computer network system and databases 
will be necessary for adequate sorting of collected information and data analysis.  In 
addition to data mining, these include the development and integration of information 
fusion technologies such as biometrics and collaborative and knowledge discovery 
technologies that identify and display links among people, content, and topics to counter 
“asymmetric threats” such as those found in terrorist attacks.  The computer network and 
database(s) associated with DNIN will support analysts in the IC and LE. 
5. Social Network Analysis 
Existing terrorist network research is still at its beginning stage.  Although 
previous research has emphasized new approaches for terrorist network analysis, studies 
have remained mostly small-scale and have used manual analysis of a specific terrorist 
organization.  For example, Krebs manually collected data from public news releases 
after the 9/11 attacks and studied the network surrounding the 19 hijackers and tracked 
two of them.74 The Global Salafi Jihad network consisting of 171 members has also been 
analyzed using a manual approach, providing an anecdotal explanation of the formation 
and evolution of this network.75 None of these studies used advanced data-mining 
 
73 National Science Foundation, "Data Mining and Homeland Security Applications" (Washington, 
D.C.: National Science Foundation, 2003); available from 
www.bfrl.nist.gov/PSSIWG/presentations/Understanding_al_Qaeda_Networks.pdf. [cited July 26, 2006]. 
74 Krebs, Connecting the Dots. 
75 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. 
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technologies that have been applied widely in other domains, such as finance, marketing, 
and business, to discover previously unknown patterns of terrorist networks.  Moreover, 
few studies have been able to systematically capture the dynamics of terrorist networks 
and predict terrorism trends.  What is needed is a set of integrated methods, technologies, 
models, and tools to automatically mine data and discover valuable knowledge from 
terrorist networks based on large volumes of highly complex data.  Only a comprehensive 
networked IT system and database(s) can provide such methodologies; this is the intent 
of DNIN. 
6. Chatterbot Techniques 
The premise of a natural language program, e.g., a chatterbot, is to create an 
intimate atmosphere where individuals can converse with the program and receive 
meaningful and immediate responses to queries related to a specific domain without the 
necessity of searching the Internet for the answers themselves.  Most chatterbot 
techniques rely on pattern-matching algorithms that (1) take inputs from the user; (2) 
parses and matches the input to questions in the query or script; (3) selects the 
appropriate response dictated by the script; and (4) displays it to the user.  Examples 
include ALICE, ELIZA, and Parry.76  Chatterbots can provide users with easy access to 
domain-specific knowledge and also can be used to provide the necessary knowledge of 
global terrorism phenomena. 
7. Archiving Data 
Within the IT realm the verbs "backup" and "archive" mean very different things.  
They are frequently used to describe the same action — namely, the process of moving 
data from an online storage tier to near-line or off-line storage.  But backing data up and 
archiving data are distinct technology practices that have very different requirements.  
They also have very different advantages.  To the extent that organizations are able to 
embrace data archiving as a means to reduce costs, improve performance, and satisfy 
regulatory compliance requirements, it is a potentially important distinction.   
Archiving, in general, describes the process of consolidating and moving data 
from a primary online storage medium—such as a fiber-channel disk array—to less-
 
76 A.J. De Angeli, I. Graham, and L.Coventry, "The Unfriendly User: Exploring Social Reactions to 
Chatterbots" (paper presented at the Proceedings of The International Conference on Affective Human 
Factors Design, London, 2001). 
57 
expensive near-line or (in some cases) off-line storage medium.  In some cases —
compliance, for example — archiving emphasizes data longevity and authenticity, 
especially for e-mails, instant message transcripts, documents, and other kinds of semi-
structured or unstructured data.  The kinds of data that would be collected within DNIN 
and cooperating intelligence groups. 
Data archiving improves database performance and decreases storage networking 
complexity.  Within DNIN, the amount of data that would be collected will be enormous, 
and it is ironic that much of this data that users store may seldom get looked at again.  
Yet organizations are compelled to store data for many reasons, often legal or regulatory.  
Storing data drags down database performance and gobbles up valuable storage capacity, 
creating a major IT operational management headache.  Due to the nature of current 
technology and legal and regulatory requirements, not to mention agency requirements, 
collected data must be stored where it can be readily accessed in case questions arise.  In 
most instances databases cannot be maintained indefinitely due to storage capacity limits 
and thus, archiving is necessary.   
Archiving is intended to let organizations cull old data from their relational 
databases in a way that allows it to be easily restored or reexamined if necessary.  It does 
this by simultaneously capturing the records to be removed, along with all the database 
associations.  It then compresses the data for storage to online disks or an automated tape 
library.  Should the data be needed in the future, it can be quickly retrieved and restored 
with all the necessary associations intact. 
In all cases, archiving presupposes (comparatively rapid) file-level access to data, 
coupled (in many cases) with robust search and retrieval capabilities.  Archiving is a 
repository, a large index repository of data that is designed for people to get to it and be 
able to search it.  In this respect, archiving is fundamentally different from enterprise 
backup, which involves taking frequent snapshots of data to protect it against both routine 
and catastrophic loss.  Organizations typically back up operating system — or 
application-specific data and configuration settings, frequently directly to tape — and 
sometimes retain backups for only a few days, at which point they are replaced (or 
overwritten) by newer volumes.   
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Whereas archiving is typically done onsite, backup can be done both on- and off-
site, with deltas sent over a WAN connection to off-site libraries.  In most large 
organizations aged backup data is frequently managed ("vaulted") by an off-site provider.  
However, within DNIN this may not be desired or practical, and thus, the archiving 
system (not discussed here due to lack of space; contact author for additional 
information) for DNIN was designed to allow on-site archiving and data backup.  In 
backup, you are copying data, whereas in archive, you are actually moving the data.   
The primary purpose of archiving data within DNIN for intelligence purposes is 
that this technology provides file-system-level access to archive data, such that it can be 
exposed to third-party storage management tools or, alternately, to collaborative and 
other kinds of applications.  This is important because archiving has more uses than just 
compliance.  For example, intelligence personnel would be looking at large archives of 
rich-media data.  For this reason, a robust, high-speed file system is necessary that 
essentially presents near-line stored data as if it were on-line data. 
Why archive?  Or more to the point, why archive any more than you have to; for 
example, for the purposes of compliance?  There are several reasons.  First, archived 
media, which can consist of inexpensive NAS devices or (more frequently) large 
automated tape libraries, is less expensive than tier-one Serial ATA or SCSI attached 
devices.  Second, archiving can help boost performance.  Infrequently accessed files can 
be moved from primary storage into near-line archival storage.  Third, archived data can 
be stored at separate locations thereby preventing catastrophic loss of data. 
Data archiving is a widespread IT operations challenge.  Enterprise-wide, 
mission-critical databases will grow thirty-fold during this decade, according to Meta 
Group, a consulting firm in Stamford, CT.  The traditional way to handle this growth has 
been through storage management.  But the magnitude of growth is forcing a new look at 
operational data management.  The next step — operational informational management 
— will be a prerequisite for near-continuous information availability and will require new 
operations and tech support tools and techniques.  Thus, data archiving is essential if 
users are to corral growth at thirty-fold during the decade and provide repeatable 
performance. 
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Data archiving, however, is viewed first as a way of improving relational database 
performance by separating old data from current and active data.  Storage considerations 
are secondary.  Archiving is really a database technology, but it does allow one to use 
storage more efficiently, especially after one has rebuilt the database index.  Rather than 
substantially reducing the overall need for storage capacity, however, archiving will more 
likely slow the growth of database storage, allowing organizations to delay database-
related storage purchases. 
Organizations that will gain the biggest advantage from storage archiving are 
those with large relational databases, particularly those that support large packaged ERP, 
CRM, HR, and sales-force automation applications, organizations with large amounts of 
unstructured data such as DNIN, as well as large transaction-processing systems.  These 
applications have complex database structures and create extensive relationships between 
the various pieces of data, which is what is necessary in intelligence collection and 
sharing.  For organizations suffering a severe storage crunch, data archiving is unlikely to 
provide much of a solution.  Rather, it should be considered an effective way to squeeze 
better performance out of rapidly expanding relational databases and free up some 
storage, at least temporarily, in the process. 
An example of newer storage mediums for archiving and data backup that DNIN 
would use is Blu-ray Discs (BD), which is a next-generation format meant for high-
density storage of video files and data.  The name Blu-ray is derived from the blue-violet 
laser it uses to read and write to the disc.  A BD can store substantially more data than a 
DVD because of the shorter wavelength (405-nm) of the blue-violet laser (DVDs use 
650-nm wavelength red laser and an infrared 780-nm laser).  This shorter wavelength 
allows more information to be stored digitally in the same amount of space.  For example 
the BD has a capacity per layer of 25 gigabytes compared to 15 megabytes for a DVD or 
about 200 gigabytes storage capacity per disc compared to 600 megabytes for DVDs.  
Thus, this newer technology will require about one-half the space of current DVDs for 
data archiving and backup, but are significantly less voluminous than tape and other type 
backup systems.   
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A concept little known outside of IT is that all archived data must be rewritten to 
new media periodically.  The physical archive media degrades over time.  Magnetic tape 
has an average life span of 2 to 3 years.  The CD-ROMs and DVDs used today last about 
5 to 7 years.  Not enough data has been collected on the life span of Blu-ray Discs.  Once 
the physical media starts to degrade, data becomes unreadable.  A few missing bits of 
data in a video of a busy street corner is survivable; a few missing bits of data in a list of 
financial transactions can lead to missing intelligence.  Regardless of the technology used 
for data archiving and storage, this is an important component of the DNIN sharing 
model and will need to be continually updated. 
8. Transmitting Data 
Data transmission is the conveyance of any kind of information from one space to 
another.  Historically, this could be done by courier, smoke signals, a chain of bonfires, 
or semaphore and later by Morse code over copper wire.  In recent computer terms, it 
means sending a stream of bits or bytes from one location to another by using any 
number of technologies, such as copper wire, optical fiber, laser, radio, infrared or even 
the so-called Bluetooth.  Practical examples include moving data from one hard disk 
device to another or accessing a Website, which involves data transfer from a Web server 
to a user’s browser.   
A related concept to data-transmission is the data transmission protocol used to 
make the data transfer legible.  Current protocols favor packet-based communication.  
Most computer networks today use packet-based communications.  The Internet is the 
largest packet-based network in the world and in history. 
In a packet-based network, information is broken up into packets and sent to its 
destination.  The packets can use different paths to reach their destination.  Once all the 
packets have arrived, they are reassembled into the original information.  A packet-based 
network is tolerant of faults in the physical structure of the network.  Data will route 
around the fault and arrive at the destination.  This methodology works as long as there 
are multiply paths for the packets to take. 
A concept little understood outside of IT is that there are very few paths for 
packets to take in the U.S. Installing underground communication wire coast to coast is a 
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very expensive proposition.  The current bills in front of Congress to make the Internet a 
“tiered” network are an attempt by the telecommunications companies to recover some of 
their costs.  The Internet is thought to be a different network than a network used by a 
corporation to move data to field offices.  However, in both cases the same physical wire 
is used, and since all data is broken up into packets that can not interact with each other, 
the illusion of private networks is created. 
All networks have choke points.  A failure at the choke point brings down the 
network.  Our current networking technology is essentially electromagnetic.  Thus, while 
fiber optic cable uses light pluses to move data, the controlling devices for the fiber optic 
cable are electromagnetic.  There are many ways to destroy electromagnetic devices.  
Examples are water, tornadoes, solar flares or something more exotic like 
electromagnetic pulse weapons. 
Multiple redundant communication methods not based on the same technology 
must be developed between the regional centers, the central hub (DHS IA), and 16 
member agencies of the IC.  Having the data at a regional center but not being able to 
transmit it is still a failure.  This process too has been conceptually designed but not 
included within the thesis because of lack of space (contact author for additional 
information). 
9. Data Warehousing and Data Mining 
Data warehouses are composed of structure and data; the data can range from 
highly structured to loosely structured data.  Most data warehouse implementations are 
designed for decision making in the corporate or business environments.  Business data 
by default is highly structured.  Data are extracted from transaction-processing systems as 
they are generated.  This creates highly structured data that fits well into a highly 
structured warehouse, which is the easiest type of data warehouse to build, maintain, and 
use in terms of computer resources and staff.  The search engine for this type of data 
warehouse can be rather "dumb" and still report the required data.  Meta-search engines 
and chatterbots are not needed.  The data is rarely exposed to the outside world, so it can 




IC communities.  The data is stored for querying rather than analysis.  Thus, this type of 
data warehouse fits nicely into the hierarchal monolithic structures used today by 
American business. 
Terrorism data is not highly structured.  It is loosely structured at best.  A shaky 
eyewitness report, a newspaper article, or the cop on the street all produce loosely 
structured data.  Forcing loosely structured data into a highly structured warehouse 
invariably leads to data loss because the data does not "fit" the structure.  This simple fact 
will force a loosely structured warehouse for terrorism data.  Many recent systems that 
have failed encountered this problem; the FBI Carnivore system is an example.   
The more "loosely" a warehouse is structured, the more difficult it is to build, 
maintain, and use in terms of computer resources and staff.  In a very loosely structured 
warehouse, the warehouse consists of many key components where each component 
retains data.  Each component has its own search engine.  The meta-search engine must 
collate the outputs from the various search engines.  While the search engines can have a 
moderate intelligence, the meta-search engines must have a very high intelligence.  
Without this high intelligence there is a risk that critical data will be missed.  
Consequently, there is a trade-off in that using a loosely structured warehouse for 
terrorism data, the meta-search engine used by LE and the IC must have a higher level of 
intelligence.  Chatterbots will use the output of the meta-search engine to converse with 
the human users of the warehouse.  While chatterbots are useful for retrieving data from a 
warehouse by a human who has little experience in information retrieval, chatterbots 
quickly show their limitations to experienced users because current capabilities in 
artificial intelligence are limited.  A loosely structured warehouse can be used as an 
information portal.  An interface layer will exist between the output of the meta-search 
engine and the outside world.  The interface layer can have a range from a simple menu  
to a chatterbot.  Other concerns relate to politics and system security.  However, politics 
and security concerns of exposing terrorism data to the outside world is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.   
Further, computerized information analysis may require some up-front computer 
programming before any analysis can begin.  Computers are very capable and fast at 
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pattern matching.  Pattern matching finds trends in data by finding the same item in two 
different collections of data.  As an example, facial recognition programs are based on 
pattern matching.  While the most common pattern-matching programs that use terrorism 
data have already been created, there is still a need for more "exotic" ways to match data.  
Pattern matching is easier in a highly structured data warehouse.  In a loosely structured 
data warehouse there will be more data to retrieve and more methods to retrieve the data. 
Data mining is the process of automatically searching large volumes of data for 
patterns.  It also can be thought of as sending the output from a meta-search engine to 
computerized information analysis that uses the data to refine the search parameters or 
returns the answer.  Once again, data mining is easier in a highly structured data 
warehouse. 
When utilizing search engines, meta-search engines, information analysis, data 
mining, and chatterbots, the most critical component is determining how to ask the 
correct question.  There can be various levels of "correctness."  A chatterbot needs very 
little correctness because the chatterbots function is to help the user create the correct 
question that in turn leads to the answer.  A search engine needs a very correct question 
or the search engine returns useless information.  Because the Internet is the largest 
loosely structured data warehouse in history, this is why, when one queries the search 
engine, so many useless responses are returned.  One can not easily find what one needs 
quickly without the proper knowledge and tools. 
Companies that build data warehouses like to build highly structured warehouses 
using highly structured data.  This is the easiest type to build and maintain and returns the 
highest profits.  In short, these companies only deal with business data.  Once again, the 
trade-off is that terrorism data, for the most part, is loosely structured and requires a 
differing approach and generally an associated higher cost due to less structure. 
 
B. THE NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The network shown in Figure 13 can be developed using a variety of software that 
is commercially available.  An example of this software is “Network Analysis,” 
developed by Dr. Ted Lewis and colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Such 
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software can be coupled into the computer system architecture so that the user can both 
analyze and visualize the system via network analysis; it would be more representative of 
social network analysis in this instance.  Social network analysis has proven to be a 
useful tool for combating terrorism and crime as early as 1991.77  Using Figures 12 and 
13 as the example, the analysis of a terrorist or criminal network would consider five 
factors: (1) relationships (links); (2) nodes (individuals); (3) groups; (4) network 
structure; and (5) the dynamics.  Each of these factors would be concerned with various 
components.  For example, link analysis would consider link type and weight 
distribution; this is commonly called the shortest-path algorithm.  Group analysis would 
generally employ either a hierarchal clustering and/or a factor analysis.78  These of 
course would need to be compared to determine which method generated the closest 
match to the actual criminal or terrorist network.  Once a group has been identified, a 
network structure analysis should be performed to determine structure, whether it is 
centralized or decentralized, and the degree of hierarchy.  The dynamics analysis simply 
adds a time factor to the system analysis to help determine the importance or role of an 
individual or groups within the network.  The “Network Data” illustrated in Figure 14 
would represent the “Storage” component in Figure 12.  Designed properly, changes of 
the network through time could be displayed.  An example design of what this system 
architecture may resemble is illustrated in Figure 14.  
Almost any number of components could be added to each section of the analysis.  
For example, node analysis can summarize financial, social, demographics, or other 
parameters of the group or individual.  Quite simply, the criminal or terrorist network is 
treated like a graph and analyzed according to the five factors discussed directly above.  
For a greater quantitative analysis, additional factors could be added.  However, such 
factors would greatly increase the complexity of the network analysis procedure, and 
after all it is the network view that is sought, not a mathematical justification of the 
model or numbers.   
 
77 M.K. Sparrow, "Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the 
Prospects," Social Networks 13 (1991). 
78 A.K. Jain and R.C. Dubes, Algorithms for Clustering Data (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1988). 
This network analysis architecture allows the integration of multiple databases 
and can advance the technology in combating terrorism, counter-intelligence and other 
fields and help overcome the problems associated with both analysis and intelligence 
sharing.  The development of this architecture will be able to demonstrate the feasibility 
of the larger infrastructure of DNIN at both the regional and national level.   
 
 
Figure 14. System Architecture for Network Analysis. 
 
C. COUPLING NETWORK THEORY — INFORMATION SHARING 
EMPOWERED BY COMPUTER NETWORKS 
In this age of advancing technology, the computer is the backbone of national and 
global information sharing and is a networked system.   
Throughout the previous chapters I have discussed the operational network of 
DNIN through its regional and national centers, which would be staffed by personnel 
from a variety of agencies.  Once completed, the system can become a major sharing and 
resource tool to fight not only terrorism, but organized crime of all kinds — the MS-13 
Gang would be a good example.  Sharing leads and information, counter-terrorism 
research and the dissemination of counter-terrorism knowledge among the LE and IC, 
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become critical in detecting, preventing, and responding to terrorism threats.  But how are 
these leads shared?  As with the system that has been described, the computer becomes 
the backbone of that sharing apparatus.  For example, an analyst in Denver may share 
information with the regional center in New York or the National Center in Washington, 
D.C.  This will take place over the computer network.  Not only will it take place over the 
computer network, but the computer network will empower the individual with the tools 
to analyze all information collected throughout the network.  Just as a network allows 
individuals and organizations to strategically compete with much stronger entities, so too 
will the computer network allow the analyst to have a greater tool and more powerful 
analytical processes to compete against asymmetric threats. 
Ideally, just as a typical network is treated as a graph in which nodes represent 
individuals and links represent relations between them, the computer will be the node in a 
computer network and the link will be the method of connectivity of those computers.  In 
this respect an analysis of the computer network utilizing links would consider link type 
and weight distribution (the shortest-path algorithm), and group analysis could be done 
utilizing a hierarchal clustering or a factor analysis of the regional centers.  As an 
example, consider Figures 9 or 11, which show how DNIN is linked between the LE and 
IC; rather than thinking of these nodes and links as people and relationships, we can just 
as easily think of them as computers and electronic connections.  The true beauty is that 
whether we discuss DNIN in terms of agencies networked together or computers, it is the 
computer that will empower this network and link the partnering agencies and staff.  
Analysts will be able to analyze and disseminate data much more rapidly. 
One of the most empowering and comforting certainties of life is knowing what 
community one is part of, where it is located, and what its values are.  Communities help 
define how people see themselves as individuals, and they create an extensive and 
complex set of relationships for anyone who chooses not to live a hermetic existence.  
Some of these communities are geographically related neighbors, citizens, or 
countrymen.  Still others are joined or created by necessity, belief, interest, co-workers, 
religion, political parties, and teammates.  In this instance the community (DNIN) is 
created out of the desire to defeat terrorism and keep America safe.  New communities 
can be entered or abandoned; others remain the same throughout life.  The word 
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“community” itself implies sameness of geographic space, of interest, or of governance.  
Examples include the IC and the LE communities.  It also implies “sharing,” either active 
or passive, and that is the element of community formation which is, at once, the most 
basic and yet most complex aspect of community building, probably because it is the 
most difficult to define.  It is in sharing assets, ideas, and goals that the underlying sense 
of community, something which is common to its members, comes into play.  
Technology has always had an influence on individuals’ and communities’ ability to 
share, perhaps never more than it does today, at the beginning of the third millennium, 
when people are exposed to more information, more ideas, and more cultures than ever 
before.  In the case of the IC and LE particularly, it is the exposure to an overwhelming 
volume of information that must be sorted, indexed, and analyzed in some way.  As 
Stanley Brunn once commented, much of what we have learned about space and place at 
individual, community, national, and global levels has been turned “topsy-turvy.” The 
national boundaries we have known are eroding, primarily due to new economic and 
supra-national communities (the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, and ASEAN) and, concurrently 
with the disappearance of old states, new ones are emerging, putting new pressure on 
people to choose, or to identify with, a new communal identity, either at the personal, 
regional or national level.  Terrorist organizations are a good example. 
Technology, primarily telecommunications and the Internet, is making much of 
this possible.  The Internet and other new communications technologies and applications 
have the potential to empower communities to form, develop, and most importantly, 
interact to develop shared goals and policies, allowing them to participate in arenas 
where, for varied reasons and to varying degrees, they have not been able to have 
influence.  The Internet and its ability to empower communities are analogous to the 
empowerment of the computer for analysis of data that utilizes network theory. 
In actuality, the computer network via connections to other systems, networks, 
agencies, and the Internet empowers information sharing and couples this process to 
network theory without effort, i.e., it becomes a natural phenomenon due to the network 
principles from which the Internet was derived.  As an example, let us examine the recent 
death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, on June 7, 2006 
(yesterday at the time of this writing).  There has been much postulation as to the effect 
68 
                                                
the death of al-Zarqawi would have on weakening Al Qaeda and continued attacks from 
the insurgency within Iraq on American forces, Iraqi nationals, and infrastructure.  The 
author believes a brief analysis of network structure would lead to the preliminary 
conclusion that al-Zarqawi’s death will have little effect on Al Qaeda or the number of 
attacks.  Why? Observation of Figures 1 and 13 yield the answer.  First, Al Qaeda is 
expert at utilizing network theory, which has given them great asymmetric strength 
against the U.S., Iraq, and other allies.  Observation of the aforementioned figures and an 
understanding of network theory clearly illustrate that natural hubs exist within any group 
or organization, and if one connection is broken (al-Zarqawi in this case) a new hub will 
naturally develop.  Second, networked organizations operate on much the same premise 
that the Internet does — that if it were attacked, a major attack in a particular location 
will not disable the network.  Even with Osama bin Laden removed from the scene, little 
has changed concerning Al Qaeda’s operational strength.  The death of al-Zarqawi is an 
excellent analogy to this. 
Finally, consider that al-Zarqawi may have been chosen because of his 
charismatic mannerisms and ruthlessness that promoted his ability to recruit for Al 
Qaeda.  Network theory and social network analysis processes would lead one to believe 
that charismatic features could be replaced by other mannerisms, perhaps something as 
simple as a new leader that always appears masked, obscuring his identity and therefore 
adding mystery in place of charisma or, by no mannerisms at all.  In this light, and 
applying the principles of network theory as in Figure 13, the death of al-Zarqawi would 
produce only a temporary respite in attacks and operational tactics by Al Qaeda.  Thus 
little would change because of the strength of the network and network operational 
principles.  Perhaps more pointedly, if we could map the current Al Qaeda organization 
as per Figure 13, we would be able to identify the person that will become the new leader 
for Al Qaeda in Iraq and take al-Zarqawi’s place.  Five days after the author wrote the 
preceding account of al-Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq appointed a new leader (on June 12, 
2006) named Abu Hamza al-Muhajer.79 In a human time scale, the appointment was very 
quick.  The strength of a network and its operational principles is showing itself.  As an 
 
79 USA Today, "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Names a New Leader," USA Today, June 12, 2006; available from 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-06-12-zarqawi-successor_x.htm. [cited June 19, 2006]. 
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example, in all large computer networks, dead nodes can be replaced with nodes of equal 
capability with no disruption to the network.  Most large computer networks today are 
self healing.  If a node goes down, the network either replaces the node automatically or 
the network routes around the dead node.  Within such networks, critical nodes always 
have backups that can be made the primary in a few seconds.  If the new node causes 
problems on a local scale, it can quickly be replaced.  The dead terrorist, al-Zarqawi in 
this instance, was the critical node and, as was observed, had a backup who is now in 
charge — the backup was made the primary.  In human terms, the new leader (Abu 
Hamza al-Muhajer) has the same capabilities.  He will lead the terror attacks in Iraq, 
which have intensified, not diminished as U.S. forces had hoped and many terrorist 
experts failed to predict.  Thus, like a computer network, the Al Qaeda in Iraq terrorist 
network is self healing.  There was no disruption to the network.  If the new primary 
causes problems on a local scale, he too will be quickly replaced. 
This is the best example of how information and intelligence sharing is 
inextricably connected to and empowered by computer networks and how these systems 
follow network theory and principles, which further illustrates why it takes a network to 
defeat a network. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The IT conceptual system architecture for DNIN as described in this chapter, 
including data archiving, storage, security, hardware, and other components, as well as 
fusion center and other data systems incorporation, has been conceptually designed and 
can be implemented (contact author for additional information).  However, the 
architecture will not be discussed here due to space limitations and because it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  Regarding the collection, dissemination, and archiving of 
computer-based information, several issues must be considered: 
1. Cost is always a major consideration.  A cheap functional system will 
always go farther than an expensive “pretty” system.  As an example, the 




$300 million was a failure because it was an expensive system and at the 
time, in the FBI’s defense, the technology simply was not available to 
make it successful. 
2. The data should be stored in a format that is usable by all.  Changing data 
formats during transmission is always fraught with problems. 
3. Data security must be foremost.  Who can change data, who can read data, 
and who can transmit data? 
4. Data cleanliness and verification of data is important since there will 
always be inbound corruption from field and other offices. 
5. Complexity of hardware and software systems becomes critical since the 
more complex a system is, the more difficult it is to repair.  As a rule of 
thumb, the more complex a system, the greater the cost, the larger the 
required staff, and the greater the security risks. 
6. The system must be redundant, easily replaceable, and easily upgradeable.  
Thus, commodity hardware and software should be used. 
 
Additionally, there are many challenges in the field of terrorism that will be 
addressed through the networked, regional computer system of DNIN.  These include: 
• Information sharing related to data collection, sharing, and knowledge 
management. 
• Information access and management. 
• Tracing the dynamic evolution of terrorist groups and how to analyze and 
predict terrorist activities, associations, and trends. 
• How to grant systematic access to system-level intelligence. 
• Enhancing capabilities and reducing/eliminating stovepiping. 
 
The computer network capabilities addresses search engines, information portals, 
information analysis, social network analysis and network theory, chatterbot techniques, 
data archiving, and data transmission.  There are many different data formats in use 
today.  Some are complex, some are confusing, some are proprietary, and some have 
become international standards.  The international standards are usually the cheapest, the 
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simplest to use and maintain, the easiest to translate into different spoken languages, and 
are thus more reliable.  An example is the Hypertext Markup Language and Extended 
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML/XHTML).  These languages are the backbone of 
the World Wide Web, are full featured and easy to use, and can create output in most 
written languages.  It would make logical sense that rather than attempt to reinvent the 
wheel as it were, we should attempt to design the DNIN to take advantage of these 
protocols.  The question may also arise as to how current and future fusion centers can be 
incorporated into the DNIN.  The DNIN will ensure compliance and standardization on a 
national scale, which fusion centers and other systems such as RISS and JRIES do not 
have.  Although there are guidelines for fusion centers to follow, most are built based on 
stakeholder “buy in” and are thus, different in compliance standards and are not 
compatible with each other.  As most of these may be considered legacy systems, at least 
current fusion centers, connecting them to the network will be a complex undertaking in 
regards to budget, coordination, standards, training, and restoration of the network from 
old to new, but it can be efficiently accomplished.  Assuming each fusion center has 
access to the Internet the major problem with incorporation is the material within the 
fusion centers current database(s).  Database compatibility has plagued many intelligence 
collection and dissemination efforts, which is why DNIN will have a compatible database 
that all users will access based upon security level.  To incorporate a current fusion center 
will require that the center strips the data out of their database and send it to DNIN.  This 
data will then become part of the larger data stream.  Once the data from the center has 
been incorporated into the DNIN database, personnel at the center will then be able to 
access DNIN by connecting to any of the regional or national centers and retrieve 
whatever information they need and are cleared for.  Security can be performed in a 
variety of ways.  A common method is termed 3-Factor ID that incorporates biometrics 
such as a finger print or iris scan, passwords, and a token fob (a physical key).  In lay 
terms this is knows as something I know, something I have, and something I am (a 
password, token fob, and finger print respectively).  Thus, the process of incorporating a 
fusion center or any other location is not that difficult, nor is security.  There are those 
who may consider such incorporation very difficult if not impossible, however, the U.S. 
Navy, prior to the advent of the Internet, ran a program called OSIS (Ocean Surveillance 
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Information System.80  This system of intelligence collection and analysis had five to six 
centers that used teletypes and secure-line communications.  OSIS worked exceptionally 
well because it had standards and followed specific compliance rules.  The goal behind 
























80 U.S. Navy, "Naval Intelligence Operations," in Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence 
(Annapolis: U.S. Navy, 1994). 
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V. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
A. UNDERSTANDING ANALYSIS 
This section demonstrates that analysis is an integral part of DNIN.  Analysis and 
analytic capabilities also are networked in approach, although not obvious at first glance.  
Analysis take place within the center section on Figure 12; it can also take place within 
the general intelligence cycle shown on the far right of Figure 12.  As explained 
previously, DNIN would operate under the premise that the majority of intelligence input 
into the system, since it is primarily concerned with domestic intelligence, would come 
from the 800,000 LE officers across the U.S. Outside the field of terrorism research or the 
military there has generally been a lack of awareness, especially by LE, about the best 
method of dealing with terrorism analysis and related activities.  There are several factors 
to be aware of that can impede progress in terrorism or criminal intelligence analysis 
within U.S., especially for LE.  These include:  
• The First and Fourth Amendments 
• Freedom of Speech 
• Reactive versus Proactive Policing 
• Analysis before the fact, not after 
• Lack of Qualified Analysts 
• Integration of other Intelligence Programs81, 82 
While this is by no means a complete list, it demonstrates obstacles to effective 
analysis.  Generally, it has been stated that the FBI and other LE groups are reactive and 
are more interested in building a case for prosecution.  As the criminal element changes 
(e.g., focus on terrorism), more patience is required and criminal and terrorist analysts 
must become more proactive and search for nontraditional suspects, i.e., connect the dots.  
For a large-scale system such as DNIN to work effectively, it is necessary that analytical 
 
81 Other intelligence programs would include the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis 
Center (HITRAC), IC, RISS, JRIES, Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), Justice Department programs and others that are well described on the DHS 
Website at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3350[cited May 1, 2006]. 
82 Allen, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Subcommittee. 
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requirements, practices, and procedures be standardized so that everyone is operating at 
the same level, i.e., “speaking the same language.”  This will require that we look at both 
crime analysis (who is doing what to whom) and compare it to intelligence analysis (a 
focus on the relationships between individuals and groups that are involved in 
conspiratorial activities).   
To obtain a common ground, some of the axioms that should be used as 
guidelines for analysts have been set forth by Watanabe as follows:83
1. Believe in your own professional judgments. 
2. Be aggressive, do not fear being wrong. 
3. Avoid mirror imaging at all costs. 
4. Intelligence is of no value if it is not disseminated. 
5. Coordination is necessary, but do not settle for the least common 
denominator. 
6. When everyone agrees on an issue, something is probably wrong. 
7. The consumer does not care how much you know just tell him what is 
important. 
8. Form is never more important than substance. 
9. Aggressively pursue the collection of information you need. 
10. Do not take the editing process too seriously. 
11. Know your community counterparts and talk to them frequently (see 
transactive memory system discussion in Chapter VII). 
12. Never let your career take precedence over your job. 
13. Being an intelligence analyst is not a popularity contest. 
14. Do not take your job or yourself too seriously. 
 
In the current atmosphere of bureaucracy and budget restrictions, it is common 
practice to attempt to purchase the best computer systems at the lowest available price, 
which may meet the need of a specific agency but which also may lack compatibility 
with those whom you seek to share information.  Because of this and due also to 
implementation phases, costs soar and little training is available, leaving the analyst to 
learn on the fly.  This creates problems, especially since terrorists and criminals are 
 
83 F.  Watanabe, "How to Succeed in the DI: Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts," Studies in 
Intelligence no. 1 (1997); available from http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclass/axioms.html. 
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becoming transnational and not all emanate from outside CONUS.  This requires that the 
LE analysts understand theory, practices, culture, history, and other parameters prior to 
analysis.  There are essentially six keys to analysis of information: 
1. Seek both reported and unreported information. 
2. Validate the accuracy of the information, i.e., corroborate it. 
3. Know your resources, capabilities, and data. 
4. Avoid one dimensionality, look at all factors: how do they relate? 
5. Do not resort to extremes. 
6. As an analyst, immerse yourself in the process. 
 
Because LE numbers are so vast compared to the IC, prevention through proper 
and timely analysis of information is where LE can have the greatest impact.  LE must 
look at deterrence and prevention in a proactive manner and not solely concentrate on 
arrest or target hardening in a reactive manner because neither of the latter addresses the 
factor of fear.  Further, to enable a better analysis of data, LE must use taxonomy for 
terrorist or criminal groups and not treat each as an individual organization.  For example, 
splitting domestic types taxonomically might yield hate groups, militia or patriot groups, 
white supremacy groups, tax protestors, environmental groups, and so forth.  The reason 
behind this is that each group has differing goals, organizational structure, capabilities, 
and resources.  Treating each the same will not yield good results from the associated 
databases and network architecture that was discussed in Figures 12 and 14.   
1. Data Collection 
Acquiring credible, reliable, and corroborative information is the key in the 
information collection process.  The primary objective of intelligence gathering is to deal 
with future dangers, not punish past crimes.84  This is especially true when dealing with 
terrorism, and the results obtained from the network data illustrated in Figure 14 will only 
be as good as the data that is input.  In certain instances the information gathered by LE 
personnel may be more biased since a given LE entity has jurisdictional limitations.  The 
intelligence reports will typically come from an offense or incident report, which 
automatically limits the information or, it may have limited value because it must be 
 
84 P.B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 
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reported and is, thus, reactive.  This intelligence is also subjective because it is written 
from the responding officer’s point of view; thus, as much information as possible should 
be collected and restrictions on that information should be exploited.  The differences 
between a criminal and a terrorist should also be foremost on the minds of LE.  Criminals 
do not seek to have encounters with the law but will generally not shy from them.  In 
contrast, terrorists will expend great efforts to totally avoid LE and, thus, possible 
detection.  Gathering information on terrorists requires analysts to think outside the box 
and to identify nontraditional sources of information.  This factor requires proactive 
policing and paying particular attention to various considerations that should be recorded 
in great detail to obtain a more complete analysis.  These would include the individual, 
relatives, employers, associates, phone logs or subscribers, organizations (groups or 
gangs), businesses, corporations, and educational background as a start.  The collection of 
such data will aid in analysis and become greatly strengthened when shared with other 
agencies since they may have scraps of information that, while meaning little by itself, 
may allow immediate link analysis and readily demonstrate interrelationships and 
associations.   
Because many agencies are understaffed, sharing workloads can offset the 
burdensome task of data collection.  To alleviate this problem, the use of four working 
parts could be shared.  These parts are group information, financial information, 
personnel data, and location data.85  By splitting these among different groups or 
agencies, the workload for each is significantly decreased.  Once the intelligence-
gathering process is initiated and completed in detail, an analysis or interpretation process 
can begin.  One analytical method for performing this task is termed the “loop effect” and 
is illustrated in Figure 15.  Each collection effort or investigation has a starting point.  
Following Figure 15 from the case initiation (bottom center) in clockwise fashion, the 
first two steps in the loop effect are the data-collection steps.  Analysts receive and 
categorize the information as it arrives in an attempt to prioritize according to protocol 
and to identify items needing immediate attention.  The following steps follow in logical 
sequence, with the five “W’s” being who, what, where, when, and why.  Finally, the 
 
85 T. O'Connor, Intelligence Gathering and Information (Rocky Mount: North Carolina Wesleyan 
College, 2002; available from http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/392/spy/terrorism.htm. [cited May 12, 
2006]. 
product is analyzed and disseminated and the cycle begins again.  This is much like the 
general intelligence cycle and follows similar principles.  It should therefore make it 
easier to transcend from reactive to proactive intelligence gathering and analysis by LE. 
 
 
Figure 15. The “Loop Effect” (After Cooper, et al.)86 
 
 
B. ANALYSIS — TRANSFORMING INFORMATION INTO 
INTELLIGENCE 
Many steps are involved in the intelligence process, causing information to arrive 
at intermittent times, which makes organization of the information difficult.  Generally, 
the goal is to deter or apprehend the terrorist or criminal before an attack occurs.  Thus, 
the goal of information analysis in regard to terrorism is to anticipate the action of 
terrorist groups.  Failure to do so could result in catastrophic consequences.  And, while 
much has been said about the need for analysis of terrorist information, it should be 
                                                 
86 J. Cooper, E. Nelson, and M. Ronczkowski, "Tactical/Investigative Analysis of Targeted Crimes," 




realized that terrorists constantly learn from their predecessors.  New generation terrorists 
analyze the mistakes made by former comrades who were captured or killed and plan 
their strategy accordingly.  This added factor requires an even greater analytic capability 
among LE and the IC.   
The DNIN system arms the analyst with an arsenal of databases, resources, 
checklists, and variables that can be used to validate inferences, probabilities, and 
hypotheses.  Once data are consolidated, a number of analytical techniques can be 
performed against the data to develop a model.  At the initial stage an analyst seeks to 
identify potential targets, relationships, associates, time lines, and other information.  
Each piece of information is carefully analyzed.  To avoid incorrect assumptions at this 
phase, the results should be reevaluated against the “big picture” in order to validate 
them, which is particularly necessary since terrorist groups are known to have sleeper 
cells.  After comparing against the “big picture,” spatial and temporal analysis and other 
quantitative techniques can be applied to further refine the product.  During analysis one 
should be careful not to focus solely on one-on-one relationships, or other associations 
may be missed.  Consequently, analysts cannot rely upon only one method to verify 
information.  Five of the most prevalent methods of intelligence analysis are link 
analysis, which is well suited to network theory, matrix Tables, timelines, event flow 
charts and the Heuer analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH).   
1. Link Analysis Charts 
Link analysis charts provide visual or graphical overviews of interrelationships 
and are excellent tools for long-term, complex investigation.  Such analysis can be 
performed with a variety of standard software; Figure 13 is a good example of link 
analysis although it is somewhat more complex than an average investigation but is well 
suited to terrorist group analysis.  There are two basic points to remember: (1) When 
connecting relationships by using lines confirmed relationships are denoted with solid 
lines and unconfirmed relationships are denoted with a dashed line.  An arrow will 
indicate the direction of the relationship.  (2) Groups are usually indicated by boxes, and 
individuals are represented by smaller circles or solid dots.  Link charts can reflect 
individuals, infrastructure, currency, computers, or other parameters. 
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2. Matrix Tables 
Matrix Tables are often directional and are generally used in support of a link 
analysis chart.  These are commonly known Tables with the names of individuals 
generally entered alphabetically with the group name on the bottom line.  As associations 
are uncovered, symbols for various criteria are entered into the appropriate boxes.  The 
most commonly used symbols are circles, shaded and unfilled, plus signs, equal signs, 
and checkmarks.  Matrix Tables are excellent analytical tools for tracking the flow of 
goods, weapons, money, and often drugs.   
3. Event Flow Charts 
These chart types are used as a visualization tool for relationships among events 
and are similar to time lines.  The two most common methods are the Birch method and 
Mercer method.  The Birch method uses similar rules as a link chart wherein if an event 
is confirmed, the box is drawn with a solid line; a dashed line is used if unconfirmed.  
The Mercer method places the year on the top line, the applicable months on the second 
line, and the years separated on the month line, using two vertical lines.  An example is 
shown in Figure 16. 
4. Heuer — Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) Assessment 
Method 
The ACH is an eight-step process which is used to enhance judgment and 
minimize analytical pitfalls.87  This eight-step process is outlined below: 
1. Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered.  Use a group of 
analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities. 
2. Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against 
each hypothesis. 
3. Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence 
down the side.  Analyze the “diagnosticity” of the evidence and 
arguments, i.e., identify the items that are most helpful in judging 
the relative likelihood of the hypotheses. 
4. Refine the matrix.  Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence 
and arguments that have no diagnostic value. 
5. Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each 
hypothesis.  Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather 
than prove them. 
 
87 Heuer, "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis." 
6. Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of 
evidence.  Consider the consequences for your analysis if that 
evidence is wrong, misleading, or subject to differing 
interpretation. 
7. Report conclusions.  Discuss the relative likelihood of all the 
hypotheses, not only the most likely ones. 
8. Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate that 
events are taking a different course than expected. 
 
The ACH method is fairly comprehensive and complements the “loop effect” that 
was discussed earlier.  These methods can be used separately or together, which will 
greatly enhance analytical capabilities.  New software such as Netmap is beginning to 
replace some of these methods, but there is sometimes the tendency to lose focus when 
using technology only so both these methods and computer applications should be used 
conjointly, which can be accomplished with DNIN.  Both are useful when performing 
threat assessment and vulnerability analysis.   
 
 
Figure 16. Mercer Method Event Chart.  
 
 
C. PREDICTIVE TECHNIQUES 
True intelligence analysis is always predictive.  A single event can shape the 
future of a field of study, direction of research, or outcome of a problem.  The goal is to 
be able to predict this event or scenario.  For example, during the early age of computers, 
IBM approached Gary Kildall, President of Digital Research Intergalactic, to run 
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software on IBM’s personal computers.  On the date they were supposed to meet, Kildall 
decided to go flying in his new personal airplane.  The meeting did not take place and 
IBM approached Bill Gates, head of Microsoft instead, Gates developed the DOS 
operating system for personal computers and thus changed/shaped the future of the 
computer industry.  Another example is Henri Darcy who discovered how fluid flows 
through geologic media in his famous experiment in France in which he passed water 
through large cylinders of sand.  He was able to accurately describe fluid flow in the 
vertical direction, but because the flow was confined in cylinders there was no outward 
movement and he failed to anticipate it.  Thus, for transport in soils of hazardous 
materials, such as radioactive waste, the Darcy model could not accurately predict flow 
because the confined nature of Darcy’s experiment failed to account for outward flux 
(divergence).  L.A. Richards, a graduate student at Iowa State University, developed an 
equation called the Richard’s equation that predicted this and changed the history of this 
field of science.  It is this equation that developed the groundwork for storage of 
radioactive waste by the Department of Energy (DOE) at the Yucca Mountain Site in 
Nevada.  Both of these events were the actions of individuals, and they were not truly 
predictable.  However, the principles of causation should apply well to convergent 
phenomena, and prediction should be possible through proper analysis.  The objective is 
to observe long-established patterns that have been used in science and organizational 
planning so that we are able to describe the past and present state of a target and make a 
qualified prediction about the future.  Network theory, the operational principal of DNIN, 
is particularly applicable to this process. 
An example is the Kalman Filter, which is a method of combining data to 
estimate an entity’s current state and evaluating the forces acting on the entity to predict 
its future state.88  The Kalman Filter methodology uses three predictive mechanisms: (1) 
extrapolation, (2) projection, and (3) forecasting.  Each follows the approach of assessing 
forces that act on the entity.  Essentially, an extrapolation assumes no change between 
present and future states; a projection assumes there is a change between these states, and 
 
88 James A Tindall, "Deconvolution of Plant Type(S) for Homeland Security Enforcement Using 
Remote Sensing on a UAV Collection Platform," Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 1 (2006). 
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a forecast assumes both change and an addition of new forces.  The basic steps of the 
Kalman Filter method are as follows: 
1. Estimate one past state and the present, i.e.  a model.  For example, a 
model of a terrorist organization. 
2. Determine what forces acted on the entity to bring it to the present state. 
3. Make a projection — estimate the changes in existing forces that are 
likely to occur. 
4. Make a forecast — begin with the projection and identify new forces that 
may act on the entity then incorporate their effect. 
5. Determine the likely future state of the entity based on an assessment of 
these forces. 
Further, the Kalman Filter can be applied on a dual process for both analyzing 
intelligence and for identification of various parameters such as from surveillance and 
reconnaissance of the U.S. Mexico border or other targets, which is a major issue before 
DHS and congress.89, 90
In actuality a link analysis can be performed to develop the answers to these steps, 
but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, it demonstrates the necessity of 
analysis in the networked approach to intelligence sharing being discussed.  A qualitative 
force analysis is the simplest approach to projection and forecasting, i.e., it is easiest to 
perform simply by answering the following questions: 
1. What forces (technology, organizational structure, etc.) have affected the 
entity during the last several years (Al Qaeda would be a good entity to 
practice on)? 
2. Which five or six forces have more impact than others? 
3. What forces are expected to affect Al Qaeda over the next several years? 
4. Which five or six forces are likely to have more impact than the others? 
5. What are the main differences between questions 2 and 4? 
6. What is implied by these differences for Al Qaeda? 
 
89 Tindall, Deconvolution of Plant Type(S) for Homeland Security Enforcement. 
90 Strohm, "Border Intelligence Plan Still in 'Early Stages,' Official Says.” 
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Continuing with the example of Al Qaeda as a target for analysis, it is important 
to investigate the past and present state, determine a likely transition path from present to 
future, and determine the expected future state of Al Qaeda or another terrorist group 
such as Hezbollah.  Center this process on Al Qaeda, i.e., the target.  In this way it is 
target centric, and the actions of one organization will affect decisions of an opposing 
organization in terms of analysis, i.e., either by an LE or IC group.  Thus, sharing 
becomes critical and is pulled into DNIN not only at the geographic and computer centric 
components, but the analysis phase as well, and will lead to a much better or likely 
actionable intelligence product.  Further, an excellent method to use this approach with is 
to develop a scenario of a future Al Qaeda model, which would highlight large forces that 
shaped this future.  It must be remembered that intelligence analysis must be predictive to 
be useful. 
Digressing to the Kalman Filter method, extrapolation is one of the easiest 
mechanisms to perform, and the most conservative.  Extrapolation extends a linear curve 
on a graph based on historical performance.  An example would be a plot of the price per 
gallon of gasoline since the early 1960s.  Continuing the plot into the future, what would 
the price be?  Be aware that an extrapolation does not account for a change in forces that 
act on the price of gasoline.  Therefore, extrapolation is usually accurate for the short 
term, assuming an accurate starting point and an understanding of the direction of 
movement.  It is inaccurate for the long term because of narrow focus and because it 
negates dynamic forces, i.e., everything remains constant and does not change with time.  
Also, if the initial starting point for the extrapolation was inaccurate, the model it yields 
will also be inaccurate. 
Projection is more reliable than extrapolation because it predicts a range of the 
future or likely future because projection assumes that past forces will change with time.  
There is a range of possible outcomes, and all should be carefully considered, i.e., 
analyzed.  As an example, in the GWOT one could assume that the U.S. and its partners 
win, Al Qaeda wins, or there is a stalemate.  What forces will act to influence who wins 
and why?  Do any of the influencing events sway each other?  Is it possible to assess the 
outcome of particular events directly, or is there a domino effect between events upon 
which the outcome depends?  A particularly nice way to look at this is by using an 
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influence tree, which surprisingly follows fault-tree analysis that is used in network 
theory.  Without illustrating the process or mathematical components, the influence tree 
approach to evaluation of possible outcomes is more convincing to customers than an 
unsupported analytic judgment about the prospects for who wins.  Other processes that 
can be included are influence net models, correlation and regression, probability 
estimates (these can become fairly quantitative and deal with point and interval 
estimation and the use of Monte Carlo simulation), and sensitivity analysis.  Even if a 
formal probability estimate is used or similar mechanisms, they generally have a strong 
subjective element that should be avoided if possible.  Utilization of the influence tree 
and, therefore, network analysis principles will help avoid this subjectivity. 
Projections based on forecasting usually work better than extrapolations for the 
long term.  Generally, this is because new developments with time, which could not be 
foreseen by experts, have a disruptive effect on the outcome of the analysis; thus, 
forecasting can take these into account.  A major objective of forecasting in intelligence 
is to define alternative futures of the target, Al Qaeda in this example, and not just the 
most likely future.  The alternative futures are generally scenarios as discussed 
previously.  Forecasting will provide the highest possible level of prediction to customers 
and will generally gain their confidence.  As with network theory, a forecasting 
methodology requires analytic tools and principles and analysts who have a significant 
understanding of many technologies and disciplines — they must have the ability to think 
about issues in a nonlinear fashion.  Why? Because forecasting is highly nonlinear; that is 
why it is generally better than extrapolation.  Multidisciplinary individuals can pull 
together concepts from several technical fields and assess political, economic, technical, 
and social factors that influence the target.  This breadth of understanding is recognition 
of the similarities of the principles from these fields and the underlying forces that make 
them work.  However, forecasting is not an exact science; it is also based on a number of 
assumptions: (1) the future cannot be predicted only forecast; (2) forecasts will be 
misleading if they do not consider future developments in such areas as culture, 
technology, economics, institutional change and so forth; and (3) the most likely or 
alternative futures of the target are defined by human factors that include judgment, 
creativity, and imagination and are thus somewhat subjective.  Further, forecasts are 
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judged on clarity, plausibility, credibility, relevance, urgency, advantage, and technical 
quality, which serve as filters for the information analytical process.  If a given scenario 
cannot pass through these filters, it is rejected. 
The use of DNIN on a national level, in which more relevant information can be 
garnered, will improve the intelligence analytical process because both are related to 
network theory and have a direct influence or domino effect on each other. 
 
D. SHAPING FORCES AND ORGANIZATION ANALYSIS 
Shaping forces and the analytical techniques that focus on the force and how it 
pertains to organizational structures are many.  Generally, forces include economic, 
political, social, environmental, military, cultural, and religious.  Each becomes important 
in its own right but is generally influenced by one or more of the other forces.  For 
example, the U.S. IC settled on its basic organizational structure and decision-making 
process in the late 1940s and 1950s and patterned them after the dominant technology 
and business models of that era.  The IC also followed the traditional hierarchal model of 
the military, and now, after more than 50 years, the IC and other intelligence groups find 
themselves in a radically different world that has been changed by technology and in 
which a horizontal networked environment proves more effective, logical, and efficient.  
However, the IC has remained at rest because of opposition to change and is thus a 
shaping force, one of the factors that helped cause intelligence failures leading to 9/11.  
Though most organizations resist change to a point, it is necessary at some place in time 
to begin shaping with the forces or become obsolete.  That time has arrived within the IC, 
and it is now time to make the choice to remain in the organizational structure of the past 
or to move forward.  John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of RAND Corporation argued 
that, “Future conflicts will be fought more by networks than by hierarchies, and whoever 
masters the network form will gain major advantages.”  Networks and networking are 
two of the major shaping forces that are moving us toward change.  If we resist this 
change, the U.S. and its partners will lose the GWOT.  Thus, the goal would be to follow 
Newton’s third law such that for a given amount of effort we can effect a small change in 
a larger system; the IC in this instance.   
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As there are shaping forces, so too there are counter forces, but not necessarily of 
the same nature.  For example, a wise organization is not likely to play to its opponent’s 
strengths but to its weaknesses.  Al Qaeda is an excellent example in which they focus 
asymmetric attacks that are both unconventional and highly lethal.  These same 
asymmetric counter forces exist in organizations and industries since they attempt to 
achieve cost asymmetry through defensive tactics that have a favorable cost differential 
between them and the adversarial organization.  The reaction can be nothing short of 
asymmetrical.  Even the U.S. military is using such countervailing forces in Afghanistan 
and Iraq because they realize that large-force measures of battalions that worked before 
no longer work well against an insurgency using asymmetric tactics.  To involve shaping 
forces processes requires the investigation of contamination, synergy, strength, weakness, 
time delay, and a feedback process.  However, this is a networked process, and 
governments and large organizations such as the IC have a disadvantage in this 
intervention because they observe one facet at any point in time, generally using a 
simplistic approach.  The networked world we now live in is both dynamic and complex; 
remaining in such a functional state and disregarding the shaping forces that will steer an 
organization in a certain direction will result in catastrophe.  This results because of 
slower feedback processes and a more cumbersome structure.  The networked approach 
to regions and analysis will tend toward agility and, thus, a rapid reaction for planning, 
prevention and response.   
1. Organizational Analysis    
There are many ways to analyze an organization’s structure, but there are three 
primary ways: (1) examine the size and capabilities; (2) assess the effectiveness of the 
structure; and (3) analyze the relationships among groups in the organizational hierarchy.  
Network theory is thus, particularly applicable.  This is because of the ability of network 
theory to assess structural effectiveness.  In effect, an organizational analysis is a network 
analysis that analyzes organizational structure because the latter does not sufficiently 
distinguish between members (nodes) and their relationships (links).  When applied to the 
organization, this is generally referred to as social network analysis.  There are distinct 
advantages.  First, an analyst may be interested in comparing the network of trade in 
agricultural products to the network of trade in chemical manufacturing.  A computer can 
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do this in a few minutes, and it may show relationships between chemicals that could be 
used for bioterror against agricultural production or display a similar network.  Second, 
the formal methods for representing network data utilizing graphs and mathematics can 
suggest parameters that we may look for in the data that may not have occurred to us if 
we presented our data using verbal descriptions.  Additionally, the node of most 
importance in the network can be identified, which can be a person, place, relationship, or 
other parameter.  The analysis may also be able to yield why this node is most important. 
Another organizational analysis concept is that of equivalence.  For example, 
what if an individual such as Osama bin Laden were removed from the Al Qaeda 
network?  The result would be dependent on bin Laden’s centrality or uniqueness to Al 
Qaeda.  Would he be missed or would someone else easily assume his leadership role, 
i.e., would he have an equivalent?  In network terminology bin Laden would either have 
substitutability, stochastic equivalence, or role equivalence.  That is, bin Laden could be 
interchanged with another individual if there is an identical relationship of some form.  
The stochastic equivalence, though more sophisticated, would apply if the probabilities of 
another individual linked to the network through any particular node were the same.  
Role equivalence implies that two individual play the same role in different 
organizations, even if they have no common acquaintances.  Thus, what if bin Laden 
were captured or killed?  Would equivalence make a difference in Al Qaeda in continuing 
the GWOT, or would some other group(s) take up the slack? 
When analyzing a group or organization through network methodology, the 
analyst must be aware of the five principal types of networks: 
1. Vertical – organized across a value chain. 
2. Technology – alliances that allow maintaining technical superiority. 
3. Development – an alliance focused on developing new products or 
processes. 
4. Ownership – a dominant firm owns part or all of its suppliers.  The DoD 
and specific members of the IC are a good example. 
5. Political – focused on political or regulatory gains for members. 
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Variations of these principal network types are possible.  For example, it is well 
known that religious and cultural ties in the Middle East can be the basis for a type of 
hybrid terrorist network, which is a form of radicalization.91 This is why analytic 
capabilities are important from a network perspective.  Another important issue is 
technology analysis within the network viewpoint, but this issue will not be discussed 
here. 
 
E.   SUMMARY 
Intelligence analysis is a key factor of the DNIN system, which will address the 
following components in intelligence collection and analysis: 
• The six keys to analysis of information — the computer system and relational 
databases can look at multi-dimensionality that will enhance analysis. 
• Prevention through proper and timely analysis where LE can have the greatest 
impact, particularly in the area of civil liberties since LE conforms legally to 
this process.  The DNIN will greatly assist in this role. 
• Sharing workloads to reduce burdensome tasks of data collection. 
• Expediting analysis — the DNIN system arms the analyst with an arsenal of 
databases, resources, and check lists to validate inferences, probabilities, and 
hypotheses. 
• DNIN would utilize five of the most prevalent methods of intelligence 
analysis, which are well suited to network theory — link analysis, matrix 
Tables, timelines, event flow, and Heuer ACH.  DNIN also has the capability 
to absorb others. 
• Pooled intelligence within DNIN through proper analysis is likely to lead to 
more actionable intelligence. 
 
 
91 Allen, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Subcommittee. 
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• Shaping forces of networks will force change on the IC and LE groups.  
Resisting this change rather than embracing it will mean losing the GWOT.  
Counter forces such as asymmetric warfare can also be dealt with by using 
defensive tactics with a favorable cost differential. 
The DNIN approach will tend toward agility by focusing on organizational 
analysis through examining size and capabilities, assessing effectiveness and structure, 
and analyzing the relationship(s) among groups in the organizational hierarchy.  Agility 
is necessary if we are to counter unconventional enemies. 
Another aspect critically important to intelligence analysis and sharing and why 
DNIN becomes so important is the loss of institutional knowledge that is beginning to 
befall the IC and that will increase during the next few years.  This knowledge loss is due 



























                                                
VI. OVERCOMING INTELLIGENCE-SHARING POLICY ISSUES 
A. THE INTERAGENCY CONUNDRUM — CONTROVERSY OF 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND SHARING WITHIN CONUS 
The real key to information sharing is to manage knowledge, not information 
because there is too much information, but not enough knowledge.  After all, would not 
knowledge be actionable information?  This statement is analogous to “all intelligence is 
information, but not all information is intelligence.”92  Therefore, knowledge 
management and not information is the key to effective intelligence sharing. 
Throughout the manufacturing boom in the U.S., teams of personnel in factories 
and businesses worked together to complete tasks.  As times have changed and 
technology has advanced, the information- and knowledge-based enterprises of today 
require greater levels of sharing and a more intimate, higher level of interpersonal skills 
among personnel.  Ensuring the free flow of information within an organization and 
across a multi-agency culture requires not only a personnel adaptation, but a 
technological adaptation as well.  The technical abilities are present to share information 
throughout agencies, but one must ask if an agency official needs access or should be 
perusing “military-order-of-battle information” in his or her search for intelligence.  
Obviously, the answer would be no; thus, as the geographic regions for intelligence 
sharing evolve, there should also be a common computer or virtual collaboration space 
set up into which all agencies and groups involved in intelligence sharing can place data 
and from which data can be extracted.  Naturally, the DHS IA would be the logical place 
for this system to be established.  In this manner, the need-to-know would be replaced 
with need-to-share that was highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Reports.  After all, 
within the IC, it is the method and source of the intelligence that is most important.  
These would never need to be shared with other agencies unless directed by authority to 
do so.  For the general intelligence officer, analyst, or LE personnel, the only desire is the 
information that may be pertinent to them, e.g., are we going to be attacked, what is the 
likely method, and when.  These personnel do not care about how or where the 
 
92 Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World: An 
Anthology (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Group, 2004). 
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information was obtained.  As early as 2002, perhaps sooner, information clearing houses 
have been discussed.  One in particular, called the Intelligence Community System for 
Information Sharing (ICSIS) was discussed if the DHS agency was actually created.93  
The proposed system would provide controlled interfaces that will allow the IC to 
automate the process of stripping out from classified documents top-secret sources and 
methods of intelligence collection, as well as automating the sharing of that intelligence 
with analysts and officials with “secret” or lower security clearances.  Such a system, to 
work properly in a network-strengthened IC would need to have an access point at each 
of the regional intelligence-sharing centers depicted in Figure 2.  This system is also 
similar to the Regional Information Sharing System Network used by state and local 
criminal intelligence groups.94
 
B. REGIONAL STRUCTURES WITHIN AGENCIES 
Most U.S Government agencies operate on a regional basis, e.g., they have offices 
within various regions within CONUS under which a varied number of states operate.  
This enables that agency to more easily coordinate Federal operations outside of 
Washington, D.C., on a reduced scale, synchronizes programs, enhances management 
flow, and otherwise helps the government keep abreast of agency issues within CONUS.  
This regionalized structure is just as important as interagency coordination and 
cooperation.  The difficult part of regionalization is that each agency, including 
components of the U.S. military, has not only different regions, but different-sized 
regions, some of which may cross borders within a state rather state boundary lines.  
These structures may make sense to the specific agency, but the disparity among regions 
significantly inhibits interagency coordination so that any advantages gained by specific 
agencies from their unique structure are offset by the great disadvantage to coordinating 
and unifying the broader national interagency effort.95
 
93 Dan Verton, "U.S. Intelligence Community Faces Info-Sharing Overhaul," Computerworld, 2002; 
available from http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/0,10801,74053,00.html. [cited 
March 20 2006]. 
94 Ibid., 3. 
95 Bunil B. Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," Policy Review 1 (2005). 
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For greater effectiveness, it is now time for the IC and those related with it to 
convert to a unified regional structure just as the military did when they adopted a 
“unified command plan” in 1946 after WWII.  This new regionalized structure should 
follow the same pattern as the military (one command per region, joint command 
headquarters composed of personnel from each agency involved, and final authority for 
the director/commander of the regional headquarters).  The uniqueness of having 
personnel staff the regional office from all over the region is that all agencies would 
represent themselves, but that a culture of sharing would be developed through that new 
group, as has been explained previously.  Further, the agency or group owning DNIN 
would be in closer contact with stakeholders of each region and if a stakeholder such as 
the U.S. Coast Guard wanted to make one contact call to convey information, the process 
would be greatly simplified.  For the most effective planning and conduct of policy of 
operations, it is imperative that each region have clear lines of authority and geographic 
boundaries if possible.  The latter is no different that an LE officer going out of his or her 
jurisdiction.  Once he or she realizes they are about to do so, they can quickly pass the 
baton to an LE colleague who does have the authority so that they have, in effect, carried 
out a joint operation.  Therefore, it is easily observable that aligning a variety of regional 
structures into a single regional structure would foster a unity of effort.  Desai points out 
that, had the DoD, State Department, CIA, and other agencies had a single interagency 
regional structure in 1994, the genocide in Rwanda could have been prevented.96  In 
about 100 days, an estimated 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis, were murdered.97  This was 
a high price to pay for lack of drawing a few lines of regionalization in the sand.  Not 
only did lack of unified regionalization cause a lack of operational functionality, it 
significantly, in this case, decreased world opinion of the United States.  In regard of 
Homeland Security, it may be necessary to create sub regions for various agencies for 
congruity.  If there is to be a national policy against terrorism, how can it be effectively 
conducted given the difference in regional structures between all the varied agencies?  
Unifying the DNIN regional structure, as proposed in Figure 4, would enhance unity of 
effort at the state and regional levels and, more importantly, the national level.  The need 
 
96 Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle."  
97 Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_Genocide. [cited May 1, 2006]. 
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derives from the necessity to “connect the dots” from multiple individuals and locations 
within and without CONUS.  There must be a regionalized network that fights for the 
U.S. against terrorism, not a disparate network that succeeds only in creating complex 
sharing issues.  The state fusion centers may fit into this latter group that, although 
having clear goals, are not yet linked on a national or regional basis in most instances and 
therefore, lack the sharing capacity desired by DHS.98  Ultimately, people and ideas will 
matter most for consensus. 
 
C. INTEGRATED OPERATIONS — INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY AND 
OVERSIGHT — STEPS FOR MAKING INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
WORK 
Intelligence sharing within CONUS is plagued with discontinuity, turf wars, poor 
cooperation, and other factors.  Essential steps that must be taken to improve intelligence 
and information sharing are: 
• Implementation of a mutual operations doctrine. 
• Relinquishing control for the sharing process to a single authority. 
• Development of a regional structure. 
• Developing personnel policies that will foster cooperation. 
There are 16 primary intelligence agencies in the U.S. IC.  Despite the fact that 
the entire IC (www.intelligence.gov) depicts cohesiveness, cooperation among IC 
members is less than desired, which was highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report; a 
systemic problem was widely acknowledged.  Compounding this problem are other 
diverse elements within intelligence including: economic, diplomatic, corporate, and law 
enforcement (LE).  This volatile mix creates an interagency conundrum (riddle), about 
the best method to share intelligence.  While it can be argued that sharing intelligence 
relates to policy and civil liberties issues, the real reasons can be condensed to authority 
and oversight agencies and cultures.  To focus on one individual agency as the root 
problem is a mistake. 
 
98 Allen, Hearing of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Subcommittee. 
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Due to blame levied on the FBI as a result of 9/11, it has been attempting to 
transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts rather than react to them as 
crimes.  In late 2004 the FBI reorganized part of its agency creating a National Security 
Branch (NSB) under direction of the Deputy Director.  Within the NSD is the Directorate 
of Intelligence.  The purpose of this reorganization, i.e., the creation of the Directorate of 
Intelligence, was to drive and coordinate intelligence work across the FBI and the U.S. 
IC, build a cadre of well-qualified analysts, establish a dedicated intelligence element in 
every FBI field office, and increase intelligence production and the development of 
counter-terrorism sources.  Many feel this reorganization is just reshuffling and that the 
FBI remains ineffective in capturing terrorists, especially since only one person was 
prosecuted involving the 9/11 attacks.  Despite spending millions on reorganization of the 
FBI little has changed, they remain as ineffective at sharing intelligence as before, which 
is supposed to be the lead DI agency’s role.  An elitist prevailing attitude denies those in 
other agencies who have great ideas from expressing them and contributing to the 
problem.  It is the authors and others opinion that the currently operated state fusion 
centers are following along this same path although there is more promise of sharing 
among LE groups.  This also fosters the premise of the need-to-know versus need-to-
share.  If one is outside the agency, there exists less likelihood of a personal relationship 
and therefore, no sharing.  The conundrum between culture and sharing is therefore 
manifest. 
Agency cultures are characterized by different goals, policies, varied sets of 
values and other characteristics such as decision-making methods, leadership style, and 
communication policies, all of which contribute to problematic cooperation and 
integrated operations.  Can differing cultures and separate agencies cooperate, coordinate, 
and be successful in accomplishing specific tasks and goals?  Yes.  A good example is 
the U.S. military.  Despite differing cultures, in times of crises they are able to coordinate 
complex tasks to achieve mission goals and objectives.  Desert Storm is a good example, 
which involved not only U.S. troops, but troops from various countries as well.  This 
cooperative/joint attitude is exactly what we need in fighting the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). 
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It is unlikely that marginalizing individual agency cultures would be successful in 
intelligence sharing.  Instead, a strong interagency culture should provide the 
foundational basis for cooperation.  There are four factors that encumber a shift from an 
agency to an interagency culture and from adequately sharing intelligence.  These include 
a lack of doctrine, lack of a single authority (who’s in charge), a regional structure that 
would allow for more timely and efficient sharing of data, and people policies, i.e., 
personnel who really do the job.  This will be further explained in Chapter V. 
1. Mutual Operations Doctrine 
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNRA) mandated 
development of policies and doctrines for coordination between branches of the military; 
it became known as the “joint doctrine” and has become very successful.  Operation 
Desert Storm was considered a work of art in military circles, so great were the 
cooperation, collaboration, and effectiveness, which included joint international forces 
operating under a single authority.  Clearly, joint doctrine serves as a good example for 
development of a similar national doctrine/policy for HS and intelligence sharing among 
agencies.  Such a doctrine must be flexible enough to evolve and change in regard to 
technological advances and strategic concepts, but should not change based on personal 
preferences due to political office rotations or individual agency culture.  This implies 
that a networking approach such as DNIN would be preferred. 
A number of Presidential Directives (PDD) has attempted to improve failures in 
interagency cooperation, specifically PDD 25 and PDD 56, which discuss managing 
peace-keeping forces and complex incident operations.  Any interagency mutual doctrine 
should emphasize all elements of national power (LE, the IC in general, and economics) 
and recognize all parties (military, LE and others) to prevent diminished capabilities and 
promote unity.  A mutual interagency doctrine must also avoid dominance by an 
individual agency — examples would be the FBI and CIA who dominate domestic and 
international intelligence and exemplify the lack of mutual trust and sharing.  An example 
is the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that is virtually owned by the FBI although 
many other agencies and groups contribute to the process.  The single agency control of 
this sharing entity undermines its effectiveness.  Finally, a mutual interagency doctrine  
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should attempt a vertical integration of intelligence from the local LE level up through 
the national level to include the international arena, since most threats may likely be 
initiated abroad. 
2. Single Authority 
A single authority is more respected than multiple heads, less confusing, and 
usually has better grasp of doctrinal development and responsibility.  The creation of 
DHS was a good step, bringing 22 agencies under its auspices; if managed properly, this 
will enhance coordination of each agency’s role and its effect on HS.  Prior to 
establishment of DHS, the President and Congress established the Homeland Security 
Council (HSC).  Then, in September 2003 and March 2004, an “all hazards” Initial 
Response Plan and National Incident Management System (NIMS) plan was published.  
Both of these plans attempted to improve interagency coordination, but there remains a 
dilemma, of which hurricane Katrina was an example.  The National Security Act of 
1947 established the National Security Council (NSC) with authority for coordinating 
interagency efforts, but not interagency doctrine; its role is to manage the process.  The 
NSC is not independent of the process, but involved in it, which creates significant 
problems.  Only the HSC has influence over interagency coordination through the HSPDI 
and Homeland Security Act of 2002.  With the development of the DHS IA we have, for all 
intents and purposes, a domestic intelligence (DI) agency, the new IA, established initially as 
the IAIP after 9/11 to enhance intelligence collection and sharing among LE groups and the 
IC agencies in CONUS.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established IAIP within the 
DHS to provide intelligence integration and to merge into one organization the capability to 
identify and assess future terrorist threats.  Immediately after the IAIP was established, 
President Bush (January 28, 2003, State of the Union) created the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center (TTIC) as a single source of collection and analysis of all terrorism intelligence, 
which has evolved into the National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC).99  Within months, 
the terrorist screening center (TSC) that disseminates terrorist watch list information, was 
formed; managed by the Director of the FBI, TSC also works with NCTC.  The TSC and 
NCTC are located in a joint facility; tragically, the IAIP, despite Congressional mandate to 
carry out its intelligence duties, is not located with these groups.  After four years, the IAIP 
 
99John Scott Redd, "Statement to the United States Senate" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2005).  
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(Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection) has been separated and IA has 
become the Office of Intelligence Analysis within DHS, which has appointed a Chief 
Intelligence Officer, Mr. Charles Allen, reporting directly to Secretary Chertoff.100  Allen 
is responsible for coordinating with the domestic Intelligence Community and providing 
guidance on HS specific issues.  A specific agency needs to be named to promote 
information sharing and dissemination of DI throughout all levels of government as well 
as budgetary oversight.  Could DHS IA assume this new this role? While it may not be 
the perfect choice, a single collection hub, i.e., single authority, is necessary if we are to 
achieve effective intelligence sharing.  Also, that hub likely should not be an LE agency 
but an intelligence agency since they, in the opinion of many, are better trained to collect 
and analyze intelligence information.  Thus, if not DHS IA, what agency/organization 
could pull mutual doctrine together? 
3. Regional Structure 
Due to the scope and scale of intelligence collection within the U.S., discussion of 
a regional structure is important.  Whether or not information is collected within a 
regional framework (especially when involving LE), will determine the overall 
effectiveness of intelligence-sharing goals.  Adequate intelligence sharing within the U.S. 
will require the incorporation of the 800,000 police officers representing 18,000 agencies 
and 27,000 FBI agents, only 11,400 of whom are in CONUS, as well as many other 
personnel from various agencies and the IC.  Due to scale and scope, a national program 
will not work without regionalization of the process, i.e., regional centers.  While JRIES 
and RISS operate on a regional basis, these programs are narrowly focused and utilize a 
piecemeal approach, i.e., they are not national in scope nor do they have the network 
strength for the regional operations to become a dedicated national network.  Further, 
their IT components are not compatible with other groups or fusion centers.  As another 
example and in contrast, MI5 works with only 56 agencies utilizing about 2,000 
personnel and, while it is effective, the land area of the UK is about 245,000 sq km (about 
the size of Oregon) compared to 9 M sq km for the U.S, i.e., 37 times greater.  Thus, the 
UK would be more comparable to a region within the U.S. such as that served by JRIES, 
RISS, or HSIN.  There are simply too many agencies and personnel involved within the 
 
100 DHS Staff, "Press Room: Biographies," Department of Homeland Security, 2005; available from 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=84&content=4935. [cited February 4, 2006]. 
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U.S. not to regionalize.  The military model — one command for each region under the 
authority of the regional commander who may be from any branch of service — is 
effective.  Thus, within DNIN the regional director could be DHS, FBI, or from another 
agency as appropriate.  Aligning all regional structures into a single regional structure 
would promote efficiency and enable better planning and performance of operations, 
intelligence would be from a similar reference base, would facilitate interregional 
cooperation among the various participants, would work better from a national incident 
response framework, and would reduce the management load on a national scale by 
reducing the number of individuals through appointment of regional leaders who would 
have the necessary link to the national level.  This structure would also be able to recruit 
significant LE resources for a variety of problems outside intelligence collection. 
4. People Policies 
Interagency cooperation requires that culture be nurtured, in cooperative terms, 
within each agency.  The GNRA has already set a precedent by implementing personnel 
policies to ensure development of military officers from various branches who would 
form a core of experts for operations within a joint culture.  Regionally, staff duties 
would be to the interagency, not to individual agencies, which would enhance multi-
agency trust and sharing.  Positions would be filled by personnel with many and varied 
experiences, an á la carte board of experts.  A renewed focus on personnel policy within a 
regionalized structure would diminish this long-term problem as close personal 
relationships develop with time. 
To effectively achieve intelligence sharing we need to ensure a national and 
international strategic approach in addition to improving cooperation between the IC and 
LE.  To accomplish this we must: 
• Develop a mutual operations doctrine.   
• Appoint of a single authority for national command and oversight. 
• Regionalize intelligence-gathering efforts to reduce management and 




• Develop good personnel policies in regard to cultural change and bias and 
development of relationships through these policies that foster trust by 
dissolving specific single cultures in exchange for promoting an interagency 
culture. 
 
D. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND DISSEMINATION ISSUES IN INFORMATION 
SHARING  
The recent wiretaps linked to NSA under direction of the President caused quite a 
stir in the American populace.  Are we to believe that liberty and security are in 
opposition to one another? Can we forfeit national security and still survive economically 
in the linked global world and win the war on terrorism, or do we have to forfeit civil 
liberties to fight this war? These are the questions that face the intelligence agencies 
within the U.S. despite whether the CIA or another agency is allowed to collect domestic 
intelligence; these issues will not go away.  The question then becomes how to we deal 
with them? 
Since 9/11 there has been an increase in general security measures for borders, 
critical infrastructure, and other issues, which many feel is justified.  There has been a 
federalization of airport security by turning authority for that transportation segment over 
to the Transportation Security Administration, created after 9/11 within the Department 
of Homeland Security.  There have been other changes as well, and psychologically we 
may feel safer as a Nation, but have these actions made us safer? In fact, good 
intelligence will ultimately filter down to our abilities with HUMINT.  Whether we have 
a system such as discussed previously or whether our intelligence-collection efforts 
remain the same, HUMINT will be the most effective weapon against the GWOT.  This 
brings us back to the fundamental problem of personal liberty versus state responsibility.  
Every person has a moral and ethical code, the law has ethical and legal codes, and 
agencies are pitted against these codes whenever they perform intelligence functions.  
And yet, it is these constructs that allow us to maintain order.  Should there be a 
compromise?  For example, the U.S. Government allows the individual the right to free 
speech, freedom to assemble, freedom to worship, freedom of expression, and other 
freedoms.  In other countries such as Afghanistan, particularly under the brutal rule of the 
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Taliban, and in Iran, the citizens have no such freedoms.  Thus, the citizen cannot 
challenge government control over personal liberty. 
It is the responsibility of the state to ensure its existence but also to protect the 
citizens.  Thus far, the Constitution has helped the U.S. maintain that delicate balance of 
personal liberty versus state responsibility.  However, this has required proactive 
measures which have been within the law through our governing system.  A good 
example of this is taxation.  The “Boston Tea Party” was launched because of the levy of 
a 6 percent tax, but today our taxes are much greater.  The Government has found how 
far they can push and have done so to the extent the citizens have not rebelled.  Will the 
exorbitant costs in lives and dollars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against the GWOT as we 
continue to ramp up security cause U.S. citizens to rebel?  It is interesting to note that the 
U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights does not guarantee personal liberty, but guarantees 
tools to assert and practice our beliefs as we see fit about personal liberty.  In other 
words, within the U.S., sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs 
established by the Constitution.101  The guarantees to protect personal liberties include 
Amendments 1, 2, 4, and 5.  The framers of the Constitution understood individual rights 
versus government/state power, as is evidenced by these amendments.  This allows for 
differences of opinion as well as conflict to coexist.  This can be evidenced by the polar-
charged issues within our society that include civil rights, abortion, and gun control.  
Through time, diversity has led to compromise for the good of all. 
We are now faced with a new enemy who does not acknowledge laws, 
compromise, or liberties.  This new enemy, terrorism, seeks to destroy all democracies, 
specifically the U.S., through use of asymmetric methods.  As a result of this threat, 9/11 
being the primary catalyst, the Patriot Act was passed.  A great many individuals and 
local and state governments oppose this act, believing it infringes on personal 
liberties.102  However, without security, democracy cannot exist.  Thus, there must be a 
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fine balance, at least in a democracy, between individual liberties and the power of the 
state and its survival.  Generally, every person in the U.S. would not be infringed upon.  
For example, we have already categorized many as suspected terrorists, unlawful 
combatants, non-citizens, enemy combatants, and known terrorists.  As such, these 
people are not guaranteed the same rights and privileges as those who are citizens of the 
country, if for no other reason than by definition.  So, are the citizens of the U.S. or the 
state willing to infringe on the liberties of these labeled individuals and/or the countries 
from which they originate? 
While many believe that all people within the U.S. should be protected through 
the civil laws and rights reasonable through constitutional process, this belief is in error.  
Why? It is because the Constitution only guarantees these rights to the “citizens” of the 
United States.  Therefore, labeled individuals are not protected by the law against what 
many may perceive as unwarranted wiretaps or other surveillance.  As an example, would 
U.S. citizens have an issue with the surveillance of a person planning another 9/11-style 
attack and who would be a labeled individual within U.S., but were residing in their own 
country?  The answer is a resounding no.  Thus, if it is okay to gather intelligence on that 
person in their own country, U.S. law should not protect them within CONUS or 
anywhere else.  The main reasons are that the individual is not a citizen and thus has no 
rights extended to them through the U.S. Constitution and are within a labeled group that 
may be planning harm against the U.S. and affect national security.  All of the hijackers 
in the 9/11 attacks used U.S. personal liberty laws against us and caused the deaths of 
over 3,000 individuals and billions of dollars in damage.  Should we let this happen 
again?  The answer is absolutely not. 
It is interesting to note that individuals balk so much about the wire taps against 
those known to be adversarial toward the U.S. and the democracy it represents, i.e., the 
voice of people.  Yet, these same individuals fill out credit card applications, use grocery 
store cards to swipe for savings, use gas cards, purchase cards of a wide variety, fill out 
questionnaires for trips, apply for all types of credit and knowledge, and all the while are 
giving up free information.  Each time the individual does this, multiple times per day on 
average, this information is stored in myriad databases within the U.S. and can be 
purchased by any individual or government agency for a very small fee.  An example is 
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www.intelligentinvestigations.com.  One in particular is used specifically by LE groups.  
Therefore, to balance civil liberties, the law is clear that those who are in the U.S. and 
labeled as above, especially illegal immigrants and non-citizens, are not protected by the 
Constitution and are thus subject to intelligence-gathering methodology without the strict 
requirements as applied to citizens, which would have to follow legal means unless the 
individual can be shown to fall within the labeled group.  The Patriot Act should make 
this clear, but does not.  Also, because DNIN leverages the resources of LE agencies 
nationwide, who work within a strict legal framework, many civil liberty issues in regard 
to DI collection will be solved. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
To effectively achieve intelligence sharing we need to ensure a national and 
international strategic approach in addition to improving poor cooperation between the IC 
and LE.  To accomplish this we must: 
• Develop a mutual operations doctrine.   
• Appoint of a single authority/board for national command and oversight (DHS 
IA). 
• Regionalize intelligence gathering efforts to integrate intelligence collection 
and analysis, reduce management and duplication problems, and become more 
efficient.  An, also to be closer to stakeholders for cooperation and 
collaboration purposes. 
• Develop good personnel policies in regard to cultural change and bias and 
development of relationships through these policies that foster trust by 
dissolving specific single cultures in exchange for promoting an interagency 
culture. 
• Address civil liberty issues, many of which will be addressed by incorporation 
of LE into the intelligence process since they already adhere to civil liberty 




























                                                
VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS AND INCENTIVES TO 
SHARING INFORMATION 
Earlier, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the case of WMDs in Iraq were mentioned 
as failures, of the U.S. IC.  Assuming that these instances were indeed failures why did 
they occur? Was the failure due to not sharing information, or were other issues involved 
in the sharing process that contributed to the results?  Ultimately it would appear that 
psychology, both of the group and the individual, has a great deal to do with the problems 
of sharing information or intelligence.  However, even when information is ordered 
shared by law, problems may remain.  For example, Congresswoman Jane Harman and 
Congressman Saxby Chambliss introduced legislation, called the Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Act, to direct Federal intelligence agencies to share information 
about possible terrorist attacks with the Nation’s governors, mayors, LE personnel, and 
first responders; the bill was passed in 2002.103  Despite passage of this bill, little has 
changed in regard to sharing information.  Why? 
 
A. HERDING, INCENTIVE AND FALSE POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
PROBLEMS 
An intelligence group or agency shares the same type of trade-offs as any 
organization or corporation.  While an organizational hierarchy enables the aggregation 
of information, each bit of information that is deemed important is gradually passed up 
the organizational ladder, and if the information is exceptional and optimal, matching of 
problems to expertise termed “management by exception” will occur.104  Thus, the 
hierarchy enables expert knowledge to be reserved for situations in which it is especially 
valuable.  Large organizations enable constraints to be circumvented so that more 
intelligence data can be gathered and a greater variety of expertise can be used in data 
compilation and evaluation than in small groups.  With greater resources one can trowl 
more broadly and not set restrictive upfront criteria for what is valuable data, which 
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happens with small groups with less funding.  However, there are at least three sets of 
problems associated with the hierarchy of a large group.  These problems exhibit 
themselves as, first, herding or “group think” that typically takes places at the analysis 
stage and in which the accumulated information and conclusions develop a momentum so 
strong they cannot be challenged, even if they are not correct.  Second, erroneous 
conclusions can result if a pattern is missed because different pieces of information are 
not shared, which was the major cause in the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.  Third, 
agencies can be poorly designed to achieve the desired goal.  For example, the FBI is 
supposed to be able to solve crimes and also collect domestic intelligence.  The problem 
is that the FBI is designed to solve crimes.  Because the organizational structure 
requirements for the two tasks are different, the FBI does not perform DI collection very 
well. 
As has been demonstrated, the link or relationship between two nodes (people or 
organizations) is a key aspect of the strength of a network.  Thus, who talks to whom and 
who passes along intelligence to whom is in direct proportion to the strength of a link 
between two nodes or entities.  This becomes a trust issue that is the foundation of 
personal psyche.  Because of hierarchy, however, the stages by which a particular piece 
of information moves from its origin to the point at which it is combined with other 
information for analysis is usually unknown to the analyst.  Is the information a distinct 
piece that has been corroborated, or is the same piece of information being passed along 
via different channels?  In the case of the Iraq WMDs the intelligence agencies relied 
heavily on intelligence supplied by exiles from Iraq.  Most of the reports contained 
similar findings and appeared to be corroborated.  Later it was learned that, rather than 
being distinct pieces of information from independent sources, the reports likely 
originated from one source, the Iraqi National Congress.105, 106  Did the fear of going 
against the momentum of the reports, without corroborating them, drive analysts to a 
false conclusion?  Most data concerning the issue of Iraq’s possession of biological 
WMDs originated from an Iraqi defector, which became known as the infamous 
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“Curveball” case, the name given to this defector who claimed to have worked in Iraq’s 
bioweapons program and who reported similar information several times to different 
sources.107
The problem of herding arises when an individual decides that a body of public 
information outweighs personal, contradictory information.108  An example would be 
three individuals who can observe each other going to movie A or movie B.  Individual 1 
chooses A at random and although individual 2 believes each movie is equal also chooses 
A since individual 1 chose A.  Individual 3 now has three pieces of information, the 
actions of 1 and 2, as well as his own opinion.  Because there appears to be substantial 
evidence that movie A is better, individual 3 may choose to view it as well.  Why?  
Herding occurred because each individual rationally weighed the evidence received and 
that appeared to be based on separate judgments against first-hand information; thus, the 
individual acted accordingly.  Given the case, it is clear how herding can lead to a 
situation in which everyone is wrong, i.e., a poor consensus.  Therefore, a herding 
problem can arise when intelligence analysts confront a consensus judgment based on 
many sources because the judgment may be based on the same single source that may 
have been communicated to the analyst through several channels.  Psychologically, the 
analyst is weighing one data point against what appears to be several others that appear to 
be corroborated and thus will bow to peers pressure and agree with the general 
consensus, even if he may feel he is wrong.109  A possible way to reduce the risk of 
herding, especially in a computer network or on paper, is the attachment of an encrypted 
tag to each information source.  Actually, this should be required as a standard operating 
procedure (SOP). 
Career incentives can also encourage herding, especially when the employee’s 
career depends on evaluations by his superiors.  The psychological pressure to please the 
superior can lead to the “yes man” phenomenon and also not to update prior beliefs, 
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which could make the analyst appear unreliable — an acknowledgement of error.110  In 
effect, the analyst herds with his own prior judgments.  Generally, the more experienced 
the analyst or manager and the longer time on the job, the more likely this is to occur.  
Another incentive factor in intelligence sharing is that the analyst may take the easy path 
and adopt the opinion of co-workers.  Like the old adage, “if you cannot beat them, join 
them,” there is a psychological comfort in the safety of numbers, i.e., a reduction of fear 
of criticism.  Actually, this would not be uncommon since if accurate information is 
difficult to recognize as being accurate, there will be difficulty designing a system of 
rewards for producing accurate information.  A general approach to resolve this incentive 
is to ensure that career rewards depend on performance by evaluation, i.e., merit based, 
and that the biases of superiors are known by the subordinates.  Even then, subjectivity 
will be unavoidable.  The problems discussed are weaknesses of a hierarchal 
organization.  Centralization of an intelligence system is likely to exacerbate the “yes 
man” problem by creating a tighter hierarchy.111  In contrast, in a system in which there 
are many bosses and many sources of information, such as a multi-agency, intelligence-
gathering network, even if the subordinate echoes the views of his superior, there will 
still exist many different views.  The weakness herein would be the identification of the 
ultimate superiors.  However, even through decentralization, superiors will have an 
incentive, i.e., the psychological fear of peer pressure, to conform their advice to 
policymaker preconceptions.  As an example, before the Iraqi war, the IC knew that 
policymakers were convinced that Iraq possessed WMDs.  However, the DOE did not 
concur with policymaker’s belief because they had relied on a separate piece of evidence, 
but eventually DOE caved to the consensus view concerning Iraq’s WMD capabilities, a 
position that “made sense politically, but not substantively.”112  Thus, we see that 
psychologically, the fear of going against the group or consensus may be too high a price 
to pay, at least for the individual or agency, not withstanding the long-term effects in this 
case to the people of the U.S.  Top-down systems pressures to generate conclusions that 
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fit existing or planned policy, it is the conclusions that are modified to fit the political 
agendas and the data can be discarded. 
Looser, less centralized organizations filter out fewer ideas and thus produce a 
more diverse set of options for the leaders of the organization to choose from.  When the 
environment is unstable, the organization should be decentralized in order to maximize 
the likelihood that many fresh new ideas will be produced, for that will make it easier for 
the organization to adapt to a changing environment.  For intelligence organizations, 
particularly counter-terrorism intelligence, a loosely knit, decentralized structure of 
multiple agencies is likely to be optimal.  The information environment is unstable, and 
since many intelligence leads and clues become dead ends, the few accurate clues are 
scarce and therefore valuable.  Generally, when good ideas are scarce, a decentralized 
structure is preferable as more ideas will get through the filters that are so typical in large, 
hierarchal organizations.113  Also, in intelligence work the cost of false negatives, i.e., not 
pursuing a lead and failing to aver a terrorist act such as 9/11, is likely to be considerably 
higher than the cost of false positives, e.g. pursuing a lead that turns out to be a false 
alarm.  The 1973 surprise attack by Syria and Egypt that began the Yom Kippur war is an 
example in which a centralized intelligence approach failed; 9/11 is another example.  In 
the months preceding the Iraqi war a number of low-level CIA officers in the Directorate 
of Operations expressed doubts about the accuracy of Curveball’s information.  Superiors 
disagreed due to fear of being out of sync with policymaker’s views and the information 
was presented in a filtered, unified view that did not reveal the diversity of opinion at the 
lower levels.114
In a decentralized organization there arises a trade-off between false positives and 
false negatives.  If too many warnings are given, much like the homeland security color-
coded threat warning system, it is like the “boy who cried wolf” and little attention is 
given to the alert.  Thus to minimize the number and cost of false positives or alarms, the 
standard for warnings must be raised, which requires a more centralized structure to filter 
out false alarms.  If, because of past failures such as 9/11, agents become “trigger happy,” 
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then less filtering occurs and information tends to be less accurate.  This can be buffered 
in a networked process through critical analysis at a regional center before passing the 
intelligence forward. 
 
B. INCENTIVES FOR SHARING INFORMATION 
The lack of prompt and full sharing of intelligence within the IC, and between 
Federal, state, and local government levels, has been blamed for the failures of 9/11 and 
the Iraq WMDs.  Generally, members of an organization often have disincentives to share 
information.  The fear of lack of opportunities to climb the promotion ladder, loss of job, 
or disapproval of one’s superiors serve as strong psychological fear barriers to go against 
the grain and to share information.  Competition between employees for both pay and 
promotion for a fixed number of career-level slots creates an atmosphere of non-sharing.  
There may be good incentives in terms of performance, but a lack of sharing and even 
sabotage of one employee by another is common by concealing information or providing 
false information.115  Employees may squander resources on activities that influence 
superiors’ decisions in order to manipulate the perception of their performance or gain 
favor of superiors.116  A good example is the presidential daily brief that has become 
“the” platform through which intelligence agencies seek to better themselves in 
competition with each other.  The following statement illustrates this well: “The daily 
reports seemed to be ‘selling’ intelligence — in order to keep its customers, or at least the 
First Customer, interested.”117  Influence activities, such as a turf war in which agencies 
shift resources from productive activities to influence activities is an extreme example of 
this.118  A turf war between the FBI and the CIA was at the heart of the failure to track 
9/11 terrorists as they entered and moved about the U.S.119  Since 9/11, not much has 
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changed; officials at the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center claim that “they have difficulty 
tracking and obtaining information about terrorist cases after they hand them off to the 
FBI.”120
Another reason why members of an organization may not share intelligence is 
because they do not want to lose the rents derived from their control of the resulting 
knowledge.  For example, a law enforcement agent who has information that may lead to 
an arrest is usually not willing to pass the information along to another officer or agency 
because by doing so, the reward of the arrest for him or her will be lost, even though it 
may be the right thing to do from a social perspective.  The fear of losing the reward and 
gaining advancement outweighs the spirit of doing what may be perceived to be more 
correct, i.e., sharing the information.121  However, a reward based on quantity of 
information shared causes information quality to suffer.  Psychologically, the incentive to 
share should be stated such that “value” of information is more important; therefore, 
seeking something of greater value presents a mental challenge that most are willing to 
accept, and the individual agent will go to great lengths to find the best information.  It is 
a natural competition, and incentives based on this concept retain and even increase 
information quality.  Of course, it is generally difficult to determine just how important a 
piece of information may initially be, but utilizing an “encrypted tag” system as discussed 
earlier will allow tracking where and how the collected information is referenced in other 
reports.  Academics use such a system for promotion criteria by tracking the number of 
“hits” of a particular written article, i.e., how many times that article is referenced by 
peers. 
The best method of providing incentives for information sharing is to place those 
who have the information to be shared in close proximity with others that have related 
responsibilities.  An example of this is the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) 
where representatives from various agencies sit side by side.  Psychologically, this 
creates an atmosphere of teamwork, and those who perceive others to be on the “same 
team” are more likely to share, feeling automatically that the others have a need to know.  
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This is an excellent way to align individual and organizational incentives and reduce 
officer or agent conflict.122  Further, when placed in a team situation, a feeling of needing 
to assist team members is developed, as well as mutual trust.  In the case of intelligence, 
agents will typically care more deeply about their mission in these situations and may 
place a higher priority on sharing intelligence data. 
There are various ways to accomplish trust in information sharing communities.  
Methods such as swift trust, institutional trust, and others are prevalent and well known.  
However, transactive memory theory is perhaps more easily applied and understood.  
Transactive memory theory is based on the idea that individual members can serve as 
external memory aids to each other.123  Members are able to benefit from each other’s 
knowledge and expertise if they develop a good, shared understanding of individual 
expertise in the group/unit — who knows what.  A transactive memory system is built on 
the distinction between internal and external memory encoding.  Often, individuals 
encode new knowledge internally, in their own memory.  However, even more often 
individuals encode or use knowledge encoded externally (in diaries, in books, or even in 
other people’s memory).  In these cases, the individual internally encodes the label 
(subject) of the knowledge as well as its location but not the knowledge itself.  
Transactive memory systems are built on this view of individuals playing the role of 
external memory for other individuals who, in turn, encode meta-memories (i.e., 
memories about the memories of others).  Wegner proposed that two types of meta-
memories are maintained in people’s minds — information about the subjects of 
knowledge of each member (i.e., areas of expertise) and information about the locations 
of the knowledge.124  Knowledge is encoded, stored, and retrieved from the collective 
memory through various transactions between individuals, based on their meta-
memories.  
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Findings of both field and laboratory research indicate that transactive memory 
can serve as a facilitator of group performance, where groups whose members are aware 
of the knowledge and expertise of other group members perform better than groups 
whose members do not possess such knowledge.  Transactive memory systems enable 
groups to better utilize the knowledge that their members possess, and to reach higher 
levels of performance than they would have reached without such a system.125  Members 
of small groups, who are co-located, can initially use surface information to infer rough 
estimates of “who knows what” and can then reach greater accuracy in the attribution of 
expertise to other group members through common experiences.126  This will enhance 
information sharing. 
It can be argued that centralization will improve information sharing, but as we 
have observed from the cases presented, the common centralization of either the CIA or 
FBI has not achieved this goal.  Generally, a single agency will tend to have a common 
code to share, but with the team as illustrated above, that same code has a chance of 
being stronger due to a common goal.  While the single agency may have a common 
code, compatible data networks, uniform access criteria, and other common practices, 
these same attributes can be accomplished by a network by developing the same tools for 
sharing, and as an overall team the strength of the relationships is strengthened as 
illustrated in Chapter III.  This is a clear example where centralization has failed and 
argues for a network of multiple agencies with a common goal so that psychological 
barriers based on need to know can be converted to a need to share.  That example is the 
FBI who, in the eight years following the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center, 
tried without success to develop an effective domestic intelligence capability.  On two 
separate occasions, it adopted strategic plans that it failed to implement.  The 9/11 
Commission found that the FBI had failed both to collect adequate intelligence data and 
to combine the raw, disaggregated data into accurate knowledge of terrorist threats.  The 
causes of these failures included resistance and obstacles from local field offices, failure 
to obtain additional resources asked for from Congress, reliance of analysts on personal 
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relationships from field agents (these relationships were weak), lack of a single database 
into which field offices could send information to headquarters that prevented 
aggregation and sharing, and lack of human resource development.127
 
C. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INFORMATION — WHY WE DON’T SHARE 
Generally, intelligence is a simple process, but sharing it seems to have become 
complicated.  It is not technology that causes the primary problems in sharing, but human 
nature and culture.  Within the information process there are three basic steps.  First, 
there is the data — collecting it or assembling the facts.  Second, there is information, the 
step where meaning is attempted to be gleaned from the data.  Third, we put form to the 
information phase to obtain knowledge; hence the term knowledge management.  There 
are two applications for knowledge: either an organization is in the “sense-making” 
business such as science and arts or, as with the majority of many organizations, there is 
the “application” business where information is used to improve the lives of others.  This 
is particularly true of the intelligence community, which gathers information to protect 
against threats and attacks.  Technologies such as the advent of packet switching, XML, 
and other advances have progressed to the point where most organizations cannot keep 
pace with the advancements.  Thus, the technology is like a gun, which typically has the 
ability to shoot much more accurately than the person shooting it.  In this sense 
technology cannot be blamed for our inability to share.  That inability then must stem 
from personal and shared culture. 
Let us examine some of the reasons why sharing of information is often impeded.  
These reasons stem from our mental or psychological processes based on perceptions, 
feelings of trust, the right thing to do, and so forth.  These reasons include, but are not 
limited to: (1) Many personnel do not want to deliver information their superiors do not 
wish to hear, i.e., bad news, especially if there is no plan in place or process to deal with 
it.  Information is best absorbed by superiors if that information fits their preconceived 
opinions and is related to what policy makers also desire.  Presenting such information 
does not usually coincide with upward mobility and promotion.  (2)  Within hierarchies, 
information is generously shared on a peer-to-peer basis, but is shared grudgingly either 
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upward or downward in the organization.  Reports to superiors are viewed generally as 
having little value to the person who prepares it.  Information that flows downward in 
most organizations is usually on a need-to-know basis and, as is well known, water-
cooler conversations and the office grapevine will usually spread information faster than 
the boss.  (3) Acceptance and internalization of information depends on the individual’s 
mental model.  For example, after a presentation or information is shared, unless what is 
divulged fits the individual’s personal perceptions or reinforces what he or she already 
believes, the tendency to share that information is reduced, i.e., because it does not 
conform to what is generally believed or does not fall in line with policy.  (4) 
Accountability for bad information can be severe.  Most are averse to sharing information 
orally, but especially in written form if that information is misused and is tracked back 
since he or she will be held directly accountable.  (5) Generally, an individual is very 
reluctant to admit what they do not know or understand.  In hierarchal organizations this 
is particularly true the higher up the pecking order one goes.  This leads to what is termed 
“groupthink” in which those higher up tend to consult with other higher ups, particularly 
if they do not have the skills to use the technology that subordinates are adept at.  An 
appearance of weakness is present and thus presents a perceived barrier that, 
psychologically, the superior is unwilling to cross, i.e., to admit a weakness or deficiency.  
(6) Internal competition may prevent complete sharing.  Organizations that have internal 
performance evaluation systems that pit one employee against another for limited 
rewards or promotion will succeed in promulgating peer-to-peer distrust and will push 
sharing outside the organization.  (7) Determining useful from useless information is 
difficult for most and, psychologically, most are unlikely to share that which they do not 
understand because of the exerted pressure of appearance of ignorance.  The primary 
reason for the inability to determine the difference of information type is due to the 
inability to process the volume of information garnered and general lack of imagination.  
Thus, stored data is generally underutilized while information provided “just in time” 
tends to be over-relied upon, i.e., it is simply easier to see its value within the context of 
an urgent problem.  (8) The cost of data acquisition versus not knowing is generally 
underestimated.  For example, hurricane Katrina, 9/11, the avian flu, and Iraq have all 
demonstrated that the lack of knowing can lead to catastrophic though preventable 
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results.  (9) Personal culture is such that the individual desires those he or she likes to 
succeed, while those that are not liked are desired to fail.  Thus, the more office politics 
there are, the greater the impedance to information flow, particularly if promotion, 
acceptance, and/or recognition are on the line.  Psychologically, we all fear failure.  (10) 
Rewards for sharing can produce short-term results through initial increases in 
contributions, but a reduction in quality of data. 
 
D. HOW DO WE COMPENSATE FOR SHARING IMPEDANCE? 
There are various methods that can be used to compensate for poorly sharing 
information and intelligence.  These include the following:  (1) Flatten the organization 
so that it is no longer a hierarchy.  This will transfer decision-making authority and place 
collectors and analysts on a more even playing field.  (2) Change reward systems to 
recognize the group rather than the individual contribution, i.e., make it a team effort—
small military units, SWAT teams, and law enforcement branches are good examples of 
this.  (3) Eliminate reward and performance evaluation processes that encourage 
individuals to hoard, manipulate, or fight over credit for information and ideas or that 
interfere with collaboration.  (4) Develop mechanisms to anonymously communicate 
“bad news” or information that does not fit the preconceived notion of the superior or 
policy maker.  (5) Provide personnel with informal places to meet and exchange 
information with peers since they are much more inclined to share with peers than with 
those up or down the hierarchy.  (6) Develop and use social network maps to determine 
key knowledge connectors and information transfer bottlenecks.  This will address the 
issue of rewards that usually do not work well for long and also will encourage those to 
address this issue who have the most valuable knowledge and least time to share it.  (7) 
Develop better filters for information and better ways of organizing, indexing, sorting, 
and archiving it for later retrieval to differentiate between useful and useless information.  
8) Expand risk management programs to assess the costs of acquiring information and of 
not knowing. 
Knowledge management and transfer have become significantly more important 
as society moves forward.  To be effective in sharing information and to achieve 
successful knowledge management, the psychological fear of numerous points in the 
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process must be overcome.  Knowledge transfer has always been a challenge for 
organizations.  Its importance has grown for three reasons.  First, knowledge appears to 
be an increasing proportion of many organizations’ total assets, as well as the individual.  
Second, organizations have moved away from hierarchal methods of control toward more 
decentralized organizational structures and increased employee involvement, which has 
increased fear of failure in some instances.128  Third, advances in information technology 
have created new means of knowledge transfer, itself a source of intimidation to many.  
Knowledge transfer is only valuable when it is integrated into a set of policies for 
knowledge generation and capture, which is particularly useful in intelligence. 
Far more ideas exist than good ideas, but like the question in a class, which the 
individual is encouraged to ask because “no question is a stupid question,” many fail to 
put forth the good idea for fear of non-acceptance.  Because of the prevalence of ideas, 
organizations must evaluate new ideas and determine whether they have worked in the 
past, are likely to work now, and where they may be applicable.  Personnel must have the 
capability, incentives, and structures to perform the necessary tasks related to 
information.  Possession of the right tools will of itself reduce the fear of sharing 
information that may not be corroborative or perceived as being of little importance.  In 
principle, more information is better than less.  Conjointly, too much information creates 
overload.  The Internet is a classic example, where no individual can read even a fraction 
of what is there.  The key to disseminating knowledge is that people receive it that can 
use it and those who disseminate it gain confidence that it is “good” information.  In an 
ideal world, if people knew the right thing to do, they would do it.  Such a world does not 
exist.  Complex theories have been developed as to why, even after knowledge has been 
transmitted to the right people, that it may not have been transferred to the organization.  
The FBI and CIA examples are clear illustrations of this.  These theories fall into the 
categories of inadequate capability, poor incentives, poorly trained personnel, and 
inadequate structures such as rigid operating procedures that are difficult to update. 
To effectively generate new ideas, personnel need to be trained in problem 
solving, including an ability to think “outside the box,” a term that is much overused.  A 
 
128 David I. Levine, Reinventing the Workplace: How Business and Employees Can Both Win 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). 
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typical program includes how to identify problems, prioritize, analyze root causes, 
identify possible counter-measures, implement the solution, and check whether the 
solution actually works.  Such personnel, better prepared, have great confidence and less 
fear of sharing.  As an analogy, a well-skilled martial artist walks down the street with a 
friend; he sees two men that may appear to be a threat, but given his skill knows how to 
both perceive the situation and deal with it, while the friend does not.  The reaction in the 
martial artists mind is analysis and problem-solving, “what if” scenarios while that of the 
untrained is an inward fear and panic due to possible consequences.  All are based on 
psychology of differentiating between perception and intent and one’s state of 
preparedness.  Training will reduce fear of sharing and increase productivity.  Both 
superiors and personnel must be trained to evaluate new ideas and not be threatened to 
share them.  Just as importantly, they must be trained in systematically understanding 
what evidence should be convincing.  An example would include the difference between 
correlation and causality and the problems of small samples since basic concepts are 
often difficult to apply in practice.  Training personnel to both disseminate and adopt new 
ideas may revolve around making them aware of where in the organization their ideas 
may be useful and from where ideas may arrive.  Given the current state of the IC in 
regard to loss of analysts through attrition, training analysts will become a priority.  
Charles Allen has mentioned that such training needs to be accelerated and the author 
agrees.  Although analyst training is beyond the scope of this thesis, training large 
numbers of analysts can be done quickly and efficiently with current technological 
capabilities. 
To create an environment that encourages the generation of new ideas, managers 
should consider the following policies: incentives for groups instead of just for 
individuals, duties that include experimentation with ideas and concepts, permitting such 
ideas that are well conceived but may fail, and giving credit to employees who generate 
new ideas while at the same time encouraging others.  Personnel are most likely to spend 
energy sharing what they know if they are in a single workplace with group incentives, 
i.e., a network of multiple agency personnel.  Thus, extra incentives can be helpful when 
personnel are in different units without necessarily common objectives.  An example of 
this is Buckman Laboratories (see www.buckman.com) where everyone sees who 
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answers problems on the open bulletin boards.  Those who contribute to solving company 
problems in public are praised while those who do not become conspicuous.  This creates 
a better atmosphere of unity and cooperation as those who share frequently take others 
into confidence and further open discussions and sharing of all kinds of ideas. 
Other components to promote sharing include structures and technology.  The 
most important structural component that encourages creativity or idea generation is 
often providing time to experiment and tinker.  Formal personnel involvement structures 
such as brainstorming, suggestion programs, quality circles, and self-directing teams 
support both creating and sharing information.  People need the power and responsibility 
to make improvements.  This breaks down the fear of sharing with peers and heightens 
the anticipation of possible “good” recognition, both of which are key parts of one’s 
psychological framework.  Technology can help with the dissemination of ideas by 
making it easier to target appropriate recipients such as a group defined formally by a 
common product such as a specific analyst type, a group formed by management, or an 
ad hoc group formed by personnel in the form of an email list or other membership. 
The keys to sharing are to capture the existing knowledge from within and outside 
the organization and to adopt those ideas that are relevant.  Training, incentives, 
structures and technology can all improve sharing because they become the tools to 
reduce the fear, sometimes individually preconceived, of failure or embarrassment.  Good 
and actionable intelligence should not be about who is right, but about what is right.  
Only through overcoming fear of sharing and breaking down barriers to it will effective 
intelligence sharing come about.  Further, an increase in agent numbers will mean little if 
the sharing culture does not change.   
 
E.   SUMMARY 
 Overcoming psychological barriers to sharing will require: 
• Avoiding herding or group think through incentives and promoting independent 
thinking and basing analysis on verifiable, multiple sources. 
• Investigating career incentives and adopting policies to avoid consensus. 
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• Promoting a less centralized organization that will provide more diverse options, 
i.e., to promote fresh ideas, which have been proven to come from a wide variety 
of individuals regardless of age. 
• Providing incentives for sharing information by placing those who have 
information to be shared into close proximity with others who have related 
responsibilities, i.e., a regional center with multi-agency personnel as in DNIN. 
• Examination of rents derived from control of specific knowledge — we are one 
team. 
• Integrating knowledge transfer into policy for knowledge generation and capture. 
• Ensuring personnel are better trained in problem-solving processes. 
Other processes that will break down psychological sharing barriers include 
compensation for information sharing impedance by flattening the organization; changing 
the reward system to recognize the group rather than the individual; eliminating of 
reward/promotion processes that encourage hoarding, manipulation, or credit for 
information; the ability to anonymously communicate bad news; determining key 
knowledge connectors and bottlenecks; developing better indexing, sorting, and data 
archiving methods; and expanding risk-management programs to assess cost of not 
knowing. 
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VIII. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEDICATED NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE NETWORK (DNIN) 
A. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
For many years there have been complaints about sharing intelligence between 
the two main stakeholders, the intelligence communities (IC) and law enforcement (LE).  
Reports about the events leading up to 9/11 highlight this issue, specifically regarding the 
CIA and FBI.  New York City government felt that sharing was so bad between the 
Federal IC members, especially the FBI, that they formed their own intelligence group, 
sent officers overseas to collect intelligence, and have refused to share that intelligence 
with the FBI since the latter had refused many times in the past to share intelligence with 
New York City, citing a need-to-know position.  The rationale for the NYPD’s 
transformation after September 11th had two distinct facets.  On the one hand, expanding 
its mission to include terrorism prevention made obvious sense.  On the other, there was a 
strong feeling that Federal agencies had let down New York City, and the city could no 
longer count on the Feds for its protection.129  Since the 9/11 attack on the World Trade 
Center, intelligence reforms within the U.S. have become key political and operational 
issues and forced agencies such as the FBI to reform and reorganize in response.130  The 
FBI and CIA were singled out for intelligence failures due to events leading to the attacks 
— the most blatant criticisms were that there was a lack of intelligence sharing between 
the agencies and follow through issues were a problem, as well as focus on factors such 
as “who” versus “where.”131  Undoubtedly, if the CIA and FBI had been working with a 
networked sharing model, the outcomes could have been different.  But, this criticism of 
intelligence sharing goes deeper than these two agencies; it prevails between the IC and 
LE agencies across the U.S., as well as the fact that neither of these agencies or any 
single agency involved in information sharing can hope to have the capabilities to share 
the large volumes of information that are collected on a national scope.  Thus, a network, 
DNIN, is proposed to deal with both the scope/scale and volume of collected information.  
 
129 William Finnegan, "How Is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the City?" New Yorker, July 25, 2005; 
available from http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050725fa_fact2. [cited April 12, 2006].  
130 Bowers, "How FBI Is Remaking Intelligence Functions.”  
131 9/11 Commission Report. 
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A network-centric collection is the only way feasible for collecting the desired 
intelligence; but despite the vehicle, there will be both problems and advantages, as 
outlined below. 
 
B. MISSION STATEMENT 
A primary reason for existence of a DNIN would be its mission to the citizens it 
serves.  Much like LE and the IC, the DNIN’s mission must serve to promote the safety 
of the communities, states, and regions it serves.  As an example, the Seattle Police 
Department lists its mission as preventing crime, enforcing the law, and supporting public 
safety.132 Very similar mission statements can be found for the cities of New York, Los 
Angeles, Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.133  There is an 
interesting difference between the Washington, D.C. Police Department mission and 
others in that it specifically includes preventing crime and fear of crime, including 
terrorism, which may have been added after the 9/11 attacks.  However, although LE 
agencies across the country collect intelligence of various kinds, especially through 
informants, which would be considered HUMINT, intelligence is not mentioned in any of 
their mission statements.  Perhaps this is because the police inherently believe that 
collected intelligence is simply a component of their work, which would preclude the 
necessity of singling it out.  In contrast, the CIA’s mission statement, as a leading 
member of the IC, is collecting intelligence that matters, providing relevant, timely, and 
objective all-source analysis, and conducting covert actions.134  The CIA focuses on 
overseas operations and foreign intelligence.  Although they do cooperate with IC groups 
within the U.S., their primary focus is collecting information, analyzing it, and 
conducting covert operations at the direction of the President. 
There are several attempts at local scales to gather intelligence and share it among 
LE agencies.  Examples include the intelligence fusion centers in Virginia, Phoenix, 
 
132 The mission statement of the Seattle Police Department is listed on its Website at 
http://www.cityofseattle.net/police [cited May 1, 2006]. 
133 These mission statements are found on the respective Websites of these police departments: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd; http://www.lapdonline.org; http://mpdc.dc.gov; and http://www.lasd.org 
[cited May 1, 2006]. 
134 Source of mission statement is the CIA’s Website at http://www.cia.gov [cited January 15, 2006]. 
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Atlanta, the TEW (Terrorist Early Warning) group (which is part of the Los Angeles 
Police Department), and the intelligence and counter terrorism division of the NYPD.  
However, these remain at the local level and do nothing for homeland security and 
domestic intelligence collection nationwide.  There remains a gap between LE and the IC 
in regard to intelligence that affects homeland security. 
The intelligence-sharing network, DNIN, could have the following suggested 
mission: 
DNIN is the eyes and ears for protection of the homeland to thwart and protect 
against acts of terrorism and other heinous crimes on U.S. soil.  We accomplish this 
mission by: 
• Conducting authorized collection efforts that comply with judicial procedures 
and due process.   
• Collecting and fusing intelligence from all sources.   
• Providing credible, reliable, corroborative information on a need-to-share 
basis.   
• Utilizing this information on a nationwide basis to preempt and prevent 
threats from organized gangs, terrorists, and other criminal activities. 
This mission statement serves to fuse LE and IC activities into a joined role.  
Intelligence is collected in a timely manner and disseminated on a need-to-share basis by 
LE, which can then be shared with members of the IC who may be able to 
add/corroborate with pertinent information from other sources without revealing source 
or method of collection.  Further, LE will utilize this intelligence to enhance their own 
departmental missions and knowledge; but more importantly, since LE has arrest powers 
using basic probable cause, they can arrest and detain suspects when IC members cannot.  
If a system such as DNIN had been in effect concerning Mohammed Atta, who had been 
detained several times by the police, the enhanced intelligence would likely have resulted 
in Atta’s arrest and the 9/11 outcome may have been different.  The dots just could not be 
connected between LE, the IC, and all the existing intelligence that was not shared. 
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1. Fundamental Issues 
“How can we collect information on a regional scale that becomes national in 
scope and disseminate information that is scrubbed along the way, that is credible, and 
that is reliable?”  The general goal is to overcome resistance, typical constraints, and 
drawbacks involved in information sharing among agencies so that information flows in a 
constant stream to those who need it.  The primary problems of traditional intelligence 
sharing are listed below, followed by the advantages of a networked collection and need-
to-share approach.  The fundamental challenge is to overcome the distrust and suspicion 
embedded in both organizations. 
a. Problems 
• Scale – Regional to National 
• Cost 
• Stovepiping 
• Need-to-Know Attitude 
• Specific Agency Culture 
• Job Security 
 
b. Advantages 
• Credible, Reliable, and Corroborative Information 
• Scrubbed Information 
• Need-to-Share Attitude 
• Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Agreements 
• Reputation 
• Relationship Building 
A comparison of the traditional versus networked method of intelligence 
sharing is illustrated in Figure 17.  It will be noted that the networked method follows a 
“Blue Ocean Strategy” whereas the traditional method follows a “Red Ocean 
Strategy.”135
 
















Figure 17. Traditional versus Networked Intelligence-Sharing Comparison. 
 
The categories of difference are as follows: collection (more enhanced via DNIN 
than traditional methods); culture (multi-agency and much improved via network 
compared to traditional, i.e., friction of culture is reduced in DNIN); stovepipes (virtually 
eliminated in DNIN due to cultural shift and need-to-share attitude); need-to-know 
(traditional method operates strictly on need-to-know that is not conducive to the DNIN 
theory, which is based on need-to-share and is thus rated much lower in intelligence 
sharing in traditional method); cost (DNIN will require input funds compared to existing 
traditional system, but will show much greater returns on investment); job security 
(personnel in traditional system feel they must maintain status quo to keep jobs versus 
personnel in the DNIN in which networking and relationships would reduce fear of job 
security and thus increase perception that job security exists); CRC (credible, reliable 
and corroborative information) is enhanced in DNIN since the need-to-share attitude and 
relationships are much stronger than in traditional system); trust (working closely 
                                                 
135 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market 




                                                
together with a common goal, although from different agencies builds stronger trust 
factors than isolationist/elitist attitude of traditional system thus, the mutual trust factor is 
greatly improved); relationships (relationships become stronger in networked 
atmosphere and resulting in enhanced sharing) — an example is the JTTF, although little 
improvement has been made or at least has not spread nationally; reputation (within a 
networked sharing system it is perceived highly likely that agencies will be more 
forthcoming and not want to bear the brunt of the “agency” that held out in event of a 
scenario similar to 9/11 — cooperation will foster enhanced reputation); need-to-share 
(the development of DNIN is purely based on need-to-share intelligence, eliminating 
many barriers compared to the DoD-based need-to-know attitude that the IC operates 
under thus, information sharing is greatly enhanced). 
The method of this stakeholder analysis involves building a regional to 
national intelligence-sharing network within the U.S., across barriers in which law 
enforcement (LE) are the main collectors of that intelligence.  Further, the difference is 
due to the fact that LE will be the group collecting about 80 percent of the intelligence on 
a national scale.  A recent example of this occurred in late 2005 when the City of New 
York went on heightened alert because of some gathered intelligence, which although not 
scrubbed as the IC community would have done, appeared credible.136  The IC stressed 
not to go on the alert since the intelligence was not scrubbed, but the police, who were 
the major players and were operating on the need-to-share attitude, decided to err on the 
side of caution and deployed for high alert despite the desires of the IC, who were only a 
context setter in this case. 
2. Goals 
The priorities of DNIN are simple: to collect credible, reliable, and corroborative 
information that can be shared on a national basis to help thwart threats from all sources 
and also to reestablish the lost trust in Federal agencies by LE.  The need to develop and 




136 Leigh Sales, "Subway Warning: New York on High Alert," ABC News, 2005; available from 
http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1477734.htm. [cited April 10, 2006]. 
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changed since 9/11.  The need to identify, prevent, monitor, and respond to terrorist 
threats, criminal activities, and all hazards is a significant challenge for the IC, LE, and 
private sector communities. 
All IC members and LE desire credible, reliable, corroborative, and scrubbed 
intelligence and thus, have similar goals.  However, due to 9/11 there is a lack of trust in 
the U.S. Government, which hurricane Katrina further exacerbated.137  “How can the 
government or other agencies get that trust back?” There must be a ‘buy in’ for lack of 
better terminology, of the IC with LE.  For example, LE continually passes information 
up then, nothing is returned in the process due to the need-to-know mindset.  As has been 
seen, the FBI and CIA have had serious damage done to their reputations for the 
perceived failures that led up to 9/11.  Consequently, there are two parameters that will 
have a drastic effect on the buy in for the American public.  First, there is the reputation 
factor, and second, a job security factor.  Examples of the first include the failures of the 
FBI, which has a poor reputation at present for perceived failure.  Another is Colin 
Powell’s passing along flawed information about Iraq’s WMD capabilities, which was 
passed to him by IC sources, but which were wrong.138  This resulted in damaging the 
CIA image and others in the IC.  There is also the example of the Atlanta Olympic 
bombings in which the wrong man was initially arrested.139  This caused damage to 
reputations as well.  Coupled with media reporting the damage was maximized, and the 
desired good reputation is not easily recovered.  In regard to job security, no one wishes 
to be the next failed FEMA director.  Instead, one would hope to be a Rudi Giuliani who, 
interesting to note, was not well liked leading up to 9/11, but became one head that was 
well liked and trusted after the events took place.  One would also not desire to be Mayor 
Nagan of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina devastated the area.  Yet, there are good 
examples in these areas as well.  A particular shining example in the IC is the good 
intelligence collected and shared during the Cuban Missile Crises in 1961, which may 
 
137 Borgna Brunner, Hurricane Katrina: A Disaster and Its Catastrophic Aftermath (Information 
Please, Pearson Education, 2005); available from http://www.infoplease.com/spot/hurricanekatrina.html. 
[cited April 9, 2006].  
138 Mike Wallace, "Colin Powell on 'Fox News Sunday'," Fox News, 2004; available from 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,114159,00.html. [cited April 9, 2006].  
139 Ron Ostrow, "Case Study: Richard Jewell and the Olympic Bombing," Journalism.org,; available 
from http://www.journalism.org/resources/education/case_studies/jewell.asp. [cited April l 9, 2006].  
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have averted war between Russia and the U.S.140  The value added by utilizing DNIN 
will help rebuild relationships between LE and the IC and allow for more efficient and 
rapid intelligence sharing that will protect the U.S. 
While DNIN would not be a new business, it would dramatically extend current 
collection capabilities.  So what? These capabilities would not just include a small 
increase.  It is estimated that intelligence collection within the U.S. would increase a 
hundredfold.  If DNIN is not addressed, another 9/11 would be more likely to occur.  
Evidence that supports this was the information obtained on September 10, 2001, that 
could have stopped the attacks but was not able to be shared quickly enough.141
3. Specific Approach 
The traditional method for collecting intelligence, pre- and post-9/11, has been 
through various methods practiced by the IC, which is based on a reactive approach.  The 
practices of LE have also been reactive.  To be effective in collecting and sharing 
terrorism and anti-terrorism-related intelligence depends on CRC about the enemy, 
whether a terrorist, a criminal, or even a natural hazard/disaster.  The obvious goal would 
be to provide information to identify immediate and long-term threats and the identity of 
person(s) involved in terrorism-related or criminal activities to implement prevention 
(risk-based), response, and consequence management.  The traditional alternative of the 
IC and “the wall” between the IC and LE will not accomplish this task.  The alternatives 
are the utilization of fusion centers across the country in various municipalities and states, 
which have for the most part remained isolated to a local or state basis, due to sharing as 
well as technology platform problems.  In contrast, utilization of the DNIN can be scaled 
from a regional to national scope and will overcome these problems.  The 9/11 attacks 
highlighted exactly how the traditional and local-based fusion approach failed and how it 
will do so again if we do not move to a national network of intelligence collection.  The 
DNIN, coupled with data from over 800,000 LE officers, would be the front line of 
defense against terrorist and criminal activities and assisting in disaster mitigation.  This 
network would dramatically improve information and intelligence sharing. 
 
140 National Security Agency, NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis; available from 
http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00033.cfm. [cited April 9, 2006]. 
141 9/11 Commission Report. 
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4. Environmental Scan 
A variety of factors exist that will enhance implementation of DNIN.  Those 
factors (not inclusive) include political will, “buy-in” of Federal government and IC, 
legal issues (specifically in regard to civil liberties), public reaction to intelligence 
collection (the recent wire taps performed by NSA are an example), community makeup, 
geography and culture (will collection processes be perceived as profiling?), whether or 
not it is an election year, and if another 9/11 type attack occurs.  The following strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis provides an overview of DNIN 
and provides a direction to identify the necessary steps for a strategic plan.  These also 
complement current DHS IA priorities very well. 
a. Strengths                 
• Significantly enhances data collected 
• Fosters cooperation, sharing, relationships, and trust 
• National in scope 
• More likely to detect threat and to prevent via more immediate 
action 
• Reduces stovepipes 
• Prevention based 
• Operates on need-to-share attitude 
• Improves job security 
b. Weaknesses 
• Cost 
• Large scope 
• Potential legal issues 
• Buy-in from other participants 
c. Opportunities 
• Capitalizes on ability to amalgamate diverse data from various 
sources 
• Ability to attract large pool of participants (LE) 
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• Intertwined with public’s desire to be safe and perception that 
terrorist activities will happen 
• Intertwined with local, state, tribal, and Federal LE agencies’ 
collection abilities and HS goals 
d. Threats 
• IC 
• Political demeanor 
• Policy issues 
• Database misalignment 
5. Input – Output – Outcome  
Long-standing barriers have existed among LE agencies, the IC, public safety, 
and the private sector for years.  The need to prevent terrorist and criminal activities and 
to prevent and respond to national crises is a priority, especially since 9/11.  DNIN 
represents an efficient intelligence-sharing network that can rapidly share information on 
a national basis.  Successful intelligence collection must focus on outcomes, which 
begins with where we wish to go; for DNIN, this is improved intelligence collection on a 
national scale.  The specific goals/outcomes for DNIN would be those listed in the 
mission statement above, but which can be further simplified into various components.  
The alternative means of obtaining the desired outcome is to obtain the outputs.  The 
actions (activities) necessary to achieve the various outputs must be considered (as listed 
below).  A measurement of the inputs would yield the dollar amount necessary to achieve 
the outcomes.  If the actions to get to an output that leads to an outcome are too costly, 
then another output that leads to the same outcome can be considered.  For many 
projects, especially one on the scope and scale of DNIN, a major reason behind the 
struggle of implementation is because, while the entity can control inputs (invest x $), 
actions (planning and construction of an intelligence-collection center), and to some 
degree outputs (enhance collection as an example), it cannot control the outcomes 
(illustrated in Figure 18).  The outcomes to which DNIN is supposed to contribute 
include increased data collection, improved cooperation and information flow, and a 
more rapid response.  The mission must justify the outcomes of any organization and the 
reason for the investment of public/private dollars.  In the case of DNIN, the outcomes 
are significant and therefore, warrant the investment. 
The International Police Organization (Interpol) is an excellent example of how 
improving collection capacities can affect terrorism efforts and the apprehension of 
terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminals.  Interpol demonstrates how networking 
with its 184 member countries can fight crime.  Although Interpol rarely makes 
headlines, in the last half-decade it has frequently been the puppet master behind some 
stunning feats of international law enforcement.  Last year alone (2005), Interpol’s efforts 
led to 3,500 arrests, including the capture of one of the world’s most wanted war 
criminals and assailants in the Madrid train bombings and London subway attacks.142  
Interpol was created during World War I and is probably better known for chasing art 
thieves, but as it happens, Interpol is well suited to counter-terrorism work.   
 
 
Figure 18. Illustration of inputs, outputs, and outcomes. 
 
Interpol does not have secret agents, and it cannot make arrests; it is and always 
has been an investigative support network that collects, analyzes, and disseminates 
information to law-enforcement personnel in its member countries.143  During the past 5 
years, Interpol has gotten better at connecting the dots.  In 2002 it introduced a high-tech 
global police communications system (call I-24/7), which lets member countries instantly 
send alerts about terrorists, missing person, and various threats around the globe and 
                                                 
142 Rebecca Ulam Weiner, "To Protect and Serve the World,"Boston Globe, February 12, 2006; 
available from 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/02/12/to_protect_and_serve_the_world/. [cited 
April 19, 2006]. 
143 Ibid., 2. 
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provides access to databases containing millions of criminal records, DNS profiles, 
fingerprints, and intelligence reports.  Advances in technology have driven this process 
significantly, and the U.S. Government has been influenced and impressed enough to 
back a 50-percent increase in Interpol’s budget for the last 5 years.144  As an example, in 
December 2005, this system helped end a four-year manhunt for one of the world’s most 
wanted war criminals, the former Croatian Army General Ante Gotovina, who was 
captured at a luxury resort in the Canary Islands.  The database continues to grow as each 
of the 184 member countries continually adds new data.  The arrest of Gotovina is a 
tribute to this network of world police.  Additionally, Interpol created a Fusion Task 
Force in 2002 to identify active terrorists groups, share information and intelligence, 
provide analytical support, and enhance response to terrorist and criminal threats.  Input 
into this registry from member countries during the last five years has increased 400 
percent.145  The goal is similar for DNIN, to incorporate data from all IC and LE groups 
nationwide to grow a comprehensive intelligence database. 
Although it is difficult to extrapolate these numbers to DNIN and the 18,000 LE 
agencies within CONUS, the development of DNIN and effects in the sharing process 
should be nothing less than phenomenal in comparison to Interpol.  Why?  First, because 
DNIN is region to region, and a national database should be more easily accessible; thus, 
the structural differences between members of Interpol in terms of criminal justice 
procedures would be greatly minimized.  Second, systemic differences in culture and 
differing rules of criminal procedure utilized by multiple countries, which DNIN would 
not encounter to any moderate degree, would enhance success.  Third, cultural 
differences that influence policy, prevention, and enforcement priorities should be similar 
within the U.S. and, therefore, DNIN and should help to foster better success, likely at 
least threefold or more above the success Interpol has enjoyed.  Further, in a strategic 
sense, the influence of organizations would be greatly enhanced in the police and public 
security sector, and the repatriation of personnel from the regional centers of DNIN and 
 
144 Weiner, "To Protect and Serve the World." 
145 Ronald K. Noble, "Speech by Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble" (paper presented at the 
Americas Regional Workshop on Preventing Bioterrorism; Santiago Chile, July 10, 2006); available from 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/SGBioterrorism20060710.asp. [cited May 1, 2006 ]. 
. 
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the knowledge they have gained would improve the cosmopolitanization in key areas of 
their respective organizations and between other LE groups. 
6. Specific Action Plan 
The planning for terrorist attacks and other criminal activities spans countries, 
regions, and states.  Fighting such a network will require the same level of effort and 
cooperation among LE and intelligence agencies, which is becoming more significant 
with the rise in scale and sophistication of the adversary.  The principal roles and 
responsibilities of DNIN would therefore be: 
• Collection and dissemination of pertinent intelligence and information from 
the local to regional to national scale. 
• Analytical support. 
• Terrorist and organized crime146 identification, monitoring, and threat 
assessment. 
• Solicitation of input/output parameters and data storage for a national 
criminal/terrorist database. 
• Development of new strategies/initiatives to continually improve the process 
and enhance capacity of member agencies to address terrorist and other 
threats. 
Because terrorist and criminal groups have far-reaching activities and are 
inextricably linked via technology, DNIN members would investigate attacks, 
organizational hierarchies, training, financing, methods, motives, and other parameters. 
7. Budget  
The budget exhibited in Table 2 is based upon conversations with personnel at 
various state intelligence fusion centers throughout the U.S., including, but not limited to, 
the Virginia State Police Fusion Center, Arizona Fusion Center, LA TEW (Terrorist 
Early Warning), and Georgia Fusion Center.  The costs and staffing to run these facilities 
were extrapolated to a regional scope based upon economies of scale and the authors 
personal management experience as a Vice President and also as a Chief Technology 
Officer.  Initially it was estimated that costs for a regional center would be approximately 
 
146 Organized crime in this instance refers to drug smugglers and human traffickers across the border, 
and related groups. 
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$10 million.  Because of economic situations and personnel staffing, building costs are 
based on leasing rather than new construction, which makes it easier to select a location, 
obtain the best leasing rates, and focus on areas that may not be directly in an urban 
population center.  Because intelligence is a sensitive issue, Internet technology is based 
on best practices for a secure operating environment; therefore, connection from center to 
center and to a regional hub is via a point-to-point connection and access to the Internet 
from all regional centers is through the central hub (ideally located in Washington, D.C.). 
The budget is based on a conservative estimate.  Figures are from national 
averages for software site license agreements, salaries based upon state and Federal pay 
scales, as well as private sector rates.  Building costs for lease are based on an average of 
five of the regional center geographic locations (New York was excluded because lease 
space was more than twice the average of the other center locations, which include Los 
Angeles, Denver, Dallas, Chicago, and Atlanta).  The price for the SCIF (Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility) is based upon a real proposal for a 20 x 20 x 8 foot 
room that can be retrofitted to any leased or newly constructed building, is Tempest rated, 
and can be moved elsewhere if the facility relocates.  Actual costs are significantly less 
than initially estimated cost.  The cost for a central hub that the regional centers would be 
connected to is $23.4 million including personnel, equipment, and building costs.  
Considering one potential funding scenario, there are approximately 3,000 police 
agencies in each of the six regions.  A contribution of about $3,400 from each agency or 
municipality would fund each regional center.  An additional $10,000 from each of the 
18,000 police agencies across the U.S. would be required to fund the central hub.  
Although this funding scenario is unlikely, the relatively small funding contribution from 
each participating agency demonstrates how small the cost would be if spread across 
participants (this would be comparable to a cooperative).  The contribution of currently 
assigned personnel to the centers from various agencies would significantly reduce center 
staffing costs.  These Figures are relatively small compared to the derived benefits. 
8. Implementation (Leadership and Dissent) 
• Driving the Plan  
• Pilot Initiative – Build on Existing Types 
• Consider the Alternatives 
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The 9/11 attacks were declared the fault of poor intelligence due to lack of sharing 
key information.  In the five years since the attacks little has changed in the way of 
sharing.  The NCTC was established to share information throughout the U.S., but it is 
composed of Federal agencies and their representatives.  Despite the lack of LE 
cooperation with the IC overall, it is the information collected by LE that should drive 
this process because they are the greatest collectors of the needed information.  The IC, 
since it collects intelligence primarily from overseas, will likely add little to the overall 
intelligence collected within the U.S. and will deal with both terrorism and other crimes.  
Therefore, it is the need for the information that must drive the plan, especially since no 
one agency is large enough or has enough personnel to collect, manage, analyze, and 
disseminate the collected intelligence. 
 
Table 2. Regional Intelligence Center Annual Budget (includes LE component 
costs, not IC costs such as transaction space and so forth). 
Item Number Cost 


















Phone Services 403 1,000




1Space listed as total square feet. 
2These are based on national average of $1.35 per square foot for electricity and gas. 




An example of a pilot initiative would be the Arizona or Georgia intelligence 
“fusion” centers and perhaps the Los Angeles Police Department TEW.  The Arizona and 
Georgia fusion centers were established after the 9/11 attacks.  However, the TEW was 
actually created in 1996 due to monetary problems and because of the need to share 
information within an LE venue that could have an impact on fighting crime through 
pooling valuable resources.  DNIN would actually be an extension of these concepts, but 
on a much larger scale and more dynamic with greater capabilities.  The general goal is to 
create a regional interdisciplinary group in which local, state, and Federal agencies work 
together to share information and combine resources and to enhance the ability to identify 
and respond to terrorist threats.  Ideally, this interagency approach would allow early 
response and enforcement by strengthening communication between agencies and 
facilitating a sharing culture.  The result would be a strong and effective network with the 
ability to identify information that may indicate impending terrorist or other criminal 
activity, make appropriate notifications and recommendations, and aid in the planning 
and efficient allocation of resources.  As an analogy, it would function much like a large 
group of first responders to a very large disaster with a central command and control that 
could quickly and efficiently communicate the need for specific resources to specific 
events, on the fly as it were. 
The alternative to DNIN is to continue the current procedures of sharing 
information and intelligence between the IC and LE with the same old complaints and 
results.  These complaints have not changed since 9/11 with the main one being the 
failure of the IC to share information and LE citing a need-to-know.  However, because 
LE will collect most of the information in the DNIN model, it would make sense to 
empower that entity to share on a wider basis.  Doing so would create a need-to-share 
attitude and would essentially eliminate the cause of non-sharing with the federal groups 
since the greatest amount of information could be classified as law-enforcement sensitive 
rather than of a classified type.  Enforcement, crime prevention, and terrorism prevention 
are interrelated.  Consequently, if we are to avoid another 9/11-scale tragedy, we must 
opt for a better system that is networked and capable of delivering information in a timely 
manner to those who need it most. 
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The intelligence failures that led to 9/11 have plagued intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies since the attacks and long before them.  Despite attempts to reform, 
especially by the FBI, little progress has been made in sharing information across the 
Nation, which should be a cause for grave concern given the sophistication and 
capabilities of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  Sharing problems have caused police 
departments such as NYPD and LAPD to deploy their own operatives within the U.S. and 
overseas because they do not want to count on the national IC to provide results.  A 
networked-centric collection is the only way feasible for collecting the desired 
intelligence and sharing it among all agencies.  The sole purpose of DNIN would be to 
collect, analyze, and share this information from over 800,000 LE personnel and 18,000 
police departments within CONUS and thus dramatically extend collection capabilities an 
estimated hundredfold beyond what currently exists.  The strengths and opportunities of 
DNIN outweigh the weaknesses and can overcome the threats by protecting the homeland 
against terrorist attack, organized criminal activity, and other crimes or other hazards.  
This is especially true since utilizing mostly LE intelligence across the Nation, in 
conjunction with other gathered intelligence, threats from the IC, collection policy issues, 
and database problems, would be more easily overcome. 
The comparison of traditional methods of intelligence collection versus the 
networked approach of DNIN (Figure 17) illustrates the strong position and benefits of 
the latter.  Using Interpol as a benchmark DNIN would likely outperform that 
organization by several fold, which is significant since Interpol has become very efficient 
at connecting the dots and fostering cooperation among LE agencies in 184 member 
countries.  As a result, Interpol has made significant impacts on counter-terrorism, and it 
is believed that DNIN would parallel this, except at a higher capacity.  DNIN would 
collect and disseminate pertinent intelligence from the local/regional/national scale, 
provide analytical support, identify terrorist groups, solicit data for input into a unified 
database, and develop new strategies to enhance the capacity of member agencies to 
address terrorist and other threats. 
The two primary factors that would prevent DNIN from becoming operational 
would be the cost of the network and the leadership.  However, fusion centers such as 
those in Arizona and Georgia and also the TEW in Los Angeles have met with some 
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success, and while budgeting problems have arisen, the successes gained have overcome 
many funding issues.  Leadership of the network will be critical; it must be forward 
thinking and progressive, looking at what can be done rather that what has been done.  As 
for “buy in” by the IC, that may not be necessary since the DNIN would be primarily LE 
and therefore, under different authority and jurisdiction, and with the powers of arrest.  It 
is envisioned that the IC will come to DNIN and ask for their intelligence, which the FBI 
is now doing with NYPD’s mini-CIA group — ironic how sharing between the latter two 
groups has shifted.  Ultimately, the power of the DNIN should be able to overcome these 
issues and play a prominent role in intelligence collection and sharing within the U.S. 
 
C.   SUMMARY 
The strategy of DNIN is to overcome the problems generally associated with 
intelligence sharing as listed below and replacing these problems with the advantages. 
1. Problems 
• Scale – National 
• Cost 
• Stovepiping 
• Need-to-Know Attitude 
• Specific Agency Culture 
• Job Security 
2.  Advantages 
• Credible, Reliable, and Corroborative Information 
• Scrubbed Information 
• Need-to-Share Attitude 
• Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Agreements 
• Reputation 
• Relationship Building 
 
The principal roles and responsibilities of DNIN would therefore be to: 
• Collect and disseminate pertinent intelligence and information from the local 
to regional to national scale. 
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• Provide analytical support. 
• Provide terrorist and organized crime identification,147 monitoring, and threat 
assessment. 
• Solicit input/output parameters and data storage for a national 
criminal/terrorist database. 
• Development of new strategies/initiatives to continually improve the process 
and enhance capacity of member agencies to address terrorist and other 
threats. 
 
Because of its networked approach, DNIN would be able to collect more than a 
hundredfold more intelligence than separate IC agencies and its operational network 
principles would allow for proper analysis and dissemination of this information, which 
would make significant progress in intelligence and information sharing within the U.S. 
and reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks. 
 
147 Organized crime in this instance refers to drug smugglers and human traffickers across the border, 





























Terrorists do not recognize borders therefore the flow of information and 
intelligence must not either.  Additionally, terrorist planning, surveillance, movement and 
other activities will not all occur in one sector or discipline and because of our open 
democratic society, acts of terrorism will be more difficult to thwart.  A dedicated 
national intelligence network can help fuse the necessary components to gather the 
needed intelligence to assist in prevention.  The greatest challenge within the United 
States is achieving security and protecting civil liberties.  In certain respects, the greatest 
threat to the American people is how government efforts will restrict them in pursuit of 
homeland security.  The greatest threat for the government is not being able to connect 
the dots for that one large disaster such as 9/11.  How does the government avert another 
attack of this nature?  Within the U.S., two efforts are going on simultaneously regarding 
the war on terrorism.  There is the LE component, which is more interested in building 
cases for prosecution and there is the intelligence effort who is more interested in 
gathering long-term data and following the trail to expose a larger network before capture 
is attempted.  As has been illustrated, the intelligence services missed the 9/11 attack, 
causing a high price.  The primary failure was due to intelligence sharing, which rests 
upon the lack of relationships among the agencies and their respective personnel, lack of 
trust, cultural differences, and other factors. 
The same problems still exist in terms of sharing intelligence, but due to the large 
volumes of information, there is a critical need for LE and the IC to cooperate on a 
national scale.  A small version of Britain’s MI5 is insufficient for the U.S. due to the 
sheer scope of our intelligence collection problems, geographic areas, and the differing 
governmental structures between the two nations.  To overcome this problem, the 
proposed Dedicated National Intelligence Network (DNIN) will allow collection from 
over 800,000 LE personnel to be joined on a regional to a national level in cooperation 
with local, state and Federal agencies and with the IC to gather the critical data needed to 
protect society not only against terrorists, but against all types of organized crime.  The 
current existence of various state fusion centers and several other regional centers are not 
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sufficient to perform such a task due to poor integration within the IC, lack of a single 
governing authority, lack of training, and narrowly focused approach compared to the 
overall intelligence goals of DHS.  They also do not share with each other very well due 
to mutual trust issues, but more importantly, incompatible IT platforms, software issues, 
and other preventable technical issues.  However, such centers should and can be 
incorporated into DNIN. 
The objective of this thesis was to provide a dedicated, national-scale networked 
approach for gathering and sharing intelligence within the U.S. and the allied 
methodologies to demonstrate its application and evaluation within this area.  This thesis 
has demonstrated that, given its ability to identify, uncover, map, and measure the 
interrelationships within and between networks, the network approach offers an 
alternative approach and technique for information sharing, as well as having utility 
across a wide array of fields of interest.  The network approach offers considerable 
flexibility and agility in terms of the amount of information collected, level of analysis, 
level of study, the focus on links (patterns), and the ability to detect hidden threats that 
are not readily obvious.  In certain ways, the very strength of the network approach, i.e., 
versatility, flexibility, and multiplicity, can create problems in conceptualization and, 
therefore, limits in application.  This thesis draws out some of the key network 
methodological and analytical components to provide a basic framework to address 
network-centric intelligence sharing.  However, the DNIN will provide the key enabler 
that DHS Chief Intelligence Officer Mr. Allen spoke of in terms of a national collection 
and sharing architecture, improve the quality of intelligence analysis across DHS and 
participating agencies, increase overall intelligence production, promote integration of 
DHS intelligence, ensure the priorities of DHS within the IC, and increase analytic 
capabilities.  Additionally, DNIN will further strategic goals for border, maritime, anti- 
and counter-terrorism, and other security and intelligence issues. 
The question may also arise as to how current and future fusion centers can be 
incorporated into the DNIN.  The DNIN will ensure compliance and standardization on a 
national scale, which fusion centers do not have.  Although there are guidelines for fusion 
centers to follow, most are built based on stakeholder “buy in” and are thus, different in 
compliance standards and are not compatible with each other in many instances.  As most 
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of these may be considered legacy systems, at least current fusion centers, connecting 
them to the network will be a complex undertaking in regards to budget, coordination, 
standards, training, and restoration of the network from old to new, but it can be 
accomplished.  Assuming each fusion center has access to the Internet the major problem 
with incorporation is the intelligence and information within the fusion centers current 
database(s).  Database compatibility has plagued many intelligence collection and 
dissemination efforts, which is why DNIN will have a compatible database that all users 
will access based upon security level.  To incorporate a current fusion center will require 
that the center strip the data out of their database and send it to DNIN or, DNIN could 
extract the data (with permission) using a Web spider.  This data will then become part of 
the larger data stream.  Once the data from the fusion centers has been incorporated into 
the DNIN database, personnel at the center will always be able to access DNIN by 
connecting to any of the regional centers or the national center and retrieve whatever 
information they need and are cleared for (they should always be cleared for information 
they have forwarded to the center).  Security can be performed in a variety of ways.  A 
common method is termed 3-Factor ID that incorporates biometrics such as a finger print 
or iris scan, passwords, and a token fob (a physical key).  In lay terms this is known as 
“something I know, something I have, and something I am” (a password, token fob, and 
finger print respectively).  Thus, the process of incorporating a fusion center or any other 
intelligence facility is not as difficult as some would indicate, nor is security. 
There are those who may consider such incorporation very difficult if not 
impossible, however, the U.S. Navy, prior to the advent of the Internet, ran a program 
called OSIS (Ocean Surveillance Information System.  This system of intelligence 
collection and analysis had five to six centers that used teletypes and secure-line 
communications.  OSIS worked exceptionally well because it had standards and followed 
specific compliance rules.  The goal behind DNIN is to operate similarly, but with much 
increased technology. 
It has been shown that society, on a global basis, has entered into an era of 
networks, and Al Qaeda was among the first to utilize network operational principles.  It 
is therefore likely that the network concept will continue to have an increased impact 
across many areas of endeavor for either positive or negative purposes.  Networking 
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principles are being brought into play to solve a wide array of social and public problems 
as well as to generate innovation and profitability.  Network analysis, with its distinctive 
processes and focus on relationships between nodes (people, places, or groups/agencies), 
provides an appropriate mechanism with which to wage the war against terrorism and 
organized criminal activity within the United States.  Rather than being based on trendy 
terminology, shallow methodologies and processes, or limited theory, the network 
approach presents new evaluation tools and processes for those charged with the 
formation, administration, and evaluation of networked groups that is grounded in 
science.  Networking of intelligence sharing within the U.S. offers the potential for a 
comprehensive, integrative, interdisciplinary/multi-agency approach that enables analysts 
and administrators to formulate and work on problems using a common language, 
analytical framework, and theoretical basis.  The DNIN will be agile like our enemies and 
thus, able to respond very quickly.  It will also ensure the priority capabilities of DHS and 
other IC members for communications at any security level, ensure collaboration and 
analysis because of its ability to support, search, and interactively share with all 
participants, and ensure rapid information collection and analysis from a large variety of 
sources whether criminal or terrorist activity, critical infrastructure protection, mapping 
and imaging, OSINT, media studies and analysis, or others.  Finally, DNIN will focus 
more resources on combating terrorism and criminal activities, leverage LE and other 
state, local, and tribal resources, and more importantly, perform secure, real-time 
collaboration, information sharing, and analysis on a national scale. 
 
B. FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The 9/11 Commission argued for intelligence-sharing reform and for a single 
intelligence czar among its many recommendations so that one single agency does not 
have all the powers.  Unfortunately, the commission did not specifically address the 
bloated bureaucracy of the 16 intelligence agencies and the cultural differences between 
them and also the LE groups throughout the U.S. What is needed is not more intelligence 
bureaucracy, but a streamlining and perhaps privatization of intelligence collection and 
processing.  Only through a network-centric approach, such as that presented, can 
intelligence information be streamlined and rapidly disseminated to those who need it.  
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The mere creation of newer intelligence agencies and officials ignores the basic and 
fundamental problems that include (1) timely collection and analysis; (2) recognition of 
that one tidbit of information in context with many other tidbits that becomes actionable; 
and (3) dissemination of critical information on a need-to-share rather than a need-to-
know basis. 
Any revamping of the U.S. IC must include a serious examination of the U.S. 
Congress’s role in intelligence failures.  After all, no organization can be any better than 
those giving it guidance — this includes not only the President, but Congress as well.  An 
example of this is the mandate given by Congress for the Department of Homeland 
Security’s office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to collect 
domestic intelligence in the U.S. into one place.  Almost at the same time, the President 
created what eventually became the NCTC of which DHS IAIP was not a part.  While the 
IAIP has since been split in two parts, the major failure in this case is that Congress did 
not give DHS IAIP oversight authority to carry out its mission.  Further, while the 
mechanism (IAIP) was created to help expedite sharing by Congress, it was immediately 
thwarted by the President through creation of the NCTC.  Congress has refused to 
reorganize itself to provide better oversight of the executive branch’s anti- and counter-
terrorism activities.  Further, while there are many components the comprise intelligence 
sharing and many reasons offered about why it does not work, there are three primary 
reasons that cause intelligence sharing failure.  These include agency culture, security 
clearances, and ownership.  This thesis has proposed that DHS IA take ownership of this 
network.  They have the resources and the Congressional mandate.  Additionally, they 
could also become a clearing house for security clearances on an IC-wide basis, which 
would greatly improve sharing among the IC and LE. 
A networked approach for extracting actionable intelligence for the overwhelming 
volumes of information that is available is necessary.  Counter-terrorism exercises are 
necessary between both the LE and IC entities because they are the only means, other 
than an actual attack, to uncover problems associated with prevention and response.  
While there have been exercises, each one has revealed recurring problems.  The 
recurring problems are in communications, which is the key to effective response in 
preventing an attack or to the aftermath of either an attack or disaster.  The two best 
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examples of this are the 9/11 attacks and hurricane Katrina, which struck New Orleans, 
Louisiana in the fall of 2005.  In each case, government communications have had 
significant problems.  This failure in communication represents the epitome of the 
continued lack of information sharing and explains to a large extent the problems with 
coordination among different governmental agencies and levels within them, particularly 
the CIA and FBI.  The outcome has been lack of sharing, coordination, lack of unity of 
command, and the transfer of tactical and other critical information up and down the 
chain of command.  Perhaps the real lesson learned is that bloated, ponderous 
government bureaucracies frustrate the rapid decisiveness and responsiveness necessary 
for intelligence analysis, information dissemination, and response to terrorist attacks and 
other hazards.  Such a system cannot thwart the asymmetric warfare principles of terrorist 
and organized criminal groups.  A network-centric approach, such as that outlined in this 
thesis, DNIN, can.  However, regardless of the implementation, methodology, or process 
used to link agencies and share intelligence, ultimately, personnel are the key asset.  The 
human factor is the most essential and cannot be replaced.  The better trained the 
personnel are, the better the intelligence will be.    
 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES 
Network approaches for sharing intelligence can grow in many areas of research, 
and there are several problems that will likely plague network analysis.  One particular 
area is the construction of an accurate map of a criminal network, which the analyst must 
face.  Three areas can cause problems with this construction.  First, there will be the 
inevitability of missing nodes and links that will not be uncovered.  Second, there is the 
difficulty of deciding who to include and who to exclude, what is termed fuzzy 
boundaries.  Third, networks, whether terrorist, computer, energy, or other is dynamic 
and ever changing.  The question becomes how to deal with this problem.  Additional 
research issues should include a systematic, comparative analysis of the system 
representation of terrorist behaviors and their analogies to other complex systems for 
which network theory has successfully provided insights into system dynamics.  Further, 
the development of a simulation model for terrorist group behaviors would be ideal, 
tested against case studies, for future predictions to help mitigate threats.  Regardless of 
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the research in question, it should be remembered that simply removing the leader of a 
group will be of little value regardless of the strength of the relationship of the leader to 
the group.  Another critical priority is how to train an adequate number of skilled 
intelligence analysts.  This training is a worthy and compelling undertaking that will help 
ensure success of the IC.  A blended learning approach utilizing network-based learning 
via the Internet, as well as in-class instructors and other technology can help reduce 
training costs and likely increase efficiency and perhaps economy of scale.  However, 
training is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The issue of security clearances also needs to 
be addressed.  Because almost all IC agencies and LE use the DoD security-clearance 
model, the establishment of a clearing house to issue clearances should be studied in 
depth.  Perhaps it would be advantageous for DHS IA to be that clearing house, which 
could be staffed by personnel from a variety of agencies much like the NCTC.  In this 
manner input from all agencies would assist in developing guidelines that would satisfy 
all stakeholders so that those cleared could access information as needed.  This would 
create a need-to-share rather than a need-to-know culture. 
One final area should be considered for future research — good management 
practices.  As with knowledge management, personnel management may be more critical 
since the network, in its simplest form, relies on the human factor.  This is especially true 
due to the institutional knowledge drain (loss of experienced personnel due to retirement 
and unwillingness to serve in Washington, D.C. due to cost and other factors) that is 
befalling almost all agencies in the Federal government.  An example of this would be the 
national search for the new FEMA director with extensive emergency-management 
experience due to failures exhibited by former Director Mike Brown during hurricane 
Katrina; the new Director, R. David Paulison, has 30 years of firefighting experience.148  
The DHS has not been guiltless in this area either, i.e., exhibiting poor management and 
hiring practices that fail to meet the necessary requirements and qualifications e.g., the 
new U.S. ICE Director, Julie Myers.  During her nomination hearing, Sen. George V. 
Voinovich (R-Ohio) stated that Myers’ résumé indicated she was not qualified for the 
 
148 CBS News, "Bush Nominates New Fema Director: President Taps Acting Director, R. David 
Paulison, a 30-Year Firefighter," CBSNews.com, April 6, 2006; available from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/06/katrina/main1480711.shtml. [cited July 23, 2006]. 
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job.149  Despite this public acknowledgement Myers won her appointment.  The 
appointments for Paulison and Myers are in direct contrast — Paulison was chosen due to 
the catastrophic events of hurricane Katrina and because politicians were lambasted for 
disaster response during hurricane Katrina thus due to public and political pressure, an 
experienced candidate was sought (Paulison).  Myers appointment appears to be politics 
as usual and exhibits further poor management and hiring judgment.  It is likely that a 
catastrophic event affecting ICE will result in the same consequences that befell FEMA 
during hurricane Katrina.  Hiring experienced professionals should be mandated.  Current 
hiring practices that place inexperienced staffers in significant positions of authority 
(Myers as an example) does not progress the goals of homeland security nor does hiring 
“Hollywood Types” who utilize scenarios from the television series “24” for creativity.  
A lack of imagination still plaques HS decision makers.  While we should be open and 
embrace diverse input from every stakeholder, there is no substitute for substantial or 
lifelong experience.  Unlike corporate America, HS is not an industry where a mistake 
can be rectified easily.  A poor decision within HS can have fatal and national security 
implications, which hurricane Katrina exemplifies.  To many, especially the taxpaying 
citizen, as well as experienced DHS managers, these practices are laughable.  Such 
practices will accomplish little for improving overall management and building a strong, 
cooperative, and collaborative coalition for intelligence or homeland security.  This issue 
is highlighted by a recent discussion with a young, creative, HS staffer.  As we discussed 
the issues regarding technology and the human component within HS, the staffer was 
baffled when asked how this technology could work with the discussed HS aspects.  
Further explanation to the staffer about various existing possibilities and solutions were 
replaced with a look of excitement.  The discussion with the staffer revealed that 
inexperience and lack of maturity within HS can not be replaced by working long hours 
and/or serving in a position of responsibility for which formal experience is clearly 
lacking.  The costs of living and working in Washington, D.C. does not outweigh the 
responsibility of DHS and other agencies to hire the experienced, the very best, and the 
brightest to fill critical management positions.  Our lack of imagination was an impetus 
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on the 9/11 attacks and response to hurricane Katrina.  We reacted by creating a new tool 
for the GWOT, The Patriot Act.  This new legislation streamlined procedures for LE to 
accomplish tasks that were not probable due to prior rules of conduct; perhaps the same 
should be investigated within Federal government management hiring policies.  Simply 
stated, a new threat occupies our comfort zone and the rules of engagement must change.  
This would include modifying Federal agency hiring regulations to promote those who 
may not be within the grade level required by the current position, increased pay, other 
issues and the critical need for such positions.  This is a very serious issue and should be 
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